Here are some of the questions I am currently interested in:

  • Are we responsible for our beliefs? In what circumstances are we to be blamed for having false or irrational beliefs? 
  • How does a psychiatric diagnosis affect personal narratives of mental health service users? In particular, does it change the way they experience and describe their agency?
  • What is the best account of the demarcation between mental health and mental illness? In particular, what distinguishes pathological from non-pathological cognitions?
  • What is the best psychological theory of delusion formation? Can the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory be reconciled? 
  • Are positive illusions and unrealistic optimism good or bad for us? Do they increase wellbeing? Do they support agency? In which circumstances are they detrimental?

Here are some of the papers I am working on:
  • Bortolotti. Stranger than fiction: costs and benefits of confabulatory explanations.
  • L Bortolotti. Unrealistic optimism and agency.
  • L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett and M Antrobus. Are self-enhancing beliefs epistemically innocent?
  • K Puddifoot and L Bortolotti. Epistemic innocence of memory mechanisms.
  • L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett. Choice blindness and confabulation.
  • L Bortolotti. What delusions teach us about the epistemology of belief.
  • A Polonioli and L Bortolotti. Is it rational to be polite in conversation?

Follow the links below for a list of already published outputs: