Papers

In preparation

  • Bortolotti. Stranger than fiction: costs and benefits of confabulatory explanations.
  • L Bortolotti. Unrealistic optimism and agency.
  • L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett and M Antrobus. Are self-enhancing beliefs epistemically innocent?
  • K Puddifoot and L Bortolotti. Epistemic innocence of memory mechanisms.
  • L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett. Responsibility and choice blindness.
  • L Bortolotti. What delusions teach us about the epistemology of belief.

Journal articles

  1. L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (forthcoming). Epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions. Mind & Language.
  2. A Jefferson, L Bortolotti and B Kuzmanovic (2017). What is unrealistic optimism?  Consciousness & Cognition 50, 3-11. DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2016.10.005.
  3. M Antrobus and L Bortolotti (2016). Depressive delusions. Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2), 192-201. DOI 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.14.
  4. L Bortolotti and A Jefferson (2016). Moral preferencesSociety 53 (3), 269-272DOI 10.1007/s12115-016-0027-3.
  5. L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2016). The ethics of delusional beliefErkenntnis, 81 (2), 275-296. DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9739-9.
  6. L Bortolotti (2016). The epistemic benefits of elaborated and systematised delusions in schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3), 879-900. DOI 10.1093/bjps/axv024.
  7. L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2015). Recent work on the nature and the development of delusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9), 636-645. DOI 10.1111/phc3.12249. 
  8. K Miyazono and L Bortolotti (2015). The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusionsAvant V (3), 30-50.
  9. L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2015). Are alien thoughts beliefs? (Commentary on Jordi Fernandez’s Transparent Minds). Teorema 34 (1), 135-148.
  10. L Bortolotti and M Antrobus (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimismCurrent Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2), 194-198.
  11. L Bortolotti (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusionsConsciousness & Cognition 33, 490-499.
  12. L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Costs and benefits of imperfect cognitionsConsciousness & Cognition 33, 487-489.
  13. B Fulford, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric ScienceWorld Psychiatry 13 (2), 110-117.
  14. L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2014). Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik caseNeuroethics 7 (3), 377-382. doi 10.1007/s12152-013-9198-4
  15. L Bortolotti (2013). The relative importance of undesirable truthsMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4), 683-690. 
  16. L Bortolotti and M Broome (2012). Affective dimensions of the phenomenon of double bookkeeping in delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2), 187-191.
  17. L Bortolotti (2012). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1), 1-4. 
  18. L Bortolotti (2012). In defence of modest doxasticism about delusionsNeuroethics 5 (1), 39-53. 
  19. L Bortolotti and M Mameli (2012). Self-deception, delusion and the boundaries of folk psychologyHumana.Mente 20, 203–221.
  20. L Bortolotti, R Cox and A Barnier (2012). Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1), 109-131. 
  21. L Bortolotti (2011). Does reflection lead to wise choices? Philosophical Explorations 14 (3), 297-313.
  22. L Bortolotti and H Widdows (2011). The right not to know: the case of psychiatric disordersJournal of Medical Ethics 37, 673-676.
  23. L Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the bedrockPhilosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 18 (1), 77-87.
  24. L Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric classification and diagnosis. Delusions and confabulations. Paradigmi XXXIX (1), 99-112. 
  25. A Wright and L Bortolotti (2011). Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10), 6-18 (special issue on 'Pain and the Experience of Pain: Theoretical Models and Practical Implications'). 
  26. L Bortolotti and L Malatesti (2010). Conceptual challenges in the characterisation and explanation of psychiatric phenomena. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1), 5-10 (special issue on 'Classification and Explanation in Psychiatry: Philosophical Issues'). 
  27. M Broome, M Mameli and L Bortolotti (2010). Moral responsibility and mental illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2), 179-187. 
  28. M Broome and L Bortolotti (2010). What's wrong with 'mental' disorders? Commentary on D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V". Psychological Medicine 40 (11): 1783 -1785. 
  29. A Blasimme and L Bortolotti (2010). Intentionality and the welfare of minded non-humans. Teorema XXIX (2), 83-96. 
  30. L Bortolotti (2010). Agency, life extension, and the meaning of life. The Monist 93(1), 38-56. PDF
  31. D Cutas and L Bortolotti (2010). Natural versus assisted reproduction. In search of fairness. Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4(1), 1-18. 
  32. L Bortolotti and M Broome (2009). A role for ownership and authorship of thoughts in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2), 205-224.
  33. M Broome and L Bortolotti (2009). Mental illness and mental: In defence of psychological realism. HumanaMente 11, 25-44. 
  34. L Bortolotti (2009). The epistemic benefits of reason giving. Theory & Psychology 19 (5), 1-22. 
  35. L Bortolotti and R Cox (2009). 'Faultless ignorance': strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (4), 952-965. 
  36. L Bortolotti and D Cutas (2009). Reproductive and parental autonomy: an argument for compulsory parental education. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 19 (1st July), 5-14. PDF.
  37. L Bortolotti and Y Nagasawa (2009). Immortality without boredom. Ratio XXII (3), 261-277. 
  38. L Bortolotti and M Broome (2008). Delusional beliefs and reason giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6), 801-821. 
  39. L Bortolotti (2008). What does Fido believe? Think 7 (19), 1-9. 
  40. S Camporesi and L Bortolotti (2008). Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances? Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (9), e15. 
  41. L Bortolotti and M Broome (2007). If you didn't care, you wouldn't notice: recognition and estrangement in psychopathology. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 14 (1), 39-42. 
  42. L Bortolotti and B Heinrichs (2007). Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3), 157-179. 
  43. S Holm and L Bortolotti (2007). Large scale survey for policy formation and research - a study in inconsistency. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3), 205-220. 
  44. L Bortolotti (2007). Disputes over moral status: philosophy and science in the future of bioethics. Health Care Analysis 15(2), 153-158. 
  45. L Bortolotti and M Mameli (2006). Deception in psychology: moral costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledge. Accountability in Research 13 (3), 259-275. 
  46. M Mameli and L Bortolotti (2006). Animal rights, animal minds and human mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32, 84-89.  
  47. L Bortolotti (2006). Moral rights and human culture. Ethical Perspectives 13 (4), 603-622.  
  48. L Bortolotti and J Harris (2006). Embryos and eagles: symbolic value in research and reproduction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (1), 22-34. 
  49. L Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality without rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CV (3), 385-392. 
  50. L Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind & Language 20 (2), 189-208.  
  51. J Harris, L Irving and L Bortolotti (2005). An ethical framework for stem cell research in the European Union. Health Care Analysis 13 (3), 157-162. 
  52. L Bortolotti and J Harris (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10 (1), 68-75. 
  53. L Bortolotti (2004). Can we interpret irrational behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2), 359-375.  
  54. L Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation. Philosophical Explorations VI (2), 109-123.  

Book chapters

  1. L Bortolotti and K Puddifoot. Philosophy, bias, and stigma. Forthcoming in Why Philosophy?
  2. E Sullivan-Bissett and L Bortolotti (2016). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In E Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
  3. L Bortolotti and R Gunn (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
  4. L Bortolotti, R Gunn and E Sullivan-Bissett (2017). What makes a belief delusional? In I Mac Carthy, K Sellevold and O Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda (chapter 3).
  5. E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2016). Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In G Keil, L Keuck and R Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry (chapter 10). Oxford University Press (see PDF below).
  6. L Bortolotti (2014). The vulnerability approach to animal ethics. In A Ferrari and K Petrus (eds.) Lexikon der Mensch/Tier-Beziehungen (Handbook of Humans-Animals Relationships). Transcript Verlag.
  7. J Craigie and L Bortolotti (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J Z Sadler, B Fulford, C W van Staden (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
  8. N Sabbarton-Leary, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Natural and Para-natural Kinds in Psychiatry. In P Zachar, DS Stoyanov, M Aragona, A Jablensky (eds.) Alternative Perspectives in Psychiatric Validation. Oxford University Press, 76-93.
  9. K Miyazono, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: competitors or allies? In N Galbraith (ed.) Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press, 34-54.
  10. L Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity: The role of rationality judgements in understanding psychiatric disorders (chapter 30). In B Fulford, M Davies, R Gipps, G Graham, J Sadler, G Stanghellini, T Thornton (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, 480-496.
  11. L Bortolotti, M Mameli and A Blasimme (2013). Sentience, Moral Relevance of. In H LaFollette (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
  12. A Blasimme, C Sandis and L Bortolotti (2013). Two approaches to animal ethics and the case of great apes. In K Petrus and M Wild (eds.) Animal Minds and Animal Ethics (chapter 11). Transcript Verlag.
  13. L Bortolotti, R Cox, M Broome and M Mameli (2012). Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: implications for autonomy as self-governance. In L Radoilska (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press, chapter 5, 100-122.
  14. M Broome, J Dale, C Marriott, C Merino and L Bortolotti (2012). Neuroscience, continua and the prodromal phase of psychosis. In S Borgwardt, P Fusar-Poli and P McGuire (eds.) Vulnerability to Psychosis: From Neurosciences to Psychopathology. Psychology Press, 3-21. Draft
  15. L Bortolotti (2011). The concept of scientific research. In C Romeo Casabona (ed.) Los nuevos horizontes de la investigación genética. Comares, Bilbao-Granada, Spain.
  16. L Bortolotti (2010). Double bookkeeping in delusions: explaining the gap between saying and doing. In K Frankish, A Buckareff and J Aguilar (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave (chapter 11). 
  17. L Bortolotti (2010). Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons? In Hayry, Takala and Herissone-Kelly (eds.) Argument and Analysis in Bioethics. Rodopi, 241-248. 
  18. L Bortolotti and M Broome (2009). The future of scientific psychiatry. In Broome and Bortolotti (eds.) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 365-376. 
  19. M Broome and L Bortolotti (2009). Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: an overview. In Broome and Bortolotti (eds.) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 1-12. 
  20. L Bortolotti (2009). Delusion. In E Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised and updated in September 2013.
  21. L Bortolotti (2009). Do we have an obligation to make smarter babies? In T Takala, P Herrisone-Kelly, S Holm (eds.) Cutting through the Surface: Philosophical Approaches to BioethicsRodopi, 221-230. 
  22. L Bortolotti and J Harris (2006). Disability, enhancement and the harm-benefit continuum. In J Spencer and A Pedain (eds.) Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice. Hart Publisher, 31-49. 
  23. L Bortolotti (2002). Marks of Irrationality. In T Lyons and S Clarke (eds.) Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, Kluwer, 157-174.

Review articles
  • L Bortolotti and R Gunn (2016). Review of “Measure in Madness” by Phil Gerrans. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 919-923. 
  • E Sullivan-Bissett and L Bortolotti (2014). Review of “New Essays on Belief” ed. by Nikolaj Nottelmann. Dialectica 68 (1): 141–146.
  • L Bortolotti (2012). Review of “Self Comes to Mind” by Antonio Damasio, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 17 (2).
  • L Bortolotti (2009). Review of “Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality” by Mark Okrent, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23(1): 113–115.
  • L Bortolotti (2009). Review of “Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science” by Rachel Cooper, Mind 118 (469): 163–166.
  • L Bortolotti (2009). Review of “Neurophilosophy at Work” by Paul Churchland, Analysis Review 69 (1): 176–178.
  • L Bortolotti (2009). Review of “Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood” by Simon Evnine, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 349.
  • L Bortolotti (2008). Review of “Rationality and Compulsion: Applying Action Theory to Psychiatry” by Lennart Nordebfelt, British Journal of Psychiatry 192(3): 238.
  • L Bortolotti (2008). Review of “Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry” by Tim Thornton, British Journal of Psychiatry 193: 262.
  • L Bortolotti (2007). Review of “The Case against Perfection” by Michael Sandel, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29 (3): 378–379.
  • L Bortolotti (2006). Review of “Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative” by James Stacey Taylor, Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225), 627-629.
  • L Bortolotti (2002). Review of “Functions in Mind: a Theory of Intentional Content” by Carolyn Price, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 380–381.
  • L Bortolotti (2002). Review of “Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attributions” by Denis Fisette, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2): 247–248.
  • L Bortolotti (2002). Review of “Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World” by Gerd Gigerenzer, Human Nature Review (2): 548–550.

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