Lisa Anouliès

Assistant professor / Maître de conférences

RITM, Université Paris-Saclay

Current and past positions

2013 - ... Assistant professor - RITM, Université Paris-Saclay

2012 - 2013 Temporary lecturer - Université Paris 1

2009 - 2012 Doctoral fellowship - Sciences Po

2005 - 2009 Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan full fellowship

Education

2008 - 2012 PhD in Economics - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Department of Economics

Title: Trade and environment: policy responses

Jury: Gabriel Felbermayr (referee), Mouezz Fodha, Philippe Martin (advisor), Thierry Mayer (president), Katheline Schubert (referee), Laurence Tubiana

2006 - 2008 M. Sc in International Economics - Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1, ENS Cachan

2005 - 2006 BA in Economics - Université Paris 1, ENS Cachan

2005 - 2009 Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan (economics and management department)

Teaching

Université Paris-Saclay:

2013-... Microeconomics (3rd year undergraduate, Economics)

2014, 2017-... Environmental economics (3rd year undergraduate, Economics)

2018-2020 Macroeconomics (2nd year undergraduate, Economics)

2016-2019 Economics of Sustainable Development (2nd year Master in Economics)

2013-2018 Introduction to economics (1st year undergraduate, Law)

Teaching assistant from 2008 to 2013 at Université Paris 1 (microeconomics 1st year undergraduate, macroeconomics 2nd year undergraduate, macroeconomics 3rd year undergraduate, international trade 3rd year undergraduate) and Sciences Po (macroeconomics and microeconomics 1st year undergraduate)

Research

Topics International trade, environmental policies, applied microeconomics

Publications

• Anouliès, L. (2017), Heterogeneous firms and the environment: a cap-and-trade program. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 84, July 2017, Pages 84-101

Currently, cap-and-trade programs are a cornerstone of many countries' climate change policies and proposals. This paper investigates the economic and environmental effects of different climate change policy designs in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. The analysis predicts that the cap on emissions perfectly defines the environmental quality but has no effect on firms' profits, or decisions to enter or exit the market. In contrast, increasing the share of free allocations of emissions allowances, as opposed to auctions, has no effect on environmental quality but reallocates resources among firms toward the most productive ones which has an impact on firms' entry and exit decisions, the mass of firms, and the composition of the market. Firm heterogeneity magnifies these economic effects of changes in the initial allocation of allowances. The paper provides a decomposition of the change in aggregate emissions which takes account of the changes at sector level, across the firms within a sector, and at the firm level.

Article - Working paper (FAERE Working Paper, 2015.10) (2015 version of the paper)

• Anouliès, L. (2016), Are trade integration and the environment in conflict? The decisive role of countries' strategic interactions. International Economics, 148: 1-15.

Are trade integration and the environment in conflict? I address this controversial issue in a framework of intra-industry trade of a differentiated good produced by firms in monopolistic competition who choose to enter into a market and whose activity pollutes. Two mechanisms are at work in the model: first, unilaterally strengthening a national environmental policy leads to firm relocations. Second, trade integration makes firms more sensitive to any difference in environmental policy between countries. The model then predicts that the non-cooperative environmental regulation is too strict with regard to local pollution and too lax with regard to global pollution and that trade integration reinforces the incentives to strategically use this instrument. As a result, trade integration, which has no direct effect on the environment, generates less local pollution but more global pollution through the environmental policy response it triggers. These effects can be decomposed into a technique effect and a scale effect operating both at the extensive and the intensive margins, highlighting the decisive role of strategic interactions between countries and of firms' decisions.

Article - Latest working paper version (May 2016)

• Anouliès, L. (2015), The Strategic and Effective Dimensions of the Border Tax Adjustment. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17: 824-847.

Between 2001 and 2011 the Kyoto Protocol has experienced defections of two countries which took part in its negotiation and accounted for around 44% of all parties' emissions. The border tax adjustment, a tax levied on imports to reproduce domestic taxation on similar goods, is advocated to prevent such compliance failures as well as to support unilateral pollution regulations by mitigating firms' competitiveness losses and carbon leakages. The paper investigates whether this trade instrument can constitute a decentralized solution to achieve the first-best in a non-cooperative framework. It develops a two-country two-firm reciprocal-market model of trade with global pollution and country heterogeneity. Countries interactions are studied following a non-cooperative game theory approach, for two scenarios defined by the possibility to implement a border tax adjustment to sanction unilateral deviation from the cooperative situation. The paper predicts first that this opportunity modifies the countries' choices of strategies towards more compliance; second that among the strategic and effective dimensions of the border tax adjustment, only the former allows to achieve the first-best; finally that the border tax adjustment fosters countries' participation to the cooperative international environmental agreement.

Article - Latest working paper version (August 2014)

University service

In charge of the undergraduate double degree in Economics and Mathematics of the Université Paris-Saclay for the Economics department, in coordination with the Mathematics department, 2016-2021

Member of the Commission Consultative de l'Université Paris-Saclay (CCUPS) for the economics and management sections, since 2013

Member of the faculty recruiting committees at Université Paris-Sud in 2014 and Université Paris-Est Créteil in 2016