) Case No. 10C1436

) Div. 6 v. )


Jury Trial Demanded




Comes now the plaintiff Bret D Landrith appearing pro se and makes the following answer to defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s Motion to Dismiss. The plaintiff is simultaneously filing his Second Motion to Amend the Petition to correct any of the defendants’ alleged pleading deficiencies that may be valid.


The plaintiff sold the last of the proceeds from his marital property to travel to Tampa, Florida to look for work. He was not able to get work even out of state and even in non practice of law employment because of the defendants’ misconduct described in the First Amended Complaint.

The defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI came to Kansas from Florida for an above living wage job and joined in the defendants’ misconduct and now continues the defendants’ intentional misrepresentation of the law regarding the plaintiff’s standing for civil rights relief to be able to work again and support his family. The purpose of SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s participation in this conduct is to obstruct justice and conceal the felony kidnapping of Baby C.

The defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI now has a moral duty to resign his position with the Kansas SRS and return any salary he received from the state.


1. The plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference arguments made in opposition to the defendants’ BOB CORKINS SRS CHIEF COUNSEL, STANTON A. HAZLETT, motions to dismiss prospective injunctive relief claims and DON JORDAN FORMER SECRETARY OF SRS, JOHN BADGER FORMER CHIEF COUNSEL, YOUNG WILLIAMS PC and BRIAN FROST motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages.

2. The bulk of the defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s Motion to Dismiss erroneously addresses damages claims for past conduct made against the other defendants and not the prospective injunctive relief the First Amended Petition seeks against SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI.

3. After the plaintiff filed his initial and after filing the First Amended Complaint, SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI attempted to affirmatively withdraw himself from the continuing misconduct of the conspirators described in the complaint by not continuing the prosecution in his name of the plaintiff for child support where the record clearly shows in personam jurisdiction was not obtained by the trial court and the Office of the Secretary of the SRS had notice no service of process under the Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure had been obtained. See Letter to Secretary of SRS Exb. 1.

4. The attempted affirmative withdraw from participating in the conduct of the defendant conspirators was by his agent C. William Ossmann and the agent/ co-conspirator defendant YOUNG WILLIAMS, PC and further injured the plaintiff and his children, including the deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest to parent his children in violation of the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution protected through the Fourteenth Amendment. See emails between Ossmann and Landrith on Pittsburg, KS hearing Exb. 2

5. After the plaintiff filed his initial and after filing the First Amended Complaint, SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s agents with SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI notice and knowledge, violated the fundamental liberty interest to reside in Burlington, Kansas in violation of the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution protected through the Fourteenth Amendment and violated the plaintiff’s right to enjoy federally subsidized housing benefits the plaintiff was eligible for. See Contested Notice of


Change of Address Exb. 3 and Letter Exb. 4. 6. The SRS under SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s control is still participating in the deprivation of effective counsel to vindicate the rights of natural parents seeking to protect their children from rape, battery and kidnapping through the repeated frauds on State of Kansas Courts by SRS contractors and agents under the supervision of SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI and BOB CORKINS SRS CHIEF COUNSEL, including the deprivation of effective counsel for Valerie Rosproy where she was denied a post taking hearing and even where SRS attorneys refused to corruptly pursue Valerie Rosproy for child support after taking her children through extrinsic fraud (like the taking of the plaintiff’s former client David M. Price’s 17 year old daughter through repeated frauds) in recognition of the outrageous and shocking denial of Due Process. 7. The SRS under SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s control is still participating in the withholding of exculpatory evidence that would have prevented the plaintiff from being disbarred and likely resulted in the criminal prosecution of SRS employees for aiding and abetting kidnapping and felony violations of 18 USC §§ 242, 242 and 245, solely to further the defendant conspirators’ unlawful interest in the deprivation of effective counsel to vindicate the rights of natural parents. See Exb. 5 Transcript of testimony of C. William Ossmann, SRS Chief of Litigation refusing to produce the The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children documents the private for profit Adoption attorney Austin K. Vincent Sup. Ct. Lic. # 11423 used to fraudulently misrepresent and conceal that Baby C1 had been taken out of state before the termination of parental rights and placed in the Colorado for adoptive parents’ home.


The plaintiff need not allege or prove past violations of 42 USC 1983 in order to obtain injunctive relief against SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI. The Motion to Dismiss concerns itself with claims made against other defendants and not SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI.

Instead, a plaintiff must make a showing of "irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a likelihood

1 The plaintiff’s former client David M. Price’s infant son found by the Shawnee District Court to be American Indian.


of substantial and immediate irreparable injury." Id. (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). See also, Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F.Supp. 317 (E.D.Va.1995) (holding that a plaintiff will be precluded from obtaining injunctive relief based upon past injuries and instead must show that he faces a "threat of present or future harm").

The First Amended Petition alleges in detail continuing retaliation for advocacy as an attorney on behalf the African American James L. Bolden and the American Indian infant son of David M. Price through his father under 42 USC § 1981 and the Indian Child Welfare Act racial discrimination protection federal civil rights statutes. It is beyond refute that advocating on behalf of a member of a protected class in opposition to federal civil rights prohibited racial discrimination is a protected activity. The defendants know from the plaintiff’s pleadings and oral arguments that the Kansas District Court case they cite has been over ruled on the issue of whether a white person has standing to assert race base discrimination because of his association with or advocacy on behalf of members of a racial minority or other protected class.

“The district court held that discrimination on the basis of association with a particular racial group does not state a cause of action under Section 1981. Rather, the district court held that a Section 1981 claim must allege discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis of his race.

We agree with plaintiff that the district court erred in its analysis. As this court and other circuits have held, alleged discrimination against a white person because of his association with blacks may state a cause of action under Section 1981. See, e.g., Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir.1988) (white employee who alleged that he was terminated for assisting black employee could maintain Section 1981 action); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir.1986) (white plaintiff discriminated against because of marriage to a non- white could maintain a claim under Section 1981); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890 (11th Cir.1986) (same); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir.1980) (Section 1981 held to prohibit a private sectarian school from terminating a contractual relationship with a white student because of her association with a black student at the school); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir.) (suit allowed under Section 1981 where white employee claimed his company forced him to retire because he sold his house to a fellow black employee), modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.1975). Thus, we conclude that plaintiff does have standing to sue under Section 1981.”

Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 1989). Each filing by a defendant by their agent attorneys after the plaintiff responded with controlling law

including US Supreme Court precedent was a deliberate and intentional misrepresentation of law to this court for the purpose of extrinsic fraud upon the court to deny and to postpone relief from the continuing rights violations and interference with the ability of the plaintiff to work and support his family (also a fundamental liberty interest violated by the defendants) during the progress of this lawsuit.


Each act of David W. Davies and C. William Ossmann, Amy S. Raymond, Samuel A. Green, J. Steven Pigg, FISHER PATTERSON, SAYLER & SMITH, LLP’s knowing misrepresentation of law to this court regarding the plaintiff’s standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) are violations of KRPC 3.3(a)(1) under In re Benson, 275 Kan. 913, 69 P.3d 544 (Kan., 2003)) and these attorneys are violating their duty under KRPC 3.3(3) to correct these intentional misrepresentations of law.

Now, SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI acting through his agent David W. Davies has affirmatively acted with knowledge in furtherance of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Conspiracy expressly charged against the other defendants in the First Amended Complaint who acted in concert and with identified non-defendant coconspirators to retaliate against the plaintiff for his association with protected racial minorities and advocacy against racial discrimination on their behalf and the 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) Conspiracy stated in the complaint to retaliate against the plaintiff for his testimony as a witness in a federal criminal trial and to prevent the plaintiff’s testimony in a class action against the SRS as a prosecuting witness.

The First Amended Petition alleges that the plaintiff is still endangered by Abuse of Process for bad faith retaliatory purposes including for his testimony in federal court on behalf of a Lawrence, Kansas African American storeowner targeted by state officials and this Abuse of Process claim is sufficiently pled pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

“Plaintiff also alleges an abuse of process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant committed an act in the use of process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding; and (2) an ulterior purpose or motive for the use of regular court process; and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity. “

Riggs v. City Of Wichita (D. Kan., 2010) and the Kansas Court of Appeals in Bloom v. FNU Arnold (Kan. App., 2011) which clarifies that Abuse of Process under Kansas precedent is fulfilled by an allegation of hardship being inflicted:

“Under Kansas law, the essential elements of an action for abuse of process are "a knowingly illegal or improper use of the process done for the purpose of harassing or causing hardship, which resulted in damage" to the plaintiff. McShares, Inc. v. Barry, 266 Kan. 479, 494, 970 P.2d 1005, cert. denied 526 U.S. 1158 (1998).”

Bloom v. FNU Arnold (Kan. App., 2011). This continuing threat of being jailed for non payment of child support where no service of process

was effected and that under Kansas controlling law is void ab initio is as alleged in detail within the First 5

Amended Complaint while the Kansas SRS continues to participate with the co-conspirators in depriving the plaintiff of even non-law related work with false derogatory information on criminal data bases and in depriving the plaintiff of compensation from self employment:

"The Due Process Clause ... protects an individual's liberty interest which is viewed as including an individual's freedom to work and earn a living and to establish a home and position in one's community." Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101 (5th Cir.1997), citing Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. at 2706-07. "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure." Phillips v. Vandygriff 711 F.2d 1217, 1222 (5th Cir.1983), quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915). See also: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) ("Without doubt, ['liberty' in the fourteenth amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life . ..").”

Macarthur v. San Juan County, 416 F.Supp.2d 1098 at 1155-1156 (D. Utah, 2005).


The plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint establishes the defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI violates the plaintiff’s clearly established US Constitutional rights by withholding exculpatory evidence where the SRS received a fraudulent ICPC form that ex parte misrepresented the state of residence off the adoptive parents as “Stratton, Colorado” to prevent the anti child trafficking provisions of the interstate compact from being enforced as part of the fraud on Shawnee District Court to deprive the plaintiff’s former client David M. Price of vindicating the father and child’s rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act and to complete the kidnapping by deception and extrinsic fraud in violation of the gravamen of the 18 USC § 245 statute that includes the death penalty :

“Becker also claims MFCU violated her due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence. Several other circuits have recognized a § 1983 malicious prosecution-type claim under similar circumstances. See Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002). The Eighth Circuit in Moran concluded that Albright did not foreclose a substantive due process claim because "[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment covers seizures, which would be satisfied by Moran's arrest, law enforcement's intentional creation of damaging facts would not fall within its ambit. Here, we see no specifically applicable constitutional remedy that provides Moran with explicit protection to a level sufficient to exclude substantive due process analysis." Id.13

Becker presents a similar claim: that the defendants violated her due process rights, as distinguished from her Fourth Amendment rights, by suppressing exculpatory evidence and denying her a fair hearing. And this claim has constitutional weight: the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) determined that a defendant's right to access exculpatory evidence is secured by the Due Process Clause.

Other courts allowing this type of claim despite Albright have specifically rooted the constitutional violation in the due process right to a fair trial. See Castellano, 352 F.3d at 942, 959 (reasoning that presenting perjury and manufactured evidence at trial violated substantive due


process rights, and Albright did not apply because events at trial are outside the Fourth Amendment's scope); Newsome, 256 F.3d at 752 (holding the plaintiff had "a due process claim in the original sense of that phrase — he did not receive a fair trial if the prosecutors withheld material exculpatory details"); Jean v. Collins, 107 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (4th Cir.1997) ("Albright does not preclude [this] cause of action because the right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence is grounded directly in the Due Process Clause itself [rather than the Fourth Amendment].").”

Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 at 923-924 (10th Cir., 2007). The court in Becker also found that the lack of complete information due to the complained of

withholding resulted in criminal charges being filed against Becker stated an additional § 1983 retaliation claim against non-immune officials. For this retaliation claim, the court found Becker must plead and prove (1) that she was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that a defendant's action caused her to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that a defendant's action was substantially motivated as a response to her exercise of her First Amendment speech rights. Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000).

The First Amended Complaint alleges the plaintiff was subjected to the child support show cause order by the defendant SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s predecessor DON JORDAN, and their agent YOUNG WILLIAMS PC to discredit the plaintiff the week after the plaintiff failed to be subjected to perjury for his honest testimony in the US District Court for the District of Kansas at Kansas City. And that DON JORDAN, YOUNG WILLIAMS PC, the other conspirators and now SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI are maintaining the plaintiff in a bad light and ridicule to prevent the US District Court from reconsidering its decision to reciprocally disbar the plaintiff without a hearing as the plaintiff’s former client David M. Price recently sought out of desperation in not being able to find an attorney to vindicate class action rights against the SRS for its widespread violations of federal statute and the US Constitution.


The First Amended Complaint and the plaintiff’s response to DON JORDAN FORMER SECRETARY OF SRS and JOHN BADGER FORMER CHIEF COUNSEL’s Motion to Dismiss details the SRS participation (shown to be continued by SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI and BOB CORKINS SRS CHIEF COUNSEL) with the conspirators to retaliate against advocates that stood up to statutory and ethics violations by Adoption attorneys, SRS attorneys, contractors, their agents and protectors. This court even heard testimony that the SRS attorney Matthew W. Boddington joined with


coconspirator BRIAN FROST to write a bad faith complaint to prevent the plaintiff’s former client Donna Huffman from being admitted to the Bar in any state because she had prevailed in an appeal with the SRS to save her daughter from extreme abuse by a state official that had been documented and substantiated by the agency itself.

The First Amended Complaint shows that the co-conspirators in the State of Kansas Attorney Ethics Office including the defendant STANTON A. HAZLETT and Gayle B. Larkin were so zealous in pursuing the unlawful goals of the civil rights conspiracy to obstruct justice in Kansas family law courts that Gayle B. Larkin would manufacture evidence to commit fraud on the State of Kansas Board of Law Examiners with the family law court services officer BRIAN FROST and the defendant STANTON A. HAZLETT would testify to deliberate and intentionally prejudice Huffman by claiming she lacked the character to be an attorney because she appealed the administrative decision of the SRS, regardless of the fact her appeal was meritorious and she prevailed.

STANTON A. HAZLETT in the First Amended Complaint also furthered the conspiracy by declining to prosecute Gayle B. Larkin for the materially fraudulent misrepresentations in the report to the State of Kansas Supreme Court recommending Disbarment of the plaintiff Larkin authored, and the complaint alleges he made that decision the night before the plaintiff was called to testify in Kansas District Court as part of the conspiracy’s efforts to further discredit the plaintiff through perjury.

Without the prospective injunctive relief, SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI is maintaining an unlawful state barrier to advocacy on behalf of the constitutionally protected rights of Kansas parents and their children to be free of unlawful interference by the SRS and to seek redress where the unlawful interference by the agency has injured the rights of parents to parent their children and for children to be with their non abusing parents.

SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s unlawful state barrier to advocacy is a very real chilling of speech for prospective attorneys to consider helping a natural parent targeted by the SRS or one of the for profit contractors or agents of the SRS where the financial rewards for corrupt action are immense and the consequences to pro bono and uncorrupt attorneys like the plaintiff or Huffman are life destroying.


The federal court in Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F Supp 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y., 2002) dealt with both the constitutionally protected rights of parents and children to free from unlawful interference in the family relationship that has become the bread and butter of the Kansas SRS where the First Amended Complaint cites Kansas state legislative testimony on the millions of dollars the agency is receiving for taking children and court in Nicholson also addresses the need for effective representation of counsel free from state barriers to representing the interests of parents and children like SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI is maintaining.

The plaintiff will utilize extensive citation to the Nicholson opinion because this court has on record repeatedly demonstrated an absence of knowledge or familiarity with the plaintiff’s pleadings and only appears to respond to arguments made in the defendants’ counsels filings, likely because the plaintiff has been disbarred.

Despite repeated representations by the defendants’ counsel, the plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint details a widespread pattern and practice of the Kansas SRS violating the rights of natural parents concerned with the welfare of their children. The Huffman, Rosproy, and Price examples rise to obscene perversions of justice and the mission of the SRS. The conduct of the SRS and its agents and contractors violates the constitutional rights of Kansas parents and children:

“The right under the Constitution of the United States that families retain against state interference in their affairs is buttressed by a number of factors. First, individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in decisions involving the formation of a family, including marriage and procreation. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Second, parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the control and raising of their children without state interference. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (parent's right to make decisions involving child's medical treatment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (parent's right to make decisions involving a child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to establish a home and bring up children). Third, family members have an interest in being together. Members of families have a constitutional interest in familial integrity, or put more plainly, a right not to be forcibly separated. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) ("We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended `[if] a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.'") (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).

The "right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state" is "the most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy." Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825. Plaintiffs have established that ACS has consistently violated this right of family integrity.

The interest in not being forcibly separated by the state is shared by parents and children. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825 ("This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the


reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children, and of the children in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association with the parent.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).”

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F Supp 2d 153 at 234-5 (E.D.N.Y., 2002). The barrier to representing the interests of parents and children like SECRETARY OF SRS ROB

SIEDLEKI is maintaining is an unconstitutional denial of effective counsel that has been found to violate the Sixth Amendment to the Bill of Rights:

“It need hardly be added that by counsel the Supreme Court was referring to effective counsel. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (defendant's right to effective counsel includes the right to be represented by an attorney who does not have a conflict of interest and who notifies the court of any conflict). It follows that, where the government is under a due process obligation to appoint counsel, it cannot do so in a way that structurally impedes the ability of counsel to effectively represent clients. See Opie v. Meacham, 293 F.Supp. 647, 650 (D.C.Wyo.1968) ("The state is responsible under the due process requirement contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to protect an accused's right to have the effective assistance of competent counsel.").

The right to appointed counsel when necessary for due process is a right to effective counsel. See Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir.1974) ("We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel.") (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.1960)). The Supreme Court has recognized the government's obligation in certain situations to provide counsel to satisfy due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process requires that an indigent defendant in a felony trial be appointed counsel); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (indigent prisoners whom the state wished to treat as mentally ill have right to appointed counsel); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (right to appointed counsel for indigents in some probation-revocation hearings); Douglas v. California, 373 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 1288, 10 L.Ed.2d 200 (1963) (state providing appeals as of right must appoint counsel for indigent defendants in those appeals). The Court has separately emphasized the government's related obligation not to impair the effectiveness of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (states may not conduct trials in a way that unconstitutionally impairs a defendant's right to effective counsel); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976) (court order denying defendant the right to consult with counsel during a seventeen hour recess impaired defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975) (statute allowing judge in non-jury criminal trial to deny counsel the opportunity to give closing statements unconstitutionally denies defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972) (court procedures that require defendant, if testifying, to testify before any other defense witnesses, unconstitutionally impairs counsel's ability to effectively assist defendant); Ferguson v. State of Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961) (court rules denying defendant the right to take the stand and be questioned by his attorney unconstitutionally impairs the right to effective assistance of counsel).

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F Supp 2d 153 at 239-40 (E.D.N.Y., 2002). When SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI participates with the conspirators identified in the

First Amended Complaint and violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by withholding exculpatory evidence which would have prevented the plaintiff from being disbarred and likely resulted in the persons


committing fraud on the Shawnee County District Court to be prosecuted for kidnapping and felony violations of 18 USC §§ 242, 242 and 245, or when under SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI the SRS is refusing to obey court orders, SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI’s must be subjected to prospective injunctive relief to stop his role in constructive denial of effective counsel violating the Sixth Amendment to the Bill of Rights:

“Ordinarily, claims of ineffective representation are dealt with on an individualized basis after the fact, because a person must show deficient performance by counsel and actual prejudice arising from that deficiency. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."). But where the state imposes systemic barriers to effective representation, prospective injunctive relief without individualized proof of injury is necessary and appropriate. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.2001) (no "actual injury" need be shown where prospective injunctive relief is designed to remedy systemic Sixth Amendment violations caused by prisons' attorney visitation policies); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance."); U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (circumstances may exist such that "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.").”

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F Supp 2d 153 at 240-41 (E.D.N.Y., 2002).


The motion for dismissal filed by SECRETARY OF SRS ROB SIEDLEKI reveals the Kansas SRS continued disconnection from the observance of clearly established federal law protecting the rights of the plaintiff and from observance of the agency’s duty to the citizens of Kansas.

Respectfully submitted,

S/Bret D. Landrith Bret D. Landrith Plaintiff appearing Pro se

I hereby certify I have provided on November 25, 2011 a true copy of the above to the defendants via US Mail First Class postage pre-paid as indicated:

Defendant BRIAN FROST through his attorney J. Steven Pigg, FISHER PATTERSON, SAYLER & SMITH, LLP PO Box 949, Topeka, KS 66601-0949. Via US Mail.


Defendants ROB SIEDLEKI, DON JORDAN, JOHN BADGER and BOB CORKINS to their counsel David W. Davies and C. William Ossmann, Chief of Litigation at the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 915 SW Harrison, 6th Floor, 66612-1354. Via US Mail

Defendant YOUNG WILLIAMS PC through their attorney Amy Raymond, 120 SE 6th Street Suite 106, Topeka, KS 66603. Via US Mail

DefendantCRAIGE.COLLINSat 3209SWBellAve,Topeka,Kansas66614.ViaUSMail. Defendant STANTON HAZLETT through his attorney Steve Phillips via US Mail. Chambers Copy, Hon. Judge Hendricks, Shawnee County District Court, Shawnee County Courthouse, 200

SE 7th Street Suite 209, Topeka, KS

66603 via US Mail

Respectfully submitted,

S/Bret D. Landrith Bret D. Landrith Plaintiff appearing Pro se

Bret Landrith,
Dec 8, 2011, 10:44 AM