Killeen Chair Conference 2012
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Call for Papers
“What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274-93.
“A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.),
(OUP, 2010): 298-325.
"Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure," Episteme 6: 336-353
"Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence", in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.),
(OUP): 11-174 (2010).
"The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1: 167-196 (2005)
"Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism", Philosophers’ Imprint 11, no. 6 (2011)
"Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy", Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), pp. 756-67
"Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News",
116 (2007), 187-217
"Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement," In Stephen Hetherington (ed.),
"Disagreement," in Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker, eds., Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 2010.
"Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," In Kevin Meeker & Philip Quinn (eds.), The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity. (OUP, 1999)
Peter Van Inwagen
Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?