Hello, my name is Katia. I finished my Ph.D. in Philosophy at Brown University in May 2013. As of October 2013, I am at the University of Tübingen as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Philosophy of Neuroscience group at the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience.
My primary research concerns the nature of introspection, or the way we access our mental states. In particular, I argue that a complete account of introspection must involve several distinct cognitive mechanisms, a view which I call Pluralism about Introspection. You can read more about my views and arguments in the Research, the Writing Sample, and the Papers in Progress sections of this site.
I am currently teaching a graduate seminar on Self-Knowledge and Introspection at the University of Tübingen. More information about this course and any updates and readings for the current students are available in the Current Courses section. In the past, I have taught introductory courses in philosophy of mind, and metaphysics, with a focus on personal identity at Brown University, and informal logic at Bridgewater State University.
In the immediate future, I plan on examining the epistemic consequences of my pluralist view of introspection. I am particularly interested in the tension between the internalist and externalist models of justification, and the fact that my preferred pluralist account is apparently compatible with both of models of justification. I am therefore inclined to think that there are two distinct concepts of justification.
I am also developing a strong interest in philosophical methodology, in light of the increasing influence of research from psychology and cognitive science on philosophy. Although I find the use of empirical support in guiding and verifying one's views invaluable - and have relied on it myself throughout my arguments - I also plan on writing a paper in which I argue that the fundamental philosophical methods and insights can nonetheless remain independent of the sciences, and are not reducible to them.
Finally, I have been very interested in the nature of perception for many years now, and plan on taking up my research in that area again soon. Specifically, I want to argue that disjunctivism about perception is only plausible as an epistemic position, but not as a metaphysical account of perception. However, without metaphysical grounding, disjunctivism cannot offer a fully motivated and plausible solution to skepticism.