Kairong Xiao

Curriculum Vitae

Assistant Professor of Finance

822 Uris Hall

New York, NY, 10027, U.S.

Email: kairong.xiao@gsb.columbia.edu

Working Papers

1. Monetary Transmission through Shadow Banks previously titled "Shadow Banks, Deposit Competition, and Monetary Policy" (R&R RFS Dual Submission)

NBER Summer Institute (Monetary Economics), Utah Winter Finance Conference, WFA Cubist Systematic Strategies Ph.D. Award for Outstanding Research, Annual Financial Intermediation and Regulation Conference at Queen's University, Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting, Fed/UMD Short-Term Funding Conference, FIRS, 4th Annual USC Marshall Ph.D. Conference in Finance, FMA Doctoral Consortium, CICF

The conventional wisdom of monetary policy suggests that bank deposits shrink when monetary policy tightens. The opposite happens in the shadow banking sector.

Online Appendix

Utah Winter Finance Conference (scheduled), AFA (scheduled), Miami Behavioral Finance Conference (scheduled), EFA, NBER Behavioral Finance Meeting, SFS Cavalcade, Duke-UNC Asset Pricing Conference, HEC-McGill Winter Finance Workshop

Low-interest-rate monetary policy increases investors' demand for high-dividend stocks and drives up the prices of these assets. We provide a theory based on consumption self-control.

Online Appendix

How is monetary policy transmitted through the banking system? We quantify competing theories of monetary transmission by estimating a dynamic banking model.


AEA (scheduled), NBER Political Economy Program Meeting, CIFAR, 5th Workshop on Political Economy of Development and Conflict Barcelona, Warwick/Princeton/Utah Political Economy Conference, Washington PECO

Under the surface of the Chinese Communist Party, there are rules that govern power sharing among rival factions and keep high-ranking individuals moving up the ladder.

Media coverage: Chicago Booth Review "An economic model decodes the Chinese Communist Party"

Work in Progress

1. Unintended Consequences of Post-crisis Liquidity Regulation, with Suresh Sundaresan

We present evidence that post-crisis liquidity regulation of commercial banks and money market funds (MMFs) unintentionally has shifted liquidity transformation into the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System, a government-sponsored enterprise.


Publications

FIRS (2016), SEC Third Annual Conference on Financial Market Regulation (2016), CICF (2016), The Financial Conduct Authority (UK), NFA (2016)

Against the popular claim that post-crisis regulations hurt liquidity, no evidence of liquidity deterioration is found during periods of regulatory intervention.

Online Appendix

Media coverage: Risk.net "Volcker rule didn't dry corporate bond liquidity, research says", Risk.net "Liquidity, data quality, and benchmarks"

Contribution to policy-making: Keynote remarks by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer "Is There a Liquidity Problem Post-Crisis?", Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Enterprises by Andy Green "The Fixed Income Market and Securitizations after Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III"


Miscellaneous

1. Columbia New Empirical Finance Workshop

2. Rising Five Star Junior Conference at Columbia

3.Columbia Summer Research Internship