(0041) 021 6923476
Assistant Professor - Economics, HEC Lausanne
Joao Montez is a business economist. He uses game theory to answer questions in competition policy and strategy, on topics such as pricing, bargaining, and supply-chains. His CV can be found here.
Before joining HEC Lausanne in 2016, he was an Assistant Professor at the London Business School. He completed postgraduate education at Toulouse, Lausanne and Columbia Universities. He is a CEPR Research Affiliate and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics.
Research Interests: Microeconomics - Industrial Organization and Game Theory
Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice
Rand Journal of Economics, winter 2007 Vol. 38 pp. 948-966
We study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find a non-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion.
Inefficient sales delays by a durable-good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers
Rand Journal of Economics, fall 2013 Vol. 44 pp. 425-437 (working paper version and web appendix)
article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow
adoption of durable-goods. We study a standard durable-goods monopoly
model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have
multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcome--including the
Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where
the seller first charges a high price, and only lowers that price once
some---but not all---high-valuation buyers purchase. This price
structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers, which delays
market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut
Journal of Economic Theory, July 2014 vol. 152 pp. 249-265 (working paper version)
We study a model where a central player (the principal) bargains bilaterally with each of several players (the agents) to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game. It is known that, if the payments that were previously agreed (with each of the remaining agents) are renegotiated in case any bilateral negotiation permanently breaks down, then the Shapley value is the unique efficient and individual rational outcome consistent with bilateral Nash bargaining. Here we show that when instead the agreed payments cannot be renegotiated the outcome is also unique but it now coincides with the Nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy problem. We provide a strategic foundation for this outcome. Then we study how such renegotiation affects the principal's payoff according to the properties of the surplus function. We find, for example, that renegotiation benefits the principal when agents are complements and it hurts him when they are substitutes (situations with, respectively, increasing and decreasing marginal contributions
Previous version with additional applications, circulated as "The
worth of binding agreements in one-to-many bargaining."
In a make-to-stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market-wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.
Competitive intensity and its two-sided effect on the boundaries of firm performance (with Mike Ryall and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda)
Management Science forthcoming (working paper version)
We contribute to the "value capture'' stream in strategy, which uses cooperative games to study firm performance under competition. We are motivated by the idea that there are two sides to competition -- a good side (competition for the firm) and a bad side (competition for the firm's transaction partners). We develop three increasingly general measures of competitive intensity and demonstrate that intensity on the good side places a minimum bound on the value captured by the firm, while that on the bad side imposes a maximum. The core, a standard solution concept appropriate for productive deals in free markets, associates each agent with an interval of payoffs. Because our bounds contain the core and require less information to compute, they may be interpreted as alternative solutions consistent with boundedly-rational agents. They also provide empirically testable implications and normative guidance in settings where the computation of core intervals is not practical.
Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations (with Roman Inderst)
We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides flexibility to adjust trades during (temporary) disagreement. We find that a larger buyer pays a lower per unit price when buyers' bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently high, and a higher price otherwise. An analogous result holds for larger sellers and specific changes in the well-known concentration measure HHI. These predictions and the implications of different technologies are explained by the fact that size, rather than being an unequivocal source of power, is a source of mutual dependency---with simultaneously positive and negative effects.
Work in progress
Unions and investment with intra-firm bargaining
Exclusive dealing, relationship length and specific investments (with Bjørn Johansen)
Generic entry in the pharmaceutical market: why can less be better (with Annabelle Marxen)
Garbage in oligopoly: when does sharing capacity information helps? (with Nicolas Schutz)
are studying a symmetric duopoly game where firms invest in capacities before
setting prices but capacities remain unobservable. The game has a unique
equilibrium, which features three types of distortions: i) firms charge
positive markups, ii) firms may refrain from serving the market, and
iii) firms tends to produce garbage (i.e., part of the equilibrium
output ends up not being sold to consumers). In the context of this game, we are working on issues of taxation and information sharing.
A case for manufacturer returns
We study whether a
manufacturer should endogenously reduce the extent to which retailers'
inventory cost is sunk by offering the possibility of returning unsold
stocks for a fraction of the wholesale price. The answer solves a
trade-off: returns intensify retail competition by giving retailers the
incentive to order excess stocks, but such inefficient over-production
must be paid up-front by the manufacturer. Therefore the optimal return
decreases as the manufacturing marginal cost increases.
"Taxe sur les huiles de chauffage: Faut-il réformer le droit du bail?" Le Temps (Swiss newspaper of wide circulation), 28th April 2007 (Opinion article with Nicole Mathys)"Why some MBA's are reading Plato" Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2014 (link) (feature on his LBS course Nobel Thinking)