Geolibertarianism is the belief that each individual has an exclusive right to the fruits of his or her labor, and thus an exclusive right to the value of those fruits; and that all individuals have an equal right to land, and thus an equal right to the value of land.
By embracing this belief, geolibertarians are simply taking the core libertarian principle of self-ownership to its logical conclusion: Just as the right to oneself implies the right to the fruit of one's labor (i.e., the right to property), the right to the fruit of one's labor implies the right to labor, and the right to labor implies the right to labor -- somewhere. Hence John Locke's proviso that one has "property" in land only to the extent that there is "enough, and as good left in common for others." When there is not, land begins to have rental value. Thus, the rental value of land reflects the extent to which Locke's proviso has been violated, thereby making community-collection of rent (CCR) a just and necessary means of upholding the Lockean principle of private property. In the late 19th century, CCR became known as the "Single Tax" -- a term often used to denote Henry George's proposal to abolish all taxation save for a single tax on the value of land (irrespective of the value of improvements in or on it).
Throughout the rest of this FAQ I will often refer to the Single Tax as the LVT (land value tax).
No, because it would neither increase demand nor decrease supply. Henry George explained it best when he wrote:
So, far from increasing the price of land, the LVT would actually decrease it. The reason for this becomes more clear when one considers that the price of land is nothing more than capitalized rent – i.e., the annual rental value divided by the interest rate. In short, the more rent is diverted into the public treasury, the less rent there is to be capitalized into a sale price.
No, self-ownership is. That is to say, the foundation of property rights (and the freedom that flows from those rights) is the property that each person has in himself and, by extension, in the fruits his labor.
No, because government would have no authority to dictate when, how, or by whom land itself is used; it would only have the authority to ensure the rent of land goes to everyone on an equal basis, since all individuals have an equal right to the use of land. Henry George put it thusly:
The only alternative to George's proposal is to treat land as the unconditional property of a relative few. The problem with this alternative is that, when taken to its logical conclusion, we find that the fruits of individual labor must inevitably be treated as conditional property for everyone else. Why? Because no one can produce wealth in the first place unless he or she first has access to land. Consequently, since all land is legally occupied, and since producing more land isn't an option, those who don't have titles to land cannot legally access the earth -- and thus cannot legally sustain their own lives -- unless they first "consent" to pay a portion of their earnings to those who do have titles to land. (This is why geolibertarians regard landed property as the mother of all entitlements.)
Land itself does not originate from labor; thus, property in land does not originate from labor, but from the law that confers ownership to an individual or group. Landed property is therefore law-made property, and is, in that sense, clearly distinct from man-made property. Thus, to compel one group to pay rent to another group for mere access to the earth is to elevate law-made property above man-made property. And since the latter is an extension of self-ownership, to elevate the former above the latter is to strike a blow at the very foundation of property rights.
To this some might object that the LVT does just that -- compels one group to pay rent to another group for mere access to the earth. While this objection may sound logical at first, it is fatally flawed. Why? Because it ignores a universal law of today's economy: the fact that land rent gets paid either way -- regardless of whether or not it gets diverted into the public treasury.
Thus, it is not a question of if land rent gets paid, but to whom and on what basis.
If it is paid exclusively to titleholders on the basis of the earth being the unconditional property of titleholders, then, for reasons given above, the property that non-titleholders have in themselves and in the fruits of their labor is thereby violated. If, on the other hand, it is paid to the community on the basis of the individual members of that community each having an equal right to land, then said property right (the right to one's self and the fruit of one's labor) is thereby upheld for everyone -- both titleholder and non-titleholder alike.
Another common objection is that, if government collects the rent of land, it automatically becomes the owner of land. This objection is based on the myth that the terms "rent collector" and "owner" are synonymous. While many rent collectors do, indeed, own the property on which they collect rent, there are, nevertheless, thousands of private rental agents and property managers all over the country who routinely collect rent on properties they do not own. Thus, one does not have to be an "owner" to be a "rent collector." Government is no exception to this rule.
That doesn't mean the government of, say, North Korea does not assert ownership over the land on which it collects rent. It does. But it is not merely the authority to collect land rent, but the authority to dictate how land is used, that makes the North Korean government an "owner" of land. Critics of the LVT repeatedly insist that you can't have one authority without the other, but as mentioned above, the rent-collection services provided by non-owning rental agents and property managers prove just the opposite.
This becomes easier to understand once you realize that "property" refers, not to a single right, but to a bundle of rights -- the right to rental income being one of them. The other rights include the right to possess, use, exclude, and transfer title. As any lawyer will tell you, those rights can be transferred in whole or in part.
This is precisely why, in the U.S., it is possible for city councilmen to collect a portion of land rent through property tax levies, yet be lawfully excluded from the land itself by whoever holds title to that land. Although the local government in this case has a legal right to a certain percentage of the land's rental value, the titleholder has all the other rights of the aforementioned "bundle."
Not only would the titleholder retain those rights under a geolibertarian system, those rights would be strengthened by the fact that (1) he would no longer be taxed for being productive, thus making it far easier for him to afford whatever the rental charge is, and (2) the law would require any surplus revenue to be distributed equally as a citizens dividend. (The latter would provide a built-in incentive for citizens to bring enormous pressure to bear on government to limit its spending, since less wasteful spending would mean a greater surplus, and thus a higher dividend.)
5. Since people need food to sustain their lives, and since food, like land, is in limited supply, could not the same argument for taxing the value of land be used to justify taxing the value of food?
No, because (1) while food is in "limited" supply, it is not in fixed supply; and (2) with food starvation is not the only alternative to purchasing it from others, whereas with land it is.
With food, one can always produce instead of buy. Not so with land. Some might counter that one can always produce to earn the wages needed to acquire land, but this presupposes the very issue in question – access to land. While it is true people can always acquire land by earning the wages needed to rent or purchase it, one cannot earn wages to begin with unless one first has access to land, which brings us right back where we started.
Food is a product of labor; land is not. Thus, the notion that one has an exclusive right to the fruits of one’s labor is incompatible with the notion that there is a common right to the value of those fruits, while it is not incompatible with the notion that there is a common right to the value of land.
No, but not for lack of trying. Rothbard's argument against the LVT is fatally flawed for at least two reasons -- one moral, the other economic. From a moral perspective, it completely ignores the unjust interference that the overextension of law-made property imposes on man-made property. From an economic perspective, it is based on a false understanding of what conditions are necessary for land to have rental value.
In Libertarian Party at Sea on Land, LP activist Dr. Harold Kyriazi explains why Rothbard's attack on the LVT was misguided at best. The following is from pages 57-61 of that book:
The only well-known libertarian writer whom I know to have explicitly, and at great length, opposed the idea of community collected user fees for natural resources is Murray Rothbard, which is odd, given his admiration for Albert Jay Nock and Frank Chodorov, who, in turn, revered Henry George. Rothbard apparently had extensive discussions with Georgists:
The following is taken from his The Ethics of Liberty.
With this statement, Rothbard may seem to have carried the "first use" doctrine to its illogical extreme. (If walking over some land constitutes transformation and use, then is it just one's footprints that one owns? Or does one's rightful claim extend out to all the underbrush one has cleared away? Or, can one claim land as far as the eye can see? This is the very definition of the word "arbitrary.") But in his defense, to convert the claim into actual ownership would, Rothbard would say, require actual use (though we're again faced with the question of what constitutes "use" -- see p. 79, "Anti-Rothbard..."). For example, earlier, in a Robinson Crusoe paradigm, he stated that Crusoe's "true property--his actual control over material goods--would extend only so far as his actual labor brought them into production. His true ownership could not extend beyond the power of his own reach."
What, then, would Rothbard say about large American corporations owning, but not using, millions of acres of land, as some now do? He gives us his answer in an essay he wrote on Henry George's Land Value Tax idea, entitled "The Single Tax: Economic and Moral Implications" (FEE "Special Essay Series," 1957). Here are a few examples from that work:
Of course, LVT would and could do no such thing, as those who strive to put idle land into productive use would have to bid against other land users for labor, and only the best uses of labor and land would win out. Thus, rather than forcing all land into use, LVT would discourage all but the most productive use of land, just as any market tends to allocate resources most wisely. Another thing that would happen is that the earnings of labor would increase due to increased competition for it, and (ideally) none of the produced wealth would go to landowners qua landowners. Let me rephrase Rothbard's last sentence in a way that makes sense: Forcing land users to pass over ideal idle land and utilize marginal land instead, is wasteful of human labor and natural opportunities, a disservice to all mankind and a boon only to landlords and land speculators.
But here's the most embarrassing passage:
False! They'd be valueless only to those market participants who wish only to speculate in land, not to those who wish to use land in some productive endeavor.
Wrong again. While it's true there'd be no sale price for vacant land, one would still have to pay the ground-rent to use it.
Wrong yet again. He's assuming the LVT would be set by an actual ground-rent charged by the landlord, rather than being an assessed value that would have to be recouped. And, I might add, total rental costs would tend to decrease as additional units come on the market as the monopoly stranglehold on land loses its grip.
He continues to pound a straw man.
He took a wrong turn, and just keeps going!
Rothbard then goes on to state,
Completely false. Even if LVT were applied at a national level, and there were no competition among municipalities for residents, people would still bid on the leases of occupied property, providing price information. (For more on this, see p. 97, "How would LVT work?")
In Power and Market: Government and the Economy (second edition, 1977), Rothbard went even further into the realm of irrationality in his attempt to refute Georgist land theory (p. 131):
I know of no Georgist who would ever use the phrase "free-market" in conjunction with our current, individual monopoly market in land.
It is an obvious fiction that any use, however small or large the effort, should grant full private ownership for all time, unless we're talking about a make-believe world with unlimited land where access to all of it is instantaneous (i.e., where travel time is zero). This fiction ignores the fact that someone who, for example, puts up a fence and lets a cow graze, is much less the rightful "owner" of land than one who builds an industrial plant or a shopping mall. (For more on this, see p. 79, "Anti-Rothbard...")
To purchase Libertarian Party at Sea on Land, click here.
No. Karl Marx’s labor theory of value asserts that the value of an object is a result of the labor expended to produce it. Henry George flat-out rejected this view:
Why, then, do some mistakenly identify Marx's labor theory of value as being one of the core premises of the LVT? Because many LVT-advocates often describe land value as being produced by the community, and, in so doing, unwittingly sacrifice clarity for brevity. What they actually mean is this. It's not that members of the surrounding community produce land value itself, but that they produce the goods and services which give rise to that value. Max Hirsch put it this way:
No, it is based on the Lockean idea that the right to land is an equal right.
By that I mean: the idea that an individual has "property" in land only to the extent that there is, in the words of John Locke, "enough, and as good left in common for others." In that sense, the right to land is not a collective right, but an individual right that exists independently of the collective (i.e. "society"). The equality of this right is merely a limitation that arises from the presence of others with like rights.
By contrast, a collective right to land dictates that an individual does not have a right to use any land unless society -- either explicitly or by omission -- has granted him the right to do so.
With the equal right to land, one does not require the consent of society to use land. The right to the use of land belongs at birth to each individual. So while the consent of others is not needed, it is, nevertheless, necessary that in the exercise of that right, one does not infringe upon the equal right of others -- i.e., violate Locke's proviso that there be "enough, and as good left in common for others." And since the rental value of land provides an accurate measure of the extent to which said proviso has been violated, "others" should be compensated in accordance with that value. At the same time, of course, all taxes on labor and capital should be abolished, since they violate the exclusive right that each individual has to the fruits of his own labor.
No, because if only some people "own" the earth, then only some have a right to live upon it.
All individuals must have access to the earth in order to exercise their right to sustain their own lives. Thus, to allow the earth to become the unconditional property of a relative few is to deny this right to everyone else, since it makes the latter obligated at birth to pay the former for mere access to the planet -- as if the former were responsible for the earth’s very existence.
While the private collection of land rent may seem harmless at a micro-level, at a macro-level it constitutes an entitlement scheme, whereby Group A receives payment from Group B, even though Group A renders no service in return. In that sense, it violates the right of the members of Group B to the fruits of their labors.
If some people fail to see this, it is because they, in the words of Henry Hazlitt, "overlook the woods in their precise and minute examination of particular trees." In this case they overlook the affect that private rent-collection has on the economy as a whole in their precise and minute examination of particular transactions, and how these transactions benefit particular groups. Overall, the payment of land rent to the few at the expense of the many imposes on the latter artificially high costs of living on one hand, and artificially low wages on the other.
To learn more about why the current land market is anything but "voluntary," read the following article by Fred Foldvary.
10. As a general rule, taxation is wrong since it involves the use of force. Is a "tax" on land value an exception to this?
Yes, for the simple reason that "force," as such, is neither good nor bad. If used to defend one's person or property from aggressors, or to enforce payment of a rightful debt, it is a good thing. If used to harm the person or property of a non-consenting other, or to enforce payment of a wrongful debt, it is a bad thing.
A tax on wages or interest implies that the income one receives in return for the exertion of one's labor, or for the use of one's capital goods, belongs (at least in part) to others. This conflicts with the basic libertarian principle that you have an exclusive right to the fruits of your labor.
A tax on rent implies that the income one receives for the value of the land one holds belongs to others. Since land itself (1) is not the fruit of anyone's labor, and (2) is that to which all have an equal right of access; and since the rent of land (1) is not a return to labor, and (2) reflects the extent to which Locke's proviso has been violated, a "tax" on rent does not conflict with the principle that you have an exclusive right to the fruits of your labor, but is in fact a just and necessary means of upholding it.
Thus, the part of one's income that is taken via taxation of wages and interest constitutes the enforcement of a wrongful debt, whereas the part of one's income that is taken via taxation of rent constitutes the enforcement of a rightful debt.
Still, critics will argue, a tax on rent involves the use of force, and is therefore wrong. The problem with this argument becomes evident when they are presented with the scenario of a tenant no longer able to pay a titleholder for the value of the land he is using, and then asked whether or not it would be legitimate to use force to remove the tenant from the titleholder's land. They typically answer yes to this question, and when pressed for an explanation, finally concede that yes, there is such a thing as a legitimate use of force when it comes to upholding a rightful debt.
The dispute, then, is not over whether force, in and of itself, is right or wrong, but whether the debt in question is right or wrong -- i.e., whether or not the taxation of rent conflicts with the libertarian principle that each person has property in himself and, by extension, in the fruits of his labor. Geolibertarians hold that it does not so conflict, since rent, as mentioned before, is not a return to labor.
Rent is in fact a return to land, meaning the percentage of one's income one could receive simply by renting out the land one holds to someone else. Yet to whom does this value rightfully belong? Since land values derive, not from what titleholders do, but from the extent to which "others" (particularly those who make up the surrounding "community") are denied access to land they wish to use, and to which they have an equal right of access, it follows that this value is rightfully owed to these others, while wrongfully owed to titleholders. All individuals have an equal right to land, so all have an equal right to the rental value thereof.
No, because land rent, as mentioned before, gets paid either way -- regardless of whether or not it gets diverted into the public treasury.
Even when you pay the sale price of land, you are paying land rent, since the sale price is simply the rental value divided by the interest rate. And since land is in fixed supply, decreases in land value taxation are invariably capitalized by titleholders into higher rents and land prices. Thus, people in general, and the working poor in particular, end up paying back in higher rents and land prices what they presumably get from the tax cut; and pay back even more in terms of (1) a lower margin of production (and thus lower pre-tax wages), and (2) a heavier reliance on wage and sales taxes.
So once again, it is not a question of if land rent gets paid, but to whom and on what basis -- to a fraction of the population, on the basis of the earth being "owned" by a relative few; or to everyone equally, on the basis of the earth being that to which all have an equal right of access? Geolibertarians believe it should be the latter, since that is the only just and practical way of establishing true equality of opportunity without enforcing equality of outcome in the process.
As for poor people, the LVT would actually make it much easier for them to acquire land, since it would reduce the artificially high price of land, as well as increase wages by raising the margin of production, on the one hand, and reducing the need for wage taxes, on the other.
No, because the value of land has no reference to a cost of production; it is purely a function of demand. This, among other things, led Adam Smith to conclude that:
Nobel prize-winning economist, Paul A. Samuelson, reached the same conclusion two centuries later:
What is even more "striking" is that Samuelson's remarks are only half-true. Not only will a tax on rent lead to no distortions or economic inefficiencies, it will actually stimulate the economy by (1) lowering the entrance-barrier into the market place, and (2) encouraging much more efficient use of land within that market place. A well-documented case in point is the overall success of the "split rate" property tax (whereby land values are taxed at a higher rate than improvements) in over a dozen localities throughout Pennsylvania.
It is the taxation of wages and interest that discourages production -- "wages" being the return to labor, and "interest" the return to capital. Thus, it follows that the more we shift the tax burden off labor and capital and onto land values, the more prosperous the economy will be overall. Henry George put it this way:
13. There are some who still insist that the LVT would discourage production since the value of land cannot be separated from the value of improvements. Is that true?
No, it has long been common practice in the real estate industry for land value to be assessed separately from the value of improvements:
The only people who seem intent on ignoring this fact are opponents of the LVT.
14. Some people claim there are documented examples of land being produced. Doesn't this refute the idea that land is in fixed supply?
No. Those who insist otherwise are confusing two different senses of the word land. In the every day sense, land usually refers to the dry surface of the earth; in the economic sense, however, it refers not just to the dry surface of the earth, but to the entire material universe, excluding humans and their products. In other words, land is not merely matter that occupies space; it is space. While matter can certainly be manipulated within that space, space itself cannot be added to or subtracted from. This is precisely why the value of "land" is often and more accurately described as the value of "location."
No. To understand why, simply ask yourself the following question. If the importance of land is indeed going down, why does the price of land keep going up?
The answer is that, as the economy grows, the importance of land grows along with it -- especially for the working poor. If you doubt this, visit the following links:
16. Are land values capable of generating the revenue needed for the legitimate functions of government?
The answer to this question depends on (1) how you interpret national income figures, (2) what you consider to be the "legitimate" functions of government, (3) the extent to which a reduction in taxes on labor and capital would drive up the rental value of land (and thus revenue capacity), and (4) the extent to which shifting to a land-based tax system would increase economic output (and thus the tax base).
With respect to national income figures, many economists accept (seemingly without question) the Commerce Department's claim that land rent makes up only 2% of the national income. Assuming for the sake of argument that this is true, that means, with the national income at roughly $10.8 trillion as of last year (2005), a land-based tax system could yield little more than $216 billion in annual revenue.
Not all economists, however, subscribe to the belief that rent constitutes only 2% of the national income. For instance, in The Losses of Nations (1998), Fred Harrison explains how a study by Wall Street economist Michael Hudson revealed that the revenue capacity of land is about 14% of the national income, or what in 2005 would amount to approximately $1.5 trillion in annual revenue.
With respect to the "legitimate" functions of government, there are some who consider all current expenditures (including corporate welfare and the insane drug war) to be "legitimate," in which case the LVT would need to generate roughly $3.2 trillion in annual revenue for all levels of government. On the other hand, there are some who consider "legitimate" only those expenditures that go toward protecting individual rights (e.g., defending our national borders from military invasion, enforcing laws against force and fraud, adjudicating civil disputes, etc.), in which case the LVT would need to generate no more than $1.5 trillion in annual revenue for all levels of government.
With respect to the reduction of taxes on labor and capital, and the effect this has on the rental value of land, economists throughout history have observed that, when said taxes are lowered, land rent tends to rise proportionately. Why? For the simple and obvious reason that, the more people can afford to pay for access to a fixed quantity of land, the more titleholders tend to charge higher rents. If, for instance, the payroll tax were abolished, most of the resultant increase in take home pay would be absorbed by higher rents. Thus, it follows that the more the tax burden on labor and capital is reduced, the more the revenue capacity of land is raised by a comparable amount. (Economist Mason Gaffney explains this more thoroughly in Ch. 7 of The Losses of Nations.)
And finally, with respect to economic output, it is common knowledge that, all else being equal, an increase in output means an increase in tax revenue (regardless of the tax system in place). It is also common knowledge that, all else being equal, an increase in output means an increase in the rental value of land (regardless of whether land rent is collected publicly or privately). The question thus arises: to what extent would a land-based tax system increase output, and hence the tax base? On page 147 of "The Losses of Nations," economist Nicolaus Tideman estimates that
All that being said, if you take the Commerce Department at its word on rent being only 2% of the national income; if you believe that current tax revenue outlays at all levels of government should be maintained; and if you ignore the extent to which both land values and economic output would skyrocket in the absence of taxes on labor and capital, then you will undoubtedly conclude that land values are not an adequate source of public revenue.
If, on the other hand, you agree with Dr. Hudson's conclusion that rent is approximately 14% of the national income (if not more), then even if you oppose a moderate reduction in overall spending; and even if you ignore the increase in land values and economic output that would accompany any significant decrease in the taxation of labor and capital, the LVT would still allow for the abolition of the federal income tax. But if you believe that $1.5 trillion could easily fund the legitimate functions of government, and if you realize the extent to which both land values and economic output would increase in the absence of taxes on labor and capital, then you will almost certainly conclude, as I have, that land values are a more than adequate source of revenue for all levels of government.
No, it would help farmers. In the first place, the LVT would fall primarily on urban land, not rural land, since land values are concentrated primarily in urban areas. In the second place, the increased cost of paying a higher tax on land value would be more than offset by (1) the savings incurred from paying lower taxes on everything else, (2) the reversal of urban sprawl (and thus of the inflationary pressure that sprawl currently imposes on the value of farmland), and (3) the increase in income that would result from both a higher margin of production and a surge in overall economic activity.
For supportive empirical evidence, see the following:
For a more exhaustive treatment of the underlying principles, see:
In short, the same way it is now. Critics of the LVT are fond of pretending that land values are not already being taxed, when in fact they are (albeit to a limited extent) by existing property taxes. The machinery for the LVT is already in place. Thus, all that is necessary to implement the LVT locally is to exempt houses, buildings and other improvements from taxation, and thereby focus existing property taxes on land values only. In this way the property tax would be converted to a land value tax.
As for state and federal taxation, geolibertarians advocate a bottom-up system whereby a portion of the LVT-revenue generated locally is sent to the applicable state governments, and a portion of that, in turn, to the federal government. Ideally, this would be phased in over a period of years. That is, as the LVT is slightly increased each year, taxes on wages, sales and capital goods would be slightly decreased. This process would continue until all taxation is eliminated save for a single tax on land values.
The term, geolibertarian, contains the word "libertarian" for a reason -- namely, to signify general agreement with the libertarian philosophy, and thereby distinguish libertarian supporters of the LVT from non-libertarian supporters. Thus, as one might expect, geolibertarians agree with much of the Libertarian Party (LP) Platform. They also agree with the basic libertarian principle that all persons are entitled to keep the fruits of their labor.
Land, however, is not the fruit of any person's labor. This is where the prefix "geo" comes in. "Geo" refers both to a general emphasis on land (as it does in the term, geography), and to a particular emphasis on the Georgist system of private land tenure. Thus, for reasons explained elsewhere in this FAQ, geolibertarians take exception with the LP Platform's Rothbardian position on landed property, particularly as it applies to the community-collection of land rent.
In addition, some geolibertarians take exception, as I do, with the Rothbardian position on monetary reform. While I agree with Rothbard's critique of fractional reserve banking, I disagree with his insistence that the only way to eliminate "chronic inflation, as well as the booms and busts brought by that system of inflationary credit," is to return to "a monetary system where a market-produced metal, such as gold, serves as the standard money" (The Case Against the Fed, p. 146).
Not only is that not the "only" way, it's not the best way. (Click here to read about problems with the gold standard). I'm convinced there are at least two methods of monetary reform preferable to the one proposed by Rothbard.
One method, proposed in Robert De Fremery's Rights vs. Privileges, is to peg the debt-free expansion of the U.S. money supply to a "population standard." Another is to peg said expansion to the consumer price index (or something similar) -- that way, if the price level began to rise, the law would require (1) a moderate decrease in the percentage of government spending that comes from newly-issued Treasury currency, and (2) a proportionate increase in the percentage that comes out of tax revenue. If the price level began to fall, the law would require the reverse.
As the resultant decrease in the public debt freed up an increasing percentage of the $200+ billion wasted every year on interest payments alone, and as the resultant boom in prosperity increased the tax base, tax revenues would soon exceed overall expenditures, thereby creating a real budget surplus (as opposed to the phony, "projected" surplus we heard so much about in the late '90s). At that point, adjustments to the growth-rate of the money supply could be made simply by adjusting the percentage of the surplus that is rebated to taxpayers. In other words, the rebate would go down if the price level went up, and up if the price level went down.
Dan Sullivan's Geolibertarian Home Page
The Thomas Paine Network
Fred Foldvary's Home Page
The Banneker Center for Economic Justice
The Henry George Institute
The School of Cooperative Individualism
Agrarian Justice - by Thomas Paine
Progress and Poverty - by Henry George
Social Problems - by Henry George
Democracy vs. Socialism - by Max Hirsch
Selected Articles by Harry Gunnison Brown: The Case for Land Value Taxation - by Harry Gunnison Brown
Libertarian Party at Sea on Land - by Harold Kyriazi
Rights vs. Privileges - by Robert De Fremery
Public Revenue Without Taxation - by Ronald Burgess
Land and Taxation - edited by Nicolaus Tideman
The Corruption of Economics - by Mason Gaffney and Fred Harrison
Of the above list, Libertarian Party at Sea on Land and Rights vs. Privileges are the two best introductions to geolibertarian principles. If you enjoy heavy reading, the two best are Progress and Poverty and Democracy vs. Socialism. (In the latter, Max Hirsch improves upon Henry George's treatment of interest, thereby removing the sole logical blemish from the economic views expounded in the former.)
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