I am a Ph. D. student at theĀ Department of Economics at the University of Mannheim. You can find my CV here (PDF).

Research Interests:
  • Macroeconomics
  • Finance
  • Computational Economics

Job Market Paper:

Corporate Debt Maturity and Investment over the Business Cycle (PDF, 553kb)

I document that the share of long-term debt of US corporate non-financial firms is pro-cyclical. Furthermore, the long-term debt share of small firms has a higher standard deviation and correlation with output than the long-term debt share of large firms. I construct a quantitative model in which firms optimally choose investment, leverage, the maturity structure of debt, dividends, and default. Firms face idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity risk. When they choose their maturity structure, firms trade off default incentives and roll-over costs. As a result, financially constrained firms endogenously prefer to issue short-term debt, because they face high default premia on long-term debt. Financially unconstrained firms issue long-term debt, because it has lower roll-over costs. The model, which is calibrated to match cross-sectional moments, can explain about one third of the variation of the aggregate maturity structure, and about sixty percent of the variation of the maturity structure of small firms. Restricting firms to issue only short-term debt or no debt at all can lead to higher average equity values and less default, but does not increase the average firm value.

Other Papers:

Bank Capital Regulation and Shadow Bank Runs
with Xue Zhang

We study the welfare effects of retail bank capital requirements in a
DSGE model with both retail and shadow banking sectors and endogenous bank runs. Shadow banks differ from retail banks along two key dimensions: They are unregulated and subject to bank runs. Such runs can occur if fire sales depress the price of capital, making shadow banks insolvent. Retail bank capital requirements reduce the frequency of bank runs by mitigating drops in the price of capital during fire sales. However, they reduce the aggregate capital stock by increasing the cost of capital for retail and shadow banks. We calibrate the model using Euro Area data. Under our calibration, retail bank capital requirements are effective: by increasing the bank capital requirement from 8 to 10 percent, the frequency of bank runs decreases from 3 to 1.2 runs per 100 years. At the same time, the steady state capital stock decreases by approximately 1 percent. This cost of bank capital requirements outweighs the benefit of fewer bank runs.

Johannes Poeschl

University of Mannheim
L9, 7, Room 308
68131 Mannheim


+49 (0) 621 181 1473