The Inessential Indexical (with Herman Cappelen)


What is Philosophical Methodology? (forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology)

The Revenge of the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction (2013, Philosophical Perspectives 27, 104-144)

Formal Semantics (2012, in the Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 47-83)

Compositionality (2012, in The Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, 91-102)

History of Connectives (with Dan Bonevac) (2012, in Handbook of the History of Logic Volume XI, 175-234)

Epistemic Modals (2011, in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemology)

The Counterexample Fallacy (with Dan Bonevac and David Sosa) (2011, Mind 120:1143-1158)

The Disunity of Truth (2009, in Compositionality, Context, and Semantic Values)

The Two-Envelope Paradox and Using Variables Within the Expectation Formula (with Eric Schwitzgebel) (2008, Sorites 20:136-141)

Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism (2007, Philosophical Books 48:1-16)

Compositionality (2006, in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, 633-666). Also, the extended mix.

The Conditional Fallacy (with Dan Bonevac and David Sosa) (2006, The Philosophical Review 115:273-316)

Semantic Value (2005, in Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics)

Binding into Character (2004, in New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind)

Review of Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Problems of Compositionality (2003, The Philosophical Review 112:254-258)

Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality (2003, Philosophical Studies 114:223-251)

Complex Demonstratives (2001, Linguistics and Philosophy 24:271-330)

Believing in Words (with Herman Cappelen) (2001, Synthese 127:279-301)

A Clash of Orthodoxies: An Exchange (2000, First Things 104:45-49)

Compositionality as Methodology (1999, Linguistics and Philosophy 22:311-326)

Worlds Apart: On the Possibility of an Actual Infinity (1998, Taiwanese Journal for the Philosophy and History of Science 10:95-116)

Slingshots and Boomerangs (with Stephen Neale) (1997, Mind 106:143-168)

JOSH DEVER is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and a Professorial Fellow at the Arche Philosophical Research Center at the University of St Andrews. He received his undergraduate training at Princeton University (AB Philosophy, 1991) and his graduate training at the University of California at Berkeley (Ph.D. Philosophy, 1998), where he wrote his dissertation Variables under the direction of Stephen Neale and Charles Chihara.

Professor Dever works primarily in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic, with interests in the application of these fields to problems throughout core areas of philosophy. His publications include work on the principle of compositionality in formal semantics and its philosophical consequences ("Compositionality", a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language", "Compositionality as Methodology", Linguistics and Philosophy; "Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality", Philosophical Studies) and work on the consequences of direct reference theories ("Complex Demonstratives", Linguistics and Philosophy; "Believing in Words", Synthese). His recent interests include the semantics, logic, and philosophical applications of conditionals, and foundational issues in the nature of semantic values.

Undercooked Items

(Slides from talks; old drafts I'm not sure what to do with. Buyer beware: ranges from out-of-context-incomprehensible to confused to wrong.)

Negation as Barrier

Some Tentative Diagnostic Remarks on Deep Negation


I am writing a continually-in-progress logic textbook, with the eventual aim of covering pretty much everything of interest to philosophers in logic, broadly conceived. The most recent version of the book can be found here. and is updated once a week.