John Brunero

About Me

I teach ethics and the philosophy of law at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, where I am Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, and Graduate Chair, in the Philosophy Department.  

I received my Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University, where I taught Contemporary Civilization for three years in the Core Curriculum.  Before that, I received my B.A. in government and philosophy from Colby College.  

In 2013-2014, I was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow in the  University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.  

I'm an Associate Editor at The Journal of Ethics, and an Ethics Area Editor at Ergo.   

I was President of the Central States Philosophical Association (CSPA), and organized the most recent annual meeting, which took place here at UNL in April 2022.  

You can reach me through email at:  jbrunero2 [at] unl [dot] edu.

Here's a recent version of my CV (updated in January 2023).

On the right, there are links to several journal articles and reviews.  For draft versions of the papers, you could look at my Phil Papers page, or my page.  Or you could email me for a copy.  

On the left, there's a link to my recent book with OUP on instrumental rationality.  

Papers, etc.       

Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. 

The Extended Theory of Instrumental Rationality and Means-Ends Coherence Philosophical Inquiries [special issue; L. Ferrero, ed.] 11 (2023): 109-125.

Practical Reasons, Theoretical Reasons, and Permissive and Prohibitive Balancing Synthese 200 /92 (2022): 1-23.  

Rationality and Normativity International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2022.  

Intention Persistence Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 104 (2022): 747-763.  

Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2022): 41-64.

The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning The Journal of Ethics 25 (2021):13-37.

Ambivalence, Incoherence, and Self-Governance in The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence (D. Gatzia and B. Brogaard, eds.) Routledge, 2021.

Review of Benjamin Kiesewetter's The Normativity of Rationality Philosophical Review 129 (2020): 313-317.

Fittingness and Good Reasoning Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2019): 133-143.

Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (D. Star, ed.) Oxford University Press, 2018.

Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 99-119

Review of Mark Schroeder's Explaining the Reasons We Share Ethics 126 (2015): 238-244.

Idealization and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Ethics 126 (2015): 153-161. 

Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly on Reasons & Rationality (co-edited with Eric Wiland) 52 (2015)

Cognitivism about Practical Rationality Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9  (R. Shafer-Landau, ed. ) Oxford University Press, 2014, 18-44.   

*awarded the 2016 American Philosophical Association Article Prize for the "best paper published in the previous two years by a younger scholar" (under 40 or within 10 years of Ph.D.).  I am no longer a younger scholar.  

Rational Akrasia  Organon F (special issue on the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality, ed. J. Fink) 20 (2013): 546-566.

Reasons as Explanations Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 805-824. 

Instrumental Rationality  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (co-authored with Niko Kolodny): 2013; updated 2018, updated 2023.

Metaethics and Ethics  International Encyclopedia of Ethics (co-authored with Eric Wiland) 2013

Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry, and Scope  Philosophical Studies 157 (2012): 125-140. 

Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons  Utilitas 22 (2010): 351-359. 

Self-Governance, Means-Ends Coherence, and Unalterable Ends  Ethics 120 (2010): 579-591.

The Scope of Rational Requirements  Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010): 28-49. 

Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality  Philosophical Studies 146 (2009): 311-325. 

Reasons and Evidence One Ought  Ethics 119 (2009): 538-545. 

McDowell on External Reasons  European Journal of Philosophy 16 (2008): 22-42.  

Are Intentions Reasons?  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007): 424-444.  

Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (2005): 557-569. 

Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 2-20. 

Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism  Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2004) 253-264.