John Brunero

About Me

I teach ethics and the philosophy of law at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, where I am Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, and Graduate Chair, in the Philosophy Department.

I received my Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University, where I taught Contemporary Civilization for three years in the Core Curriculum. Before that, I received my B.A. in government and philosophy from Colby College.

In 2013-2014, I was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.

I'm an Associate Editor at The Journal of Ethics, and an Ethics Area Editor at Ergo.

I am currently the President of the Central States Philosophical Association, and will be organizing the next meeting of the CSPA, which will be April 29-30, 2022 at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

You can reach me through email at: jbrunero2 [at] unl [dot] edu.

Here's a recent version of my CV (updated in August 2021).

On the right, there are links to several journal articles and reviews. For draft versions of the papers, you could look at my Phil Papers page, or my academia.edu page. Or you could email me for a copy.

On the left, there's a link to my recent book with OUP on instrumental rationality.



Papers, etc.

Rationality and Normativity International Encyclopedia of Ethics, forthcoming.

Intention Persistence Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.

Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.

The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning The Journal of Ethics 25 (2021):13-37.

Ambivalence, Incoherence, and Self-Governance in The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence (D. Gatzia and B. Brogaard, eds.) Routledge, 2021.

Review of Benjamin Kiesewetter's The Normativity of Rationality Philosophical Review 129 (2020): 313-317.

Fittingness and Good Reasoning Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2019): 133-143.

Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (D. Star, ed.) Oxford University Press, 2018.

Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 99-119

Review of Mark Schroeder's Explaining the Reasons We Share Ethics 126 (2015): 238-244.

Idealization and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Ethics 126 (2015): 153-161.

Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly on Reasons & Rationality (co-edited with Eric Wiland) 52 (2015)

Cognitivism about Practical Rationality Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9 (R. Shafer-Landau, ed. ) Oxford University Press, 2014, 18-44.

*awarded the 2016 American Philosophical Association Article Prize for the best paper published in the previous two years by a younger scholar (under 40 or within 10 years of Ph.D.). I am no longer a younger scholar.

Rational Akrasia Organon F (special issue on the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality, ed. J. Fink) 20 (2013): 546-566.

Reasons as Explanations Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 805-824.

Instrumental Rationality Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (co-authored with Niko Kolodny): 2013, updated 2018.

Metaethics and Ethics International Encyclopedia of Ethics (co-authored with Eric Wiland) 2013

Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry, and Scope Philosophical Studies 157 (2012): 125-140.

Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Utilitas 22 (2010): 351-359.

Self-Governance, Means-Ends Coherence, and Unalterable Ends Ethics 120 (2010): 579-591.

The Scope of Rational Requirements Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010): 28-49.

Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality Philosophical Studies 146 (2009): 311-325.

Reasons and Evidence One Ought Ethics 119 (2009): 538-545.

McDowell on External Reasons European Journal of Philosophy 16 (2008): 22-42.

Are Intentions Reasons? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007): 424-444.

Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (2005): 557-569.

Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 2-20.

Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2004) 253-264.