Here is the schedule. Readings are attached below ('*' indicates an optional reading).
I. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXT
1/31 Rationalism
Descartes, Rules 1-4, 6-7, 9, and 11-12 of Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence (1626-1628)
Bonjour, “The Problem of A Priori Justification” (ch. 1 of In Defense of Pure Reason, CUP, 1998)
Peacocke and Boghossian, “Introduction” (in New Essays on the A Priori, OUP, 2000)
* Quine, §6 of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Phil Review, 1951) -- check out Quine's Pyke-photo/blurb (cf. Stich's Pyke-photo/blurb)
* Peacocke, ch. 1 of The Realm of Reason (OUP, 2004)
2/7 Arguments for Intuition and/or the A Priori
Bealer, “The Incoherence of Empiricism” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1992)
Bonjour, chapter two (esp. §§2.1-3, 7) and §4.2 of In Defense of Pure Reason (CUP, 1998)
* Peacocke, §5 of “Explaining the A Priori” (in New Essays on the A Priori, OUP, 2000)
* Weatherson, “Intuition isn’t Unreliable” (TAR weblog, 2008 -- link)
* Dogramici, “Knowledge of Validity” (Nous, 2010)
II. THE NATURE AND EPISTEMIC STATUS OF INTUITION
2/14 Intellectual Seemings, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Modal Reliabilism
Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy” (in Rethinking Intuition, 1998)
Huemer, §§5.3-4 of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Palgrave MacMillian, 2001)
Tolhurst, “Seemings” (American Phil Quarterly, 1998)
* Pust, §C of “Intuition” (SEP entry, forthcoming)
* Huemer, §§5.1-2 of Ethical Intuitionism (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005)
* Markie, §1 of “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief” (Nous, 2006)
* Koksvik, “Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability” (ms -- link)
* Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (PPR, 2007)
2/21 Attractions to Assent and Virtue Epistemology
Sosa, “Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status” (Phil Studies, 1996)
Sosa, “Intuitions” - chapter three of A Virtue Epistemology (OUP, 2007)
Boghossian, “Virtuous Intuitions” (Phil Studies, 2009)
* Sosa, “Intuitions and Truth” (in Realism and Truth, OUP, 2006)
* Lynch, “Trusting Intuitions” (in Realism and Truth, OUP, 2006)
2/28 Reflective Equilibrium, Intuitive Justification, and Theoretical Virtues
Lewis, selection from the Introduction to Philosophical Papers, volume 1 (OUP, 1983)
Lewis, “The Incredulous Stare” (§2.8 of On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, 1986)
Weatherson, “What Good are Counterexamples?” (Phil Studies, 2003)
Kelly and McGrath, §1 and §5 of “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” (Phil Perspectives, 2010)
* Pust, ch. 1 of Intuitions as Evidence (Garland Publishers, 2000)
* Kelly and McGrath, §§2-4 of “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” (Phil Perspectives, 2010)
3/6 Minimalism and Evidence Neutrality
Williamson, selections from The Philosophy of Philosophy (OUP, 2007) -- pp. 1-5, §5.5, §§6.1-3, §§7.1-2, and §§7.6-7
* Malmgren, “Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements” (Mind, 2011)
* Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe” (Phil Studies, 2009)
* Schapiro, “The Nature of Inclination” (Ethics, 2009)
3/13 Quasi-perceptualism
Chudnoff, “What Intuitions are Like” (PPR, 2011)
Bengson, “The Intellectual Given” (ms)
* Conee, “Seeing the Truth” (PPR, 1998)
* Parsons, §5 of “Platonism and Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Gödel's Thought” (Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 1995)
* Bealer, §9 of “Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism” (Phil Perspectives, 1987)
* Chudnoff, “The Nature of Intuitive Justification” (Phil Studies, 2009)
3/20 “Naturalistic” Theories of Intuition
Goldman, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status” (GPS, 2007)
Kornblith, “Naturalism and Intuitions” (GPS, 2007)
Williamson, “Naturalism and its Limits” (NYT, 2011)
* Korblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself” (ch.1 of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, OUP, 2002)
* §4 of Weatherson, “What Good are Counterexamples?” (Phil Studies, 2003)
* Berker, notes on Kornblith's account of intuitions [link]
III. CHALLENGES TO INTUITION
3/27 Intuition and Error
Bonjour, §§4.4-5 of In Defense of Pure Reason (CUP, 1998)
Weinberg, “How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically without Risking Skepticism” (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2007)
Bealer, “Intuition and Modal Error” (in Epistemology: New Essays, OUP, 2008)
Bealer, pp. 109-114 (on "the three C's") of “The Incoherence of Empiricism” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1992)
* Stich, “Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology, and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity” (in Rethinking Intuition, 1998)
* Cummins, “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium” (in Rethinking Intuition, 1998)
* Huemer, §§6.3-4 of Ethical Intuitionism (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005)
* D. Sosa, §§1-4, 6 of “Skepticism about Intuition” (Philosophy, 2006)
* Bonjour, “Non-Euclidean Geometry and Relativity” (from In Defense of Pure Reason, 1998)
4/10 Experimental Philosophy
Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg, “The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions” (PPR, 2008)
Bengson, §§1-2 of “Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers” (PPR, forthcoming) [read on as interested]
E. Sosa, “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition” (Phil Studies, 2007)
Ludwig, “The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First-person and Third-person Approaches” (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2007)
* Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (Phil Perspectives, 2001) [link]
* E. Sosa, “A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy” (in Stich and His Critics, 2005)
* Alexander and Weinberg, “Experimental Philosophy and Analytic Epistemology” (Phil Compass, 2007)
* Wright, §4 of “On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic” (Cognition, 2010)
* Cullen, “Survey-driven Romanticism” (Review of Phil and Psych, 2010)
4/17 The Benacerraf Problem
Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth” (Journal of Philosophy, 1973)
Field, selections from Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (OUP, 1989)
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic”, esp. (Phil Perspectives, 2010)
* Field, §I and §V of “Recent Debates about the A Priori”, (in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2005)
* Linnebo, “Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism” (Phil Studies, 2006)
* Mackie, §1.9 (“The Argument from Queerness”) of Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977) [link]
* Balaguer, §5 (“The Epistemological Argument against Platonism”) of the entry on “Platonism in Metaphysics” (SEP, 2009) [link]
* Linnebo, brief selections from the entry on “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics” (SEP, 2011) -- §1.0 [link], §2.1 [link], and §4.1 [link]
4/24 Responding to the Benacerraf Problem
Lewis, “How Can We Know?” (§2.4 of On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, 1986)
E. Sosa, “Reliability and the A Priori” (in Conceivability and Possibility, OUP, 2002)
Bengson, “Grasping the Third Realm” (ms) [link]
* Bonjour, §6.7 (“Toward a Theory of Mental Content”) of In Defense of Pure Reason (CUP, 1998)
* Boghossian, §IV of “Blind Reasoning” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2003)
* Burge, selections from “Frege on Knowing the Third Realm” (Mind, 1992)
* Wright, “Intuition, Entitlement, and the Epistemology of Logical Laws” (Dialectica, 2004)
* Field, §VI of “Recent Debates about the A Priori”, (in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2005)
* D. Sosa, §5 of “Skepticism about Intuition” (Philosophy, 2006)
* Chudnoff, “Awareness of Abstract Objects” (Nous, 2012)
4/31 Evolutionary/Debunking Arguments
Street, §§1-6, 8, and 11 of “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (Phil Studies, 2006)
* Rea, §§8.3-4 (“The Evolutionary Argument Against Atheism” and “Against Intuitionism”) of A World Without Design (CUP, 2002)
* Bedke, “Intuitive Non-naturalism meets Cosmic Coincidence” (Pacific Phil Quarterly, 2009)
* Enoch, “The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism” (Phil Studies, 2010)
* Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge” (Ethics, 2012)
5/7 Explanationism and Skepticism
Pust, “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Intuitions” (Phil Studies, 2001)
White, §§1-2, 4.1-3, and 5 of “You Just Believe that Because...” (Phil Perspectives, 2010)
* Schechter, pp. 452-454 of “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic” (Phil Perspectives, 2010)