Johannes Moser

I received my PhD in Economics from the University of Regensburg as a member of the International Graduate Program "Evidence-Based Economics" (EBE), funded by the Elite Network of Bavaria.

Currently, I am working as an Analyst for d-fine GmbH ( ).

My research interests are behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory and applied microeconometrics.

Here you can find a current CV.


Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation (Theory and Decision 87 (1), 17-56.)

There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue - also denoted by contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The overall pattern of the data suggests that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find negative effects of additional information.

Available under:

View-only version is available under:

[PDF of working paper]

Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games (with Michael Eichenseer) (Economics Letters, 108941 )

To classify cooperation types, a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a one-shot public goods game are convenient experimental setups. We explore the within subject stability of cooperation preferences in these two games. Our results suggest that subjects classified as conditional cooperators in the prisoner's dilemma match others' contributions in the public goods game to a significantly larger degree compared to other types, which indicates a substantial consistency. We find that the prisoner's dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game.

Available under:

[PDF of working paper]

Correlation neglect in voting decisions: An experiment (with Niklas Wallmeier) (Economics Letters, 1109656 )

We investigate the influence of correlation neglect on information aggregation when a voter has to weigh external information against her preferences. In an online experiment, the subjects have to vote on either a safe or a risky payment of the same expected value for their society. The voters receive either one or two signals providing a hint about which alternative may yield a bonus or a penalty for each member once implemented. Our findings suggest that, in line with theoretical evidence, information aggregation may be improved by correlation neglect since it reduces uninformed voting.

Available under:

[PDF of working paper]

Working Papers

Leadership in dynamic public good provision: Endogenous growth and inequality (with Michael Eichenseer)

We explore how leadership affects a dynamic public goods game. Using an experimental setting where cooperation gains can be reinvested, our findings suggest that leadership has a positive impact on final wealth of the groups. Additionally, we also observe that leadership has a positive effect on reducing inequality within groups as measured by the Gini index. Based on a sequential prisoner's dilemma, we elicit types for conditional cooperation. Our results indicate that groups work best when led by cooperatively inclined individuals. Furthermore, early contributions by the leader are crucial and yield a high return.