Joel Katzav

School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
University of Queensland



About Me

After receiving my PhD in Philosophy early in 1999, I worked as a translator and a software engineer. I returned to academia towards the end of 2000 and have, since then, worked at the University of Arkansas, the University of Dundee, the University of Reading, the University of Oxford, the University of Leeds and Eindhoven University of Technology. I have been at the University of Queensland since the start of 2017.

My PhD examines Neo-Kantian, Humean and necessitarian conceptions of laws of nature using an empirical methodology. Since completing my PhD, I have published work in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, argumentation theory and the history of philosophy. My main research focus over the last six years has been the philosophy of climate modelling, including its epistemology and theoretical foundations. I have argued that probabilistic assessment of our uncertainty about climate is unreliable and have proposed a possibilist approach as an alternative means of assessing this uncertainty.




Published/accepted papers

Katzav, J. and Vaesen, K. (2017) ‘On the emergence of American analytic philosophy’, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy

von der Heydt A. S., Dijkstra H. A., van de Wal R. S. W., Caballero R., Crucifix M., Foster G. L., Huber M., Kohler P., Rohling E., Valdes P. J., Ashwin P., Bathiany S., Berends T., van Bree L. G. J., Ditlevsen P., Ghil M., Haywood A., Katzav J., Lohmann G., Lohmann J., Lucarini V., Marzocchi A., Palike H., Ruvalcaba Baroni I., Simon D., Sluijs A., Stap L. B., Tantet A., Viebahn J., Ziegler M. (2016), ‘Lessons on climate sensitivity from past climate changesCurrent Climate Change Reports, doi:10.1007/s40641-016-0049-3.

Katzav, J. and Parker, W. S. (2015) ‘The future of climate modeling’, Climatic Change, 132, pp. 375-387.

Katzav, J. and Parker, W. S. (2015) ‘Introduction to Assessing climate models: Knowledge, Values and Policy’, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5(2), pp. 141-148.

Katzav, J. (2014) ‘The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2014, 46(B), pp. 228-238.

Katzav, J. (2013) ‘Severe testing of climate change hypotheses’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 44(4), pp. 433-441.

Katzav, J. (2013) ‘Dispositions, causes, persistence as is, and general relativity’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 27(1), pp. 41-57.

Katzav, J., Dijkstra, H. and A. T. J. de Laat (2012) ‘Assessing climate model projections: state of the art and philosophical reflections’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 43(4), pp. 258-276.

Katzav, J. (2012) 'Hybrid models, climate models and inference to the best explanation',British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi: 10.1093/bjps/axs002.

Katzav, J. (2011) 'Should we assess climate model predictions in light of severe tests?', Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union, 92(23), p. 195.

For older papers see my page on


Special editions

Assessing climate models: Knowledge, Values and Policy (ed. with W. S. Parker), European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2015, 5(2).

Online talks


Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), 20-6-2011


 What scientific models might teach: philosophical perspectives ( Audio and PowerPoint)