I am an economist, belonging to BETA (Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée) at the University of Strasbourg, France. I have two main topics of research :
- Industrial organization (more particularly, networks and payment systems)
- Economics of Incentives (with applications to personnel economics, and education economics ).
June 13, 2019 : New working paper : Managing Employees 'Insides' to Remedy Agency Problems? A Model of Transformational Leadership with Olivier Simard-Casanova (BETA)
We consider a leader who can choose between a transactional or a transformational style of leadership to motivate a team of followers, in presence of moral hazard and free riding. Transformational leadership extends transactional leadership by allowing the leader to deliver a motivational message in addition to standard monetary incentives. When followers adhere to the leader's message, they get more motivated and exert more effort. We show that there is a complementary between monetary incentives and the motivational message. Furthermore followers are better off under transformational leadership. We also show that when the team size increases, transformational leadership - even if it comes at a fixed implementation cost - becomes less and less profitable for the leader compared to transactional leadership, at least when the size increase does not reinforce too much the social incentives to adhere to the leader's vision. When the size increase makes social incentives sufficiently stronger, transformational leadership regains interest and can even remedy the free-riding and moral hazard problems. Our results are in line with the empirical literature on leadership.
February 2018 : new publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (JEBO): "Becoming 'We' Instead of 'I', Identity Management and Incentives in The Workplace" (joint with Trude Gunnes, SSB)
Abstract: In this article, we show that the firm can be viewed as a locus of socialization wherein employees with heterogeneous work attitudes can be motivated and coordinated through adherence to a social norm of effort. We develop an agency model in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal of effort. The firm does not observe the personal ideals, but can make its workforce more sensitive to the social ideal by fostering social interaction in the workplace. We show that there are two reasons why the firm invests in social bonding. First, it reinforces the effectiveness of monetary incentives and increases average effort. Second, strengthening the social ideal reduces the adverse selection problem and the need for distorted compensation schemes. We further show that the firm allocates more time to social interaction when personal ideals of effort are low or heterogeneous. How work norms make people more similar (and predictable) and how this affects optimal incentive schemes has not yet received much attention in the literature.
Keywords : agency theory, social interaction, social norms, norm regulation.