Jing Wang 

Assistant Professor of Finance

Department of Finance

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Lincoln, NE 68588-0490


Welcome to my webpage!

I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, College of Business Administration.

Previously, I worked at Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance

In 2013, I graduated from Purdue University, Krannert School of Management with a PhD in Finance.

I conduct empirical research on corporate finance and my recent research focuses on financial contracting and creditor control rights.

Here is my Resume.


Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights (with David J. Denis), 2014, Journal of Financial Economics.

Abstract: Using a large sample of private debt renegotiations from 1996 to 2011, we report that, even in the absence of any covenant violation, debt covenants are frequently renegotiated. These renegotiations primarily relax existing restrictions and result in economically large changes in existing limits. Renegotiations of specific covenants are a response to both the distance the covenant variable is from its contractual limit and the firm׳s specific operating conditions and prospects. Moreover, the borrower׳s post-renegotiation investment and financial policies are strongly associated with the covenant changes resulting from the renegotiation. Overall, the findings imply that, even outside of default states, creditors have strong control rights over the borrower׳s operating and financial policies, and they exercise these rights in a state contingent manner through covenant renegotiations.

Working paper:

Debt Covenant Design and Creditor Control Rights: Evidence from Covenant Restrictiveness and Loan Outcomes 

Abstract: I examine the association between the ex ante design of debt covenant restrictions and the ex post exercise of creditor control rights.  I find that contracts with higher level of covenant restrictiveness at loan origination are more likely to subsequently experience either a covenant renegotiation or a covenant violation, suggesting that stricter covenants translate into more frequent exercise of creditor control rights.  Further, I find that contracts in which capital expenditure restrictions are the most restrictive covenant are more likely to be renegotiated, while those in which income statement covenants are the most restrictive covenant are more likely to be violated, even after controlling for the level of covenant restrictiveness.  Overall, my results imply that the ex ante design of covenant restrictiveness plays an important role in the ex post transfer of control rights.