Published papers:

Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Can Reduce Prices (with Michael Sacks) 

Economics Letters (2026) [working paper version, supplemental appendix]

Theories suggesting that minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) is pro-competitive typically rely on inducing costly investments by downstream firms that are valued by consumers. We present a model in which minimum RPM can be implemented by an upstream monopolist with many downstream retailers that benefits consumers independent of the provision of complementary services or inventory effects. Minimum RPM disrupts coordination by downstream firms that sustains the monopoly price, leading to lower retail prices and higher retail quantities. Counter-intuitively, therefore, a binding minimum resale price can reduce retail prices, which increases consumer surplus and aggregate producer surplus. 

Do Ridesharing Services Increase Alcohol Consumption? (with Keith Teltser and Conor Lennon)

Journal of Health Economics (2021) [working paper version] 

Recent studies suggest ridesharing services, such as Uber and Lyft, may reduce instances of intoxicated driving. However, such services may reduce the costs, and thus increase the frequency and intensity, of drinking activity. To examine whether ridesharing affects alcohol consumption, we leverage spatial and temporal variation in the presence of Uber's taxi-like service, UberX, across the United States. Using self-reported measures of alcohol consumption in the past 30 days among individuals aged 21 to 64, we find that UberX is associated with a 3.6% increase in number of drinks per drinking day, a 2.7% increase in drinking days, a 5.4% increase in total drinks, a 4.3% increase in the maximum number of drinks in a single occasion, and a 1.3% increase in those who report drinking any alcohol. For certain groups, such as males, individuals aged 21-34, and students, UberX is associated with even larger increases in drinking. For example, among those aged 21-34, total drinks increase by 7.4% and binge drinking instances increase by 9.5%. We also find that the marginal impact of Uber on drinking is larger in areas that have weaker public transit. Using administrative employment data, we find that some of the additional alcohol consumption is occurring at bars. Specifically, we estimate that UberX is associated with a 3.5% increase in employment and a 3.7% increase in total earnings among workers at NAICS-designated “drinking places.

The Strategic Impacts of Voluntary vs. Mandated Vertical Restraints and Termination Restrictions on Exclusion of Rivals 

Journal of Regulatory Economics (2021) [working paper version] 

It has been shown that manufacturers can employ vertical practices and restraints to prevent entry in markets where upstream entrants require downstream accommodation. I show that if downstream product investment is important and encouraged by the restraint, foreclosing entry this way may not be credible. Additionally, publicly mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions could prevent foreclosure, but if these restrictions reduce downstream product investment, they could have the opposite effect and decrease entry.

Impact of Mandated Exclusive Territories in the US Brewing Industry: Evidence from scanner level data 

International Journal of Industrial Organization (2019) [working paper version]

I examine the competitive effects of mandated exclusive territories in the US beer industry. Theory is ambiguous as to the competitive impacts of this vertical practice. Using scanner data from a large number of grocery stores, I empirically examine the impact on beer prices, quantities, and number of brands sold after Wisconsin mandated that brewers must assign exclusive wholesale territories in 2006. Reduced form results from a differences-in-differences model using several control groups and a synthetic control show that the mandates increased prices and reduced quantity of craft beer. Overall number of brands sold decreased as well and craft brewers were the most negatively impacted. Findings suggest that the mandate gave protection to wholesalers and caused an increase in the costs of distribution and reduced competition in the brewing industry.

Working Papers:

Exclusive Territories and Efficiency: Evidence from the brewing industry (revisions requested)

Theories conflict as to whether the use of vertically imposed exclusive territories have a positive or negative impact on welfare, and the appropriate antitrust treatment of these policies has long been debated. I examine the impact that the use of exclusive wholesale territories have in the brewing industry. I do so by studying beer sales in Indiana which banned the use exclusive wholesale territories from 1979-2002. After the repeal of the ban, brewers specified exclusive wholesale territories in contracts. Estimates show that beer sales increased significantly and prices also increased. This is consistent with higher levels of product investments downstream and the efficiency-based theories of exclusive territories.  

Franchise Termination Laws, Craft Brewery Entry and Growth

This paper estimates how beer franchise laws and their interaction with restrictions on vertical integration between manufacturing and wholesaling impacted US craft brewers’ entry and production decisions. The effects are identified by exploiting variation in policies across states and time between 1980 and 2016. I find that beer franchise laws significantly reduced craft brewery entry and growth, leading to lower levels of breweries and craft beer production. The effects are largest in states that place restrictions on brewery/wholesaler integration. The findings in this paper indicate that contract termination restrictions, which were legislated to protect wholesalers from upstream brewers, had the effect of encouraging opportunism from wholesalers and inhibited the growth of smaller firms in the industry. 

(previously circulated as "Trouble Brewing? Impact of Mandated Vertical Restraints on Craft Brewery Entry and Production")

Employment

Federal Trade Commission 2026-present

Economist

US Department of Justice 2020-2026
Antitrust Division
Economic Analysis Group
Economist

University of Louisville 2016-2019

Visiting Assistant Professor