nd Psychological Fluency
In Press. Understanding and Psychological Fluency. In Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding, Oxford University Press, 7000-9000 words, Edited by Stephen Grimm. Oxford University Press.
2016. Epistemology for (Real) People (with Mike Bishop). Chapter 8 in Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy. (Eds.) David Coady, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Kimberley Brownlee. Blackwell, pp.103-119.
2013. Diagnostic Prediction and Prognosis: Getting from Symptom to Treatment. In William Fulford (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. New York: Oxford (with Michael Bishop; 8000 words).
2013. Clinical versus Actuarial Prediction. (pp.613-615) In H. Pashler, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Reference, with Michael Bishop.
2013. Democracy and Scientific Expertise: Illusions of Political and Epistemic Inclusion. Synthese (Special Issue), 190, 1267-1291. (Eds.) Klemens Kappel, Kristoffer Ahlstrom, and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen.
2012. The Language of Consent in Police Encounters. In Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Language and Law. New York: Oxford University Press (with Janice Nadler as first author).
2010. Philosophical Messages in the Medium of Spoken Language. In Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press (with Robert Remez), pp.234-263.
2008. Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass, 3/5, 1049-1065. (A refereed entry for a subscription database, sponsored by Blackwell; with Michael Bishop).
2008. Seduction Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 281-282.
2007. A Restriction Maybe, but is it Paternalism? Cognitive Bias and Choosing Governmental Decision Aids. NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, 2(3), 455-469.
2007. The Psychology of Discounting: A Policy of Balancing Biases. Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 21(2), 201-220.
2007. The Psychology of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass, 2/3, 564-591. (A refereed entry for a subscription database, sponsored by Blackwell).
2005. The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Noûs 39 (4), 696-714 (with Michael Bishop).
2005. Lexical Boosting of Noise-band Speech in Open- and Closed-set Formats. Speech Communication 47(4), 424-435.
2005. Paternalism and Cognitive Bias. Law and Philosophy 24(4, July), 393-434.
2005. Paying the Price for a Theory of Explanation: de Regt’s Discussion of Trout (2002). Philosophy of Science 72 (January), 198-208.
2004. The Philosophical Legacy of Meehl (1978): Confirmation Theory, Theory Quality, and Quantitative Epistemology. Applied & Preventive Psychology: Current Scientific Perspectives, 11(1), 73-76.
2003. Biological Specializations for Speech: What Can the Animals Tell Us? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(5, October), 155-159.
2003. Epistemology’s Search for Significance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 15(2), 203-216 (with Michael Bishop).
2002. Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding. Philosophy of Science 69(2), 212-233.
2002. 50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should be Enough: Lessons for the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S197-S208 (with Michael Bishop).
2001. Metaphysics, Method and the Mouth: Philosophical Lessons of Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology, 14, (3), 261-291.
2001. The Biological Basis of Speech: What to Infer from Talking to the Animals. Psychological Review, 108, (3), 523-549.
2000. Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Redistribution, and the Science of Happiness. Journal of Law and Politics, 16(4), 765-847 (with Shahid Buttar as second author).
1999. Measured Realism and Statistical Inference: An Explanation for the Fast Progress of ‘Hard’ Psychology. Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings): S260-S272.
1995. Diverse Tests on an Independent World. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 26 (3), 407-429.
1995. Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence (pp.187-217). In Ü. D. Yalçin and E. E. Savellos, eds., Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (with P. K. Moser).
1995. Ontological Progress in Science. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25 (2), 177-201 (with R. Burian as first author).
1994. Austere Realism and the Worldly Assumptions of Inferential Statistics (pp.190-199). In M. Forbes, D. Hull, and R. Burian, eds., Philosophy of Science 1994, Volume 1, Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.
1994. A Realistic Look Backward. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 25 (1), 37-64.
1993. Robustness and Integrative Survival in Significance Testing: The World's Contribution to Rationality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 1-15.
1992. Theory-Conjunction and Mercenary Reliance. Philosophy of Science, 59, 231-245.
1991. Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress. Synthese, 87, 379-400.
1990. Auditory and Visual Influences on Phonemic Restoration. Language and Speech, 33, 121-135 (with William Poser as second author).