justin.dallmann [at] usc [dot] edu | Vitae
I am an ABD PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of Southern California working with Kenny Easwaran. My principal research interests focus on questions about epistemological normativity like: "What should we believe in light of our evidence?", "How confident should we be in a given proposition?", "What is evidence anyways?", and "How is belief in a proposition related to our confidence in that proposition?".
I also have major research interests in normative ethics, the philosophy of science, philosophical logic, and modality.
Before beginning my PhD at USC, I received an MA in Philosophy from the University of Manitoba on Bayesian measures of confirmation --- the theory of what evidentially impacts what --- under Rhonda Martens, Chris Tillman and Brad C. Johnson. Before that I completed an Honours degree in Philosophy with a concentration in Mathematics at the University of Manitoba.
"Epistemic Reasons to Ignore Evidence."
"Credal Stability and Auxiliary Rejection."
"A Frankfurtian Account of the 'Real Self'."
"Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."
"Aristotle's Strong Conditional in Theta.4."
"A Generalized Theory of Explanation."
Below are some some resources for getting students ready to do philosophy inspired by Feldman's Reason and Argument --- produced using the online TeX editor ShareLaTeX:
For those who are tired of "Blackboard" and other university communication websites, I strongly endorse the use of edmodo.com as an educational social-media option for stimulating philosophical discussion outside of class.
Mudd Hall Philosophy Library
(2014) "A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism", Synthese, Online first DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0402-9.
(Forth) "Historicist Theories of Rationality", Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2014 edition. With Carl Matheson.
URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/.
(2013) "Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."
(November, 2012) "A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism."
(2011) "The 'Real Self' - A Frankfurtian Account."
(2011) "Taking Confirmation First: Towards a Naive Conception of Confirmation Theory."
(April, 2009) "The Paradox of Confirmation Generalized."
(May, 2006) "Simplicity, Bayes' Theorem and Subjectivity."