About me

justin [at] jdallmann [point] org

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Toronto working with Jonathan Weisberg. I received my doctorate in philosophy at the University of Southern California in 2015, working with Kenny EaswaranJacob Ross, and Ralph Wedgwood.

My principal research interests focus on questions at the intersection of epistemology, the philosophy of science, and cognitive science like:

"What should we believe in light of our evidence?", "What is evidence and evidential impact?", "How should we respond to information given our cognitive limitations?", and "How does our believing a proposition relate to our confidence that that proposition obtains?".

In addition, I have research interests in the psychology of human reasoning, philosophical logic, modality, and ethics broadly construed.

Before beginning my PhD at USC, I received an MA in Philosophy from the University of Manitoba on Bayesian measures of confirmation --- the theory of what evidentially impacts what --- under Rhonda Martens, Chris Tillman and Brad C. Johnson. Before that I completed an honours degree in Philosophy with a concentration in Mathematics at the University of Manitoba. 

Manuscripts in progress 

(Latest drafts available on request!)

"Plans, Persistent Possibilities, and Probabilistic Belief States." (Under review)

"When Obstinacy is a Better (Cognitive) Policy." (R&R)

"A Puzzle Concerning Evidence, Belief, and Credence."

"Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."

Teaching resources

Below are some reference resources on argument which are inspired by Feldman's Reason and Argument:

If you are interested in the source tex files, let me know.

For those who are tired of "Blackboard" and other university communication websites, I also strongly endorse the use of edmodo.com as an educational social media option for stimulating philosophical discussion outside of class.

Mudd Hall Philosophy Library

"A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism", Synthese, 191(10):2301-2313, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0402-9.

"Historicist Theories of Scientific Rationality",  with Carl Matheson, in Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2014 edition.

Selected conference activity

(2016) "A Puzzle Concerning Evidence, Belief, and Credence"

  1. MuST 9: Evidence, Inference, and Risk, Ludwig Maximilians University Munich, March.
  2. Université de Montréal (invited speaker), February.

(2014-15) "When Obstinacy is a Better (Cognitive) Policy."

  1. The Formal Epistemology Workshop, Washington University in St. Louis, May (2015).
  2. The Norms of Inquiry Workshop, session on stability and belief with Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson, New York University, February.
  3. The Inductive Logic and Confirmation in Science Workshop, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, October (2014).
  4. Invited colloquium speaker at the University of Manitoba, October (2014).

(2014) "Plans, Persistent Possibilities, and Probabilistic Belief States."

The Society for Exact Philosophy, Caltech, Pasadena, June. 

(2013-14) "Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."

  1. APA Pacific Division, San Diego, March (2014).
  2. Western Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, Winnipeg, October.

(November, 2012) "A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism."

Arché/CSMN Graduate Student Conference, University of Oslo.

(2011) "The 'Real Self' - A Frankfurtian Account."

  1. Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (poster presentation), University of Colorado, August.
  2. Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Philosophy Conference, Princeton, March.

(2011) "Taking Confirmation First: Towards a Naive Conception of Confirmation Theory."

  1. Society for Exact Philosophy, Winnipeg, June.
  2. Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference, UC Davis, March.
  3. Pitt-CMU Graduate Conference, Carnegie Mellon University, March.
  4. The 33rd Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, March.
(April, 2009) "The Paradox of Confirmation Generalized."

City University of New York 12th Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, CUNY.

(May, 2006) "Simplicity, Bayes' Theorem and Subjectivity."

Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, York University.

Other stuff

When I'm not doing philosophy, I spend most of my time with my wonderful wife, Amanda, and son, Reid. I have learned more about pedagogy from them than anyone else.

When I have the time, I enjoy making sounds and have had the privilege to play with some great acts from the frigid tundra of Manitoba and philosophers from Southern California.

Site design

Inspired by Roberts via Schupbach via Beall via Sider.