My principal research interests focus on questions at the intersection of epistemology, the philosophy of science, and cognitive science like:
"What should we believe in light of our evidence?", "What is evidence and evidential impact?", "How should we respond to information given our cognitive limitations?", and "How does our believing a proposition relate to our confidence that that proposition obtains?".
In addition, I have research interests in the psychology of human reasoning, philosophical logic, modality, and ethics broadly construed.
Before beginning my PhD at USC, I received an MA in Philosophy from the University of Manitoba on Bayesian measures of confirmation—the theory of what evidentially impacts what—under Rhonda Martens, Chris Tillman and Brad C. Johnson. Before that I completed an honours degree in Philosophy with a concentration in Mathematics at the University of Manitoba.
"Plans, Persistent Possibilities, and Probabilistic Belief States." (Under review)
"When Obstinacy is a Better (Cognitive) Policy." (R&R)
"A Puzzle Concerning Evidence, Belief, and Credence."
"Inseparability or Encroachment."
"Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."
Below are some reference resources on argument which are inspired by Feldman's Reason and Argument:
If you are interested in the source tex files, let me know.
For those who are tired of "Blackboard" and other university communication websites, I also strongly endorse the use of edmodo.com as an educational social media option for stimulating philosophical discussion outside of class.
Mudd Hall Philosophy Library
"A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism", Synthese, 191(10):2301-2313, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0402-9.
"Historicist Theories of Scientific Rationality", with Carl Matheson, in Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2014 edition.
(2016) "A Puzzle Concerning Evidence, Belief, and Credence"
(2014-15) "When Obstinacy is a Better (Cognitive) Policy."
(2014) "Plans, Persistent Possibilities, and Probabilistic Belief States."
(2013-14) "Existence and the Cognitive Event-type Theory of Propositions."
(November, 2012) "A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism."
(2011) "The 'Real Self' - A Frankfurtian Account."
(2011) "Taking Confirmation First: Towards a Naive Conception of Confirmation Theory."
(April, 2009) "The Paradox of Confirmation Generalized."
(May, 2006) "Simplicity, Bayes' Theorem and Subjectivity."