A B O U T




J O N    M O R G A N
Ph.D. student
Dept. of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
jbrinkmorgan [at] utexas [dot] edu

























































Perception of an object costs
Precise the Object’s loss—
Perception in itself a Gain
Replying to its Price—

The Object Absolute—is nought—
Perception sets it fair
And then upbraids a Perfectness
That situates so far—

-Emily Dickinson






R E S E A R C H     I N T E R E S T S 

I am primarily interested in exploring the extent to which the senses are like familiar technical instruments. For instance, a speedometer can 'say' that something is moving at a certain speed, but it cannot say which particular thing is moving at that speed. Similarly, we might think that the visual system can 'say' that there is something red and round before one, but it cannot say which particular thing is red and round. If this is right, I want to know what it tells us about our mental lives and the point at which mind meets world. 

Accordingly, much of my work focuses on:

(1) the nature and scope of perceptual representation;
(2) whether and to what extent we should explain perceptual experience in terms of representation;
(3) the cognitive-epistemic role of perceptual experience; and
(4) naturalistic theories of intentionality.