 | Jordi Blanes i Vidal Associate Professor Managerial Economics and Strategy |  |
Contrary to the received wisdom in the criminology literature, the police are much more likely to catch an offender if they reach the location of the crime very soon after being alerted. This is partly because it is more likely that they will find a witness who will name a suspect.
Examines the problem of joint decision-making in a team in a more general setting. Adaptation failures are particularly severe when production exhibits strong complementarities. Improving the organization’s aggregate information has the adverse effect of reducing communication. In the long run, the problem can become much worse.
Bias in Open Peer-Review: Evidence from the English Superior Courts, with Clare Leaver; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2015, 31: 431-471. Winner of the 2015 Oliver E. Williamson Prize for Best Article in the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
English appellate judges are less likely to reverse the decisions of colleagues with whom they are about to work.
Decision Making and Implementation in Teams, with Marc Moller; RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, conditionally accepted.
Examines joint decision-making in a team where members have a common goal and exert individual effort to implement the agreed decision. When it is important to keep motivation high, team members are reluctant to disclose information against the initially preferred project.
Social Interactions and the Content of Legal Opinions, with Clare Leaver; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2013, 29: 78-114. Shortlisted for the 2013 Oliver E. Williamson Prize for Best Article in the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
English appellate judges randomly assigned to work with the author of a given opinion are more (less) likely to cite that opinion positively (neutrally) than judges without such an interaction.
Revolving Door Lobbyists,with Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen; American Economic Review, 2012, 102: 3731-3748.
Studies how ex-government officials use the revolving door to cash in on the personal connections acquired during periods of public service. Lobbyists with past working experience in the office of a US Congressman command a premium in terms of generated revenue, which increases with the political power held by that Congressman. See coverage at: Huffington Post, Washington Post (and also here), Freakonomics, Marginal Revolution, VoxEU, Cato Institute, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times (and also here). Watch the video here.
Tournaments without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records, with Mareike Nossol; Management Science (lead article), 2011, 57: 1721-1736.
Workers in a field piece rate setting work harder when provided with feedback on their relative performance .
Are Tenured Judges Insulated from Political Pressure?, with Clare Leaver; Journal of Public Economics, 2011, 95: 570-586.
Judges do not favour candidates with elite backgrounds in promotion decisions to the English Court of Appeal. When faced by the prospect of losing autonomy, senior judges begin to favour non-elite candidates, as well as candidates unconnected to members of the promotion committee.
When Should Leaders Share Information with their Subordinates?, with Marc Moller; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2007, 16: 251-283.
The problem with sharing information is that decision-making will be subject to a motivational bias; leaders make decisions their subordinates want to see. This is less of a problem when the leader is overconfident.
Delegation of Decision Rights and the Winner's Curse; Economics Letters; 2007, 94: 163-169.
Delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.