I'm a research fellow on the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford, working under Nicholas Shea on a project on metacognition of concepts.

I work primarily in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but I have broad research interests including philosophy of language, aesthetics, and early modern philosophy.

Much of my research concerns distinctions between kinds of mental representations (such as iconic and discursive formats), mental processes (such as inference and association), and mental systems (such as perception and cognition).

Some recent papers:

Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence. Analysis, forthcoming.

Reid's doxastic theory of perception. Philosophers' Imprint, forthcoming.

Inferential transitions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. (with Eric Mandelbaum)

Against dispositionalism: Belief in cognitive science. Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. (with Eric Mandelbaum)

What is an object file? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming. (with E.J. Green)

Iconicity and the format of perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2016.

email: quiltydunn[*at*]gmail[*dot*]com