"Two Dogmas of Consequentialism" (see "sabrumtwodogmas.docx" below)
Consequentialism has withstood the criticism to which it has been subjected because many challenges have merely hacked off branches of the consequentialist tree, leaving its trunk and roots intact. The consequentialist trunk is the “Compelling Idea” that it is always at least morally permissible to do what promotes the best state of affairs. The anchoring roots of the theory are provided by appeal to prevailing state of affairs centric accounts of attitudes, actions, reasons, and contrasting directions of fit. A state of affairs centric approach in normative ethics – consequentialism -- can seem to fall out from such state of affairs centric accounts as a virtual corollary.
My argument strategy against each of these
two dogmas is the same. First, I
demonstrate that there are in fact commitments concerning certain compelling
ideas in the first case, and contrasting directions of fit in the second, that
are widely endorsed by nonconsequentialists and consequentialists alike. Next, I demonstrate that the dogmatic
arguments for consequentialism appeal to state of affairs centric
interpretations of these commitments.
These dogmatic interpretations of the commitments are in each case
presented as the commitments themselves, hence as appropriately drawing upon
the plausibility of the original commitments for their support. Finally, with the plausible shared commitment
in each case disambiguated from its dogmatic interpretation, I demonstrate that
the shared commitments provide no support for consequentialism, and that the
state of affairs centered interpretations beg precisely the questions that are
at issue between consequentialists and their critics.
"CONSEQUENTIALIZING AND DEONTOLOGIZING: Clogging the Consequentialist Vacuum," Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 123-153. (see osnedeontologizing below)
That many values can be
consequentialized – incorporated into a ranking of states of affairs – is often
taken to support the view that apparent alternatives to consequentialism are in fact forms of consequentialism. Such
consequentializing arguments take two very different forms. The first is concerned with the relationship
between morally right action and states of affairs evaluated
evaluator-neutrally, the second with the
relationship between what agents ought to do and outcomes evaluated
evaluator-relatively. I challenge the
consequentializing arguments for both forms of consequentialism. The plausibility of the evaluator-neutral
consequentializing of certain values, I argue, in fact establishes the
implausibility of an evaluator-neutral consequentialist account of such values. The problems that beset this
evaluator-neutral consequentializing argument do not beset its
evaluator-relative counterpart. But I
demonstrate that evaluator-relatively consequentialized theories can also
readily be ‘deontologized’, located within an alternative evaluative framework
that is congenial to the articulation of nonconsequentialist moral theories. Such an alternative framework can accommodate
what is compelling in consequentialists’ ‘Compelling Idea,’ and what is
attractive in their Explanatory Thought.
This alternative, moreover, can function as a shared evaluative
framework within which the merits of consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
alternatives can be considered without begging the question either way.
"Whose Problem is Non-Identity?" co-authored with Rivka Weinberg, Journal of Moral Philosophy, published online April, 2014.
In this essay we argue for a fundamental reframing of the non-identity problem. Central to the problem, as currently framed, is an account of wrongdoing upon which x cannot be wronged by z if x has first-personally benefitted from z’s action. This account is incorporated into non-identity treatments of appeals to rights: Parfit argues that agents will retroactively consent to actions that first-personally benefit them, hence that such actions do not violate their rights. We demonstrate, however, that on standard non-teleological accounts of rights an agent is wronged whenever her second-personal claims are violated, and is wronged regardless of whether the actions in question result in first-personal benefit. Using as our central example Scanlon’s moral theory, we demonstrate that non-identity does not pose a fundamental problem for such theories once they are properly understood as providing an account of wronging another that does not require first-personal harm.
"Deontology," draft of entry in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics (see 'deontologyfin' in attachments below), 2013.
Beyond Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. I argue that current discussions of the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, I argue, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. I builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, I undermine consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but it does so, I argue, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.
“Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path Not Taken,” The Journal of Ethics, Volume 11, Number 4 December (2007), pp. 437-463.
At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires are given prior to reason. Instead, these attitudes that motivate are themselves open to rational assessment. One reason for this focus is that many philosophers, including Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, have come to reject the claim Nagel takes to block this path – that desires are somehow given prior to reason, hence are not in the relevant way proper objects of rational assessment. A second reason is that unlike the first path, this second does not require the rejection of the belief-desire theory, only the rejection of one assumption about the nature of conative attitudes. Unlike Nagel’s chosen path, then, the second holds out the prospect of reconciling ethical objectivity, internalism, and the belief-desire theory within a unified account. I argue that the account of desire found in Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, augmented by aspects of Davidson’s account of propositional attitudes, yields a coherent account of the involvement of reason even in basic desires, an account that is well suited to Nagel’s intriguing path not taken.[PDF] from jstor.org
Full-Text @ Claremont
“Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands, or None at All?”, Ethics, Volume 116, Number 4, July (2006), pp. 680-706.
Defenders of consequentialism typically concede that the theory is extremely demanding, but deploy a range of defenses against this charge. In this essay I argue that the deeper challenge confronting consequentialism is not one of excess but of defect, in particular, of defects along precisely this dimension upon which it is taken to be excessive. It is a theory of exacting moral standards, but not of rational demands upon agents to conform to these standards. As a result the theory can readily be incorporated within an overall account upon which agents rarely have any reasons to heed its standards.
“Fairness and Beneficence,” Ethics, Volume 113, No. 4, July (2003), pp. 841-864.
In his 'Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory', Liam Murphy argues that agent-neutral principles, properly understood, generate their own limits in partial compliance situations. The excesses of traditional principles can be curbed from within the impersonal standpoint, he argues, through appeal to considerations of fairness. This essay presents a critical assessment of his arguments for these claims. Although his arguments from considerations of fairness in partial compliance situations commit him to a modification of the optimizing principle, I demonstrate that they also threaten to undermine the moral conception within which both it and his own collective principle are embedded. His attempts to ward off this threat involve a departure from traditional utilitarianism that is both radical and intriguing.
“A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-desire Theory,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1-20.
This paper argues that Donald Davidson's account of
assertions of evaluative judgments contains a here-to-fore unappreciated
strategy for reconciling the metaethical "inconsistent triad." The inconsistency is thought to result because within the
framework of the belief-desire theory assertions of moral judgments must have
conceptual connections with both desires and beliefs.
The connection with desires is necessary to account for the internal connection
between such judgments and motivation to act, while the connection with beliefs
is necessary to account for the apparent objectivity of such
“A Kantian Rationale for Desire-based Justification,” Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001), pp. 1-16.
This paper demonstrates that a rationale for a circumscribed form of desire-based justification can be developed out of a contemporary Kantian account as a natural extension of that account. It maintains that certain of Christine Korsgaard's arguments establish only that desires must have certain features antithetical to instrumentalism in order to justify. Other arguments purport to establish the standard (stronger) result: that because desires do not have these features, they cannot justify. Her arguments for this strong result, I contend, cannot be reconciled with central commitments in her epistemology and philosophy of mind. The consistent implementation of these commitments opens up a surprising space within what is still readily recognizable as a Kantian ethics--the space for a circumscribed form of desired-based justification.
“Sellars’s Ethics: Variations on Kantian Themes,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 101 (2000), pp. 291-324.
“Agent-centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox,” Ethics, Vol. 107, October (1997), pp. 120-146.
“Getting Our Options Clear: A Closer Look at Agent-centered Options,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 78 (1995), pp. 163-188.
“Scheffler’s Argument For Deontology,” The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 74, June (1993), pp. 118-134.
“The Hidden Consequentialist Assumption,” Analysis, Vol. 52, October (1992), pp.241-248.
“How Weakness of the Will is Possible,” Mind, Vol. 101, No. 401, January (1992), pp. 85-88.
“The Many Appetites of Thomas Hobbes,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1990), pp. 391-407.
“Where the Traditional Accounts of Practical Reason Go Wrong,” Logos, Vol. 10 (1989), pp. 157-166.
“Dewey on Desires: The Lost Argument,” Transactions of the Peirce Society, Vol. 24 (1988), pp. 509-519. Reprinted in John Dewey: Critical Assessments, J. E. Tiles (ed.) (Routledge, 1992), pp. 91-99.