Welcome to Huaxia's Homepage

Huaxia ZENG (曾华夏/曾華夏, in simplified/traditional Chinese characters). 

Associate Professor (tenure-track), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.  

My research concentrates on microeconomic theory and mechanism design 
with special interests on voting, assignment and auction models.

See the curriculum vitae.


Office: 111 Wuchuan Road, School of Economics, 
            Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 
            Shanghai, China, 200433.
Phone: +86 21 6590 2948


  • “On random social choice functions with the tops-only property,” (with Shurojit Chatterji), Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 109: 413-435. Download
  • “A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions,” (with Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen), Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11(2): 711-733. Download 
  • “Random dictatorship domains,” (with Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen), Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 86: 212-236. Download 

Working papers

  • When is checking a subset of incentive-compatibility constraints sufficient for strategy-proofness? Characterizations and Applications, (with Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav).
  • Probabilistic generalized median voter schemes: A robust characterization, (with Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan and Arunava Sen).
  • Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains, (with Shurojit Chatterji), revision and resubmission requested, a revised version is coming soon. Download
  • Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure, (with Peng Liu), revised and resubmitted to Journal of Mathematical Economics. Download (revised version)
  • Intertemporal efficiency does not imply a common price forecast: A leading example, (with Shurojit Chatterji and Atsushi Kajii), 2018. Download

Work in progress

  • Sequential mechanisms for collective choices, (with Shurojit Chatterji and Peng Liu), in preparation.

Current teaching

  • Game Theory (Undergraduate, Sep. - Dec., 2019) Syllabus
  • Topics on Mechanism Design (Graduate, Sep. 2018 - Jan., 2019) Syllabus
  • Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate, scheduled in Feb. - May, 2019)

Recent conference travelling plan
  • December, 2018, Peking University, Beijing