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Please take the time to read the book that is supplied by clicking the
Al Barcroft got 168 people off of federal charges for all kinds of
purported crimes. He won every case except one where his client
refused to follow his coaching. His wife was one of his victories.
He is a friend of mine and told me the whole story.
He was a lawyer in Texas. The BAR called him in to chastise him
and disbar him but they could not do it without him appealing their
decision all the way to the supreme court openly. They did not want
his knowledge of the FSIA coming out publicly so they tolerated
him replying to their notices to stop representing people with
FSIA http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/28C97.txt with his usual response on their notices. He wrote "fuck you"
on their notices and returned them to the BAR.
After he was called into the chambers of a federal judge and was
warned to stop or something bad could happen to him and loved ones,
Al turned in his bar card and left the country. He only did this
after on two occasions black helicopters touched down on his ranch
in Texas. &n bsp;&nb sp; Hagans V. Lavine, 415 US 528, 533, N5, the Court said, “Where jurisdiction is denied and squarely challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed to exist ‘sub silento’ but must be proven.
As mentioned earlier, the courts today are run by the trust, for the trust, and with the primary duty to protect the trust at all costs. There appears to be no Article III Courts left, with the possible exception of the Supreme Court; and possibly the United States District Court for The District of Columbia [there is much confusion at this time about whether that court is available to an American Citizen]. There is evidence that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is a possible venue for remedy under Article III of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in, Ex Parte Bakelite Corp’n 279 U.S. 438, distinguishes between the nature of theses courts in that opinion with the following statements:
“While Article III of the Constitution declares, in section 1, that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in ‘such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,’ and prescribes, in section 2, that this power shall extend to cases and controversies of certain enumerated classes, it long has been settled that Article III does not express the full authority of Congress to create courts, and that other Articles invest Congress with powers in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers into execution. But there is a difference between the two classes of courts. Those established under the specific power given in section 2 of Article III are called constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in that section, can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise. On the other hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of other powers are called legislative courts. Their functions always are directed to the execution of one or more of such powers and are prescribed by Congress independently of section 2 of Article III; and their judges hold for such term as Congress prescribes, whether it be a fixed period of years or during good behavior.”
“‘These Courts, then are not constitutional Courts’ which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the execution of those general powers which that body possess over the territories of the United States. …These Courts, …, are legislative rather than constitutional courts, …which are not cases or controversies within the meaning of Article III, but are merely in aid of legislative or executive action, and therefore outside the admissible jurisdiction of courts established under that Article. … [at page 452]…The Court of Claims is such a court. It was created and has been maintained, as a special tribunal to examine and determine claims for money against the United States.”
Clearly, the Supreme Court draws the differences between constitutional and legislative courts in this opinion. Other opinions, such as the one found in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., reiterate and support this opinion. In O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the district courts are territorial “legislative” courts, created by virtue of Article I, or under Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated:
“This court has repeatedly held that the territorial courts are ‘legislative’ courts, created in virtue of the national sovereignty or under Art. IV, Section 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution, vesting in Congress the power ‘to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States’; and that they are not invested with any part of the judicial power defined in the third article of the Constitution. And this rule, as it affects the territories, is no longer open to question. Do the courts of the District of Columbia occupy a like situation in virtue of the plenary power of Congress, under Art. I, Sec 8, cl. 17, ‘To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States . . .’? This inquiry requires a consideration, first, of the reasons upon which rest the decisions in respect of the territorial courts.”
The Supreme Court went on to find that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was a Constitutional Court vested with Article III Section 2 Judicial Powers. This is the same court which was renamed to be the “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and is defined in the D.C. Code 11-101(1)(C) as a constitutional court.
I won’t bog you down with massive case law at this point, but it is clear that case law supports the contention that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is very different from all of the other Federal District Courts in that it has Constitutional authority to hear controversies under Article III Section 2 of the Constitution; while all of the other district courts are legislative in nature and jurisdiction, and territorial in venue. In short, the only district court remaining which apparently has constitutional authority is the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. So, how does that affect you?
The problem that faces any American Citizen seeking Article III remedy is that Washington may be a long way to travel for adjudication, and there will be resistance to his attempt to invoke the court’s jurisdiction when the cause of action may have occurred somewhere in Texas.
When we seek remedy for Rights violations as one of the sovereign American People, one of the parties will most likely be either the United States, or another foreign state or subject thereof. If we bring that action in a territorial court, it has no jurisdiction or venue in the matter, because it is legislative in nature and cannot invoke jurisdiction over the necessary parties.
Between 1933 and 1976, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to bring an action against the trust. This was so because the trust controlled all of the courts within the States; and, as the sovereign exercising plenary power over its subjects, it placed itself into a position of unlimited immunity with respect to its members. In addition, the overriding presumption in every case was that everyone who came before any of the courts was a member of trust. Since in the vast majority of the cases that scenario is correct, and because the presumption is almost never properly challenged, virtually every case is decided based upon the presumption.
But, under its grant of authority, Congress was required to provide for remedy for the sovereign American People under threat of Treason. After some 40 year in the wilderness, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [“FSIA”]. For the first time since the bankruptcy of 1933, one of the sovereign American People was provided with a reasonable vehicle through which he could receive remedy from the trust; and, the remedy could be achieved in a court close to his place of abode. I realize that it is hard to understand how the FSIA could provide any remedy against the trust to an American, because it, like most other laws and codes, was written in a manner intended to hide its true purpose [to protect the Congress from a charge of Treason].
Many of you will have difficulty with the terms used in the FSIA with relation to yourself. For instance, to take advantage of this FSIA, you must first be a “foreign state”. How many that reading this book believe that they are a foreign state? I know I didn’t.
Here again, we must visit the Act itself to figure out exactly what the term “foreign state” means in relation to the FSIA. The FSIA is codified at Title 28, Sections 1602-1611. First, we need to understand Title 28 Section 1603, which states:
For purposes of this chapter –
A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this
title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
(b) An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title,
nor created under the laws of any third country.
(c) The ‘United States’ includes all territory and waters,
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
(d) A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A ‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on by such state
and having substantial contact with the United States.
Now, let’s break down what a foreign state is in relation to the FSIA. Here, you must understand that the statutes are subject to “strict construction”, meaning that they mean exactly what they say, and nothing else [otherwise, there would be constitutional confusion]. Section 1603 (a) says that a foreign state includes a political subdivision , or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Therefore, under strict construction of the statute, the definition of a foreign state does not include the state itself, only a political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality thereof. Tricky, huh?
Section 1603 (b) defines what constitutes an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state with relation to the FSIA. It say that one must be a “separate legal person, corporate or otherwise”. Do you fit that description? I know I do.
Next, one must be an “organ” of the foreign state. An “organ” is defined as, “of or having to do with an organ; inherent; inborn, constitutional; organized, systematically arranged; in law, fundamental; as the organic law of the United States is the Constitution”. Sounds like the people who organized and formed the organic law (Constitution) of the United States. Do you fit that? If you are the descendant of one of those people, and you claim your inheritance, you do.
Last, it states that you must be neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in 1332 (c) and (d) of Title 28, nor created under the laws of any third country. When we look at Section 1332, it defines states as the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Once again, strict construction applies. Are you a citizen of any of the Territories, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico? [If you have a social security number, you are] Next, were you created under the laws of any third country? [this is the part that eliminates Frenchmen or Englishmen or anybody except Americans] If not, and you answered yes to the first two questions, then you qualify under the definition of a “foreign state” as defined in the FSIA.
What does that mean to you? It means you can claim sovereign immunity from the courts of the United States and of the States pursuant to Title 28 Section 1604, which states:
“Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605
to 1607 of this chapter.”
Note that there is an exception to that sovereign immunity if you act in a fashion that would activate Section 1605-1607 of Title 28. Without going into the exact details of the exception, it can be summarized by simply saying that if you participate in commercial activities within the United States, or if you damage another parties life or property, you loose your immunity. Any form of business with the aid or use of a social security number will activate this exception, and your sovereign immunity will be gone. For your convenience, Title 28, Section 1605:
Sec. 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of
the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except
in accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any property
exchanged for such property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired
by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in
the United States are in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this paragraph shall not apply to -
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights; or
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an
agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a
private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with
respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an
award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the
arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the
United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed
by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement
to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court
under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this
subsection is otherwise applicable.
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in
admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or
cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is based upon a
commercial activity of the foreign state: Provided, That -
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to the person, or his agent, having
possession of the vessel or cargo against which the maritime lien
is asserted; and if the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to
process obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit, the
service of process of arrest shall be deemed to constitute valid
delivery of such notice, but the party bringing the suit shall be
liable for any damages sustained by the foreign state as a result
of the arrest if the party bringing the suit had actual or
constructive knowledge that the vessel or cargo of a foreign
state was involved; and
(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement of suit as
provided in section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten
days either of the delivery of notice as provided in paragraph
(1) of this subsection or, in the case of a party who was unaware
that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the
date such party determined the existence of the foreign state's
(c) Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1), the
suit to enforce a maritime lien shall thereafter proceed and shall
be heard and determined according to the principles of law and
rules of practice of suits in rem whenever it appears that, had the
vessel been privately owned and possessed, a suit in rem might have
been maintained. A decree against the foreign state may include
costs of the suit and, if the decree is for a money judgment,
interest as ordered by the court, except that the court may not
award judgment against the foreign state in an amount greater than
the value of the vessel or cargo upon which the maritime lien
arose. Such value shall be determined as of the time notice is
served under subsection (b)(1). Decrees shall be subject to appeal
and revision as provided in other cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. Nothing shall preclude the plaintiff in any proper
case from seeking relief in personam in the same action brought to
enforce a maritime lien as provided in this section.
(d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States in any action brought to foreclose
a preferred mortgage, as defined in the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46
U.S.C. 911 and following). Such action shall be brought, heard,
and determined in accordance with the provisions of that Act and in
accordance with the principles of law and rules of practice of
suits in rem, whenever it appears that had the vessel been
privately owned and possessed a suit in rem might have been
Now, just exactly what does the FSIA do? First, it does not provide an Article III Court for your use. There are simply none of those left. What it does do is provide remedy parallel and equal to Article III. Let’s face it, since the sovereign American People never transferred authority over them to the government except in an instance where they damaged the life, liberty, or property of another, the courts of the United States could have no jurisdiction over them except where a contract activated the authority [by consent], or where damage to another’s property was involved. That’s exactly what the FSIA provides – immunity except in those cases.
The FSIA has actually codified the era prior to 1940, so that a statutory remedy equal to the Article III remedy available before the trust took over can be provided to one of the sovereign American People [who are the only ones entitled to such remedy]. While it is not exactly Article III remedy, it serves the purpose very well. If you are drawn into the commercial system where you had no commercial involvement, you can invoke the FSIA, claim sovereign immunity, and the court will have no jurisdiction.
WARNING!!! Follow these steps ONLY if you are one of the sovereign American People. Otherwise, you will land in jail, or worse.
L. 94-583 as the "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976", see section 1 of Pub. L. 94-583, set out as a Short Title of 1976 Amendments note under section 1 ...
Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide - Publications
... An article from the Maritime Advocate on the basics of maritime attachment in the United States. "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act" US Department of State. A review of US theory ...
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