A unique plenary session, located in the amphitheatre of Building S, Manufacture des Tabacs, Toulouse. 
 Last changed: September 10, 2011 with A. Jofre talk on tuesday morning.
See the abstracts here.

Monday, September  12:
  • 9:00 Opening
  • 9:30 K. Binmore (UCL London): Sex and Evolutionary Stability (with L. Samuelson, Yale)
  • 10:15 Coffee Break
  • 10:45 J. Hörner (Yale): A Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring (with J. Renault, TSE U. Toulouse 1)
  • 11:15 F. Riedel (U. Bielefeld):  Ellsberg Games 
  • 11:45 F. Germano (U. Pompeu Fabra): Dynamic Information Aggregation with Strategic Experts: A Heuristic Approach
  • 12:15 Lunch
  • 13:45 T. Roughgarden (Stanford): The Price of Anarchy: Out-of-Equilibrium Guarantees, Intrinsic Robustness, and Beyond
  • 14:30 H. Gimbert (CNRS, LABRI Bordeaux): Deciding the value 1 problem for blind games
  • 15:00 S. Lasaulce (CNRS): Information constraints based on coding theorems (with M. Le Treust, Supelec)
  • 15:30 Coffee Break
  • 16:00 G. Stoltz (CNRS, ENS and HEC Paris): Robust approachability and regret minimization in games with partial monitoring (with S.Mannor , Technion and V. Perchet, LPMA, U. Paris 7)
  • 16:30 E. Solan (Tel-Aviv U.): Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs (with D. Bauso, U. Palermo and E. Lehrer, INSEAD and TAU)
  • 17:00 V. Perchet (LPMA, Univ. Paris 7):  Purely informative game. Approachability in Wasserstein space (with M. Quincampoix, U. Brest)  

Tuesday, September 13:
  • 9:15 A. Jofre (CMM and DIM, Universidad de Chile): Equilibrium for discontinuous games and optimal regulation in electricity markets (with  Juan Escobar, Nicolas Figueroa)
  • 9:45 F. Koessler (PSE):  Full Disclosure in Organizations (with J. Hagenbach, Polytechnique & CNRS)
  • 10:15 Coffee Break
  • 10:45 P. Barelli (U. Rochester) : Equilibria in Nonatomic Games with a Continuum of Groups (with J.  Duggan, University of Rochester)
  • 11:15 B. Von Stengel (LSE): Nash Codes for Noisy Channels (with P. Hernandez, U. Valencia)
  • 11:45 G. Zaccour (GERAD, HEC Montreal):  An overview of S-adapted equilibria and their applications
  • 12:15 Lunch
  • 13:45 E. Shmaya (Northwestern): The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring
  • 14:30 D. Vermeulen (Maastricht U.): Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces (with Elnaz Bajoori and János Flesch, U. Maastricht)
  • 15:00 S. Takahashi (Princeton University): Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (with Stephen Morris, Princeton and O. Tercieux, PSE)
  • 15:30 Coffee Break
  • 16:00 O. Gossner (PSE-LSE): An entropy approach to merging and reputations.
  • 16:30 J. Gonzalez-Diaz (U. Santiago de Compostela):  Sequential equilibrium in games with infinite length (with E. Shmaya, Northwestern)
  • 17:00 F. Gensbittel (TSE, GREMAQ Toulouse 1): Covariance control problems over martingales linked to repeated game with incomplte information. Applications to financial models.

  • 18:15-20:15 Tour of Toulouse

Wednesday, September 14:
  • 9:00 R. J. Aumann (Center for the Study of RationalityHebrew University Jerusalem): Rational Expectations in Games: Challenging Nash Equilibrium (with  Jacques Dreze CORE Louvain-la-Neuve)
  • 9:45 A. Mc Lennan (U. Queensland):  The Computational Complexity of Games and Markets
  • 10:15 Coffee Break
  • 10:45 P. Mertikopoulos (Polytechnique): Higher Order Game Dynamics (with R. Laraki, Polytechnique)
  • 11:15 D. Leslie (U. Bristol): Random belief learning; a principled smooth best response
  • 11:45 Y. Viossat (U. Paris-Dauphine): Monotonic dynamics and dominated strategies
  • 12:15 Lunch
  • 13:45 W. Sandholm (U. Wisconsin): Sampling Best Response Dynamics and Deterministic Equilibrium Selection
  • 14:30 P. Bernhard (INRIA Sophia Antipolis): On the Dynamics of the Handicap Principle
  • 15:00 M. Faure (GREQAM, U. Méditerrannée): Stochastic approximations methods in game theory
  • 15:30 Coffee Break
  • 16:00 F. Thuijsman (Maastricht University):  Population Dynamics in Stochastic Games (with  János Flesch, T. Parthasarathy Indian Statistical Institute Chennai, Philippe Uyttendaele U. Maastricht)
  • 16:30 J. Flesch (Maastricht University): Strategic Disclosure of Random Variables (with A. Perea, Maastricht U.)
  • 17:00 M. Scarsini (LUISS): A Stochastic Version of Colonel Blotto Game (with Yosef Rinott , Hebrew University of Jerusalem and LUISS and Yaming Yu, U. California, Irvine)

  • 20:00 Social Diner

Thursday, September 15:
  • 9:00 P. Cardaliaguet (Ceremade, U. Paris-Dauphine):  Continuous time games with imperfect information (with C. Rainer, U. Brest)
  • 9:45 B. de Meyer (CES-Paris 1-PSE): The CMMV Pricing Model.
  • 10:15 Coffee Break
  • 10:45 C. Rainer (U. Brest): Games with incomplete information in continuous time and for continuous type (with P. Cardaliaguet, Paris-Dauphine)
  • 11:15 P. Bich (U. Paris 1 and PSE): Relaxed Nash Equilibrium Concepts for Discontinuous Games (with R. Laraki, CNRS Polytechnique)
  • 11:45 O. Tercieux (CNRS PSE): Robust Equilibria in Sequential Games under Almost Common Belief (joint with Satoru Takahashi, Princeton U)
  • 12:15 Lunch
  • 14:00 A. Neyman (Hebrew University Jerusalem): Continuous-time  stochastic games.
  • 14:30 W. Zielonka (LIAFA, U. Paris 7): Simple optimal strategies: from  multi-armed bandits to

    Markov Decision Processes.

  • 15:00 G. Vigeral (CEREMADE, U. Paris-Dauphine): Existence of the limit value of two person zero-sum discounted repeated games via comparison theorems (with S. Sorin, U. Paris 6)
  • 15:30 Coffee Break
  • 16:00 O. Serea (U. Perpignan & UPMC):  Control problems and occupational measures
  • 16:30 R. Buckdahn (U. Brest): 2-player zero-sum stochastic differential games on a Wiener- and on a Wiener-Poisson space
  • 17:00 L. Renou (U. Leicester): Secure message transmission on directed networks (with J. Renault, TSE and T. Tomala, HEC)

Friday, September 16:
  • 9:15 J. Tirole (TSE): Cognitive games and cognitive traps.
  • 9:45 P. Reny (U. Chicago): Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions.
  • 10:15 Coffee Break
  • 10:45 S. Zamir (Center for the Study of RationalityHebrew University Jerusalem): The Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions (with T. Kaplan, U. Exceter)
  • 11:15 A. Predtetchinski (U. Maastricht): Voting on randomly generated proposals (with J.J. Herings)
  • 11:45 B. Peleg (Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University Jerusalem) Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury (with S. Zamir, Jerusalem)
  • 12:15 Lunch
  • 14:00 J.F. Mertens (CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve): Shapley value with a continuum of agents: stable bridges with index 1.
  • 14:30 P. Wiecek (Wroclaw U. of Technology): Anonymous sequential games with undiscounted  payoffs (with  E. Altman, INRIA).

Poster Presentations (from September 12 to 16): 
S. Behringer (U. Bonn): The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents.
S. Brangewitz (U. Bielefeld): 
Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games (joint with J-P. Gamp, Bielefeld and Paris 1)
O. Gorelkina (Max Planck Institute, Bonn): 
Estimation-based Dynamic Implementation.
C. Gruen (U. Brest): 
A numerical approximation for stochastic differential games with incomplete information.
Z. Hellman (U. Jerusalem): 
Countable Spaces and Common Priors.
M. Laclau (HEC): 
A Folk theorem for repeated games played on a network.
J. Levy (U. Jerusalem): 
A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection.
R. Midjord (U. Basque Country): 
Can increased competition for jobs explain interview lying?
M. Karpov (U. St-Petersburg), Cooperative solutions in communication games on networks.
A. Osorio Costa (U. Rovira i Virgill): 
Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of Player's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem. 
S. Perkins (U.Bristol)
Asynchronous stochastic approximation for learning in stochastic games.
F. Pigeaard (U.Sao Paulo)
Network externalities, coalition of consumers and product differentiation.
A. Salomon (Ponts Paris Tech) Robustness of anytime bandit policies (joint with J-Y. Audibert, ENPC)
L. Sass (U. Bielefeld):  
Ellsberg Games (with F. Riedel)
I. Seryakov  (U. St-Petersburg) 
Cooperative transportation game with non-overlapping paths