Fran Flanagan
Assistant Professor

Department of Economics

Wake Forest University

Contact Information:

  • flanagfx@wfu.edu
  • Kirby 208
  • (336) 758-2311
  • Office Hours Spring 2016: Tuesday 9:30-10:30, Wednesday 12:00-1:00, or by appointment


Interests: Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, Law and Economics


  • "Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina"  2017
  • This paper uses data from felony jury trials in North Carolina to show that (i) the race and gender composition of the randomly selected jury pool has a significant effect on the probability of conviction, (ii) attorneys adjust peremptory challenge strategies in accordance, and (iii) State peremptory challenges have a significant positive impact on the conviction rate when the defendant is a black male. Jury pools with higher proportions white men are more likely to convict black male defendants relative to white male defendants. Jury pools with a higher proportion of black men are more likely to acquit all defendants, especially black men. Attorneys use peremptory challenges strategically in accordance with these results, which are robust to a wide set of controls, including county and judge fixed effects. Each State peremptory challenge is correlated with a 2.4%-2.8% increase in the conviction rate when the defendant is black.
  • "Allocating Group Housing" (with Justin Burkett and Amanda Griffith), 2016
  • We study mechanisms for allocating objects to pairs of agents when agents may have nontrivial preferences over objects and pairings. In this environment, the mechanism may distort agents' preferences over pairings. Compared to certain distortive mechanisms, a non-distortive one always has a stable allocation in our model, and selects stable outcomes that are ex ante more efficient under a regularity condition on the distribution of pair values.
  • "Manipulation of Stable Matching Mechanisms: Polarization of Interests Revisited" 2016
  • In a college admissions model in which colleges have responsive preferences, I define college improvement cycles, which I show are related to the successful manipulation of stable mechanisms. Specifically, using college improvement cycles, I show that if there exists any individual college that can successfully manipulate a stable mechanism, then there exists a group manipulation in which all colleges are weakly better off than they would be under their own best individual manipulations, and every college is weakly better off relative to the stable match produced by the stable mechanism under the true preferences.
  • "Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection" Journal of Law and Economics, May 2015, Vol. 58(2), p. 385-416
  • I examine how peremptory challenges, which are vetoes that attorneys may use on prospective jurors, affect jury composition. The purpose of peremptory challenges is to eliminate biased jurors, however I show that under the two most common rules used in the United States peremptory challenges make biased juries more likely. I show that if unanimity is required for conviction, the distribution of juror types is symmetric, and each attorney has the same number of challenges, then challenges benefit the prosecution.
  • "Contracts v. Colleagues in Matching"-  International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44(1), p. 209-223
  • I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with contracts, and the model with contracts can be embedded in the model with preferences over colleagues, thus the models are equivalent, and all results from the many-to-one matching with preferences over colleagues literature and the model with contracts literature can be applied to each other.
  • "The Substitutes Condition and the Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Allocations"- Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, 53, p. 106-110
  • In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable allocations is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market.
  • "Relaxing the Substitutes Condition in Matching Markets with Contracts"Economics Letters, 2014123(2), p. 113-117
  • In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These conditions strengthen and weaken known results by exploiting the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.