Research Fellow in Economics - University of East Anglia

School of Economics
Arts 3.69
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, 
NR4 7TJ


Research Interests
Experimental and Behavioural Economics, Industrial Organisation. 
Curriculum Vitae (PDF)

email: F.Fallucchi [at] uea.ac.uk


I will be attending the SAEe meeting in Bilbao, the RES meeting in London and the ASSA meeting in Chicago

Research Papers

We experimentally investigate how individuals react to different types of inequality in conflict. We employ the Tullock rent-seeking contest framework where two contestants compete to win a prize by expending resources to purchase lottery tickets. We classify inequality under two types: procedural (assigning subjects unequal ability to compete) and distributive (unequal wealth, or valuation of the prize). The former represents inequality of opportunity to affect outcomes, while the latter represent ex-ante and ex-post inequality in outcomes. We find that average overall rent-seeking is greater in the presence of procedural inequality than in the presence of distributive inequalities. This difference is driven by disadvantaged players who react to the biased lottery procedure with more aggressive behavior.
  • Behavioral types are portable in public good experiments (with Andrew Luccasen and Theodore Turocy) available upon request
We investigate the portability of behavioral types as defined by Fischbacher et al. (2001) across related public goods games. In a within-subject experimental design, we study four public goods games with different strategic structures. Alongside the traditional linear specification, we include three games in which the reaction function for an own-earnings-maximizing player is upward-sloping, downward-sloping, or constant. We identify five distinct behavioral types based on behavior in the linear game, and show these types behave distinctly in the other three games. In particular, we identify a group of strong conditional cooperators, who contribute the greater of a one-to-one match of the contributions of others, and the own-earnings-maximizing response. This behavior demonstrates that at least some conditional cooperators do so as a sophisticated response to the incentives of the game.

Submitted
In preparation for submission
Published
Comments