School of Economics
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, NR4 7TJ
Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Industrial Organization.
email: F.Fallucchi [at] uea.ac.uk
Work in progress (provisional titles)
- Behavioral Stability in Rent-Seeking
We test of the Theocharis` problem in contests. We compare three and five player share contests and find little support for the hypothesis that deviations from equilibrium are due to instability of the myopic best-reply process. We find that deviations from equilibrium can be quite well-explained by Quantal Response Equilibrium.
- Lottery contests: partners versus strangers (with Elke Renner)
We control for repeated game effects in Tullock contest under the interaction of different matching protocols and information feedback. With full feedback the matching protocol does not affect the path of expenditures. With own feedback analysis of individual expenditures suggest a degree of strategic warfare behavior in fixed groups.