Home‎ > ‎


On the Depth of Corruption,  (job market paper)

I propose that the study of corruption besides its spread should include its depth, i.e., the level of distortion of the duties of corrupt individuals. I develop a framework which captures the variable degree of corruption of individuals and the ensuing distortion of their duties. I derive the level of bribe that represents the 'reservation' monetary payoff for various degrees of corruption of an officer. Using this context, I evaluate the effectiveness of alternative anti-corruption policies. Based on the varying degree of corruption among individuals I also propose the development of indirect anti-corruption policies inspired by the idea of triggering bribery market failures. To illustrate this point, I present a game setup that leads to complete unravelling of the bribery market, akin to Akerlof's market for lemons.


“Corruption, Intrinsic Motivation and the Love of Praise” with Dhillon, A. and A. Nicolò 2017. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 19 (6), 1117 - 1138.

Do higher wages prevent corruption (bribe taking)? We investigate a setting where individuals who apply for public sector jobs are motivated not just by monetary incentives but also by intrinsic motivation and concern for the collective reputation of their profession. We show that an increase in monetary compensation may cause reputation concerned individuals to be more prone to participate in corruption due to an "overjustification" effect. The overall effect of monetary incentives on fighting corruption crucially depends on the composition of the pool of public sector workers for two reasons: first, different types of workers react differently to the same policy; second, the composition of the pool of workers affects individual behavior through its effect on collective reputation. These results imply in particular that policies to fight corruption should focus more on increasing the collective reputation of the public sector rather than using monetary incentives which have perverse effects on some agents.

“Nash Equilibrium on Soft Information Control Games – Based on Banking Industry in China.” with Jiang. Y., 2013. International Journal of Financial Research, 4 (1), 84-92.

“Mathematical Model of Dynamic Games of Imperfect Agency – Based on Conspiracy of SMEs and Bank Managers.” with Jiang. Y., 2012. Progress in Applied Mathematics, 4 (1), 1-8. 

“Final Consumption, Gross Capital Formation and Economic Growth: An Impulse Response-based Analysis.” with Liao. G. M., 2011, Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, 6, 23-28.

“The Analysis of Cooperative Potential of Productive Service Industry between Guangdong and Hong Kong.” with Wang. L., 2010. Economic Review, 10, 50-53.

Working papers:

“A Theory of Succession”, with Hanming Fang,  December 2016.

“Optimal Taxation with Corruption Constraints”, Spring 2017.