Summary of my research

In my job market paper "Messaging the Bases: Tailoring of Political Ads to Audiences", I theoretically and empirically examine how politicians strategically vary ad content and placement to mobilize their base and demobilize the opposing one. Politicians can emphasize policy positions via policy ads, highlight their positive valence (non-policy) attributes via positive ads, or attack the opponent via negative ads. In turn, ads affect voters' choice of candidate and decision whether to abstain due to alienation or indifference. I characterize theoretically how the optimal composition of ads varies with audience demographics and candidate characteristics. I then use the texts of different ads in states with competitive gubernatorial or presidential contests in 2008 and 2012 to identify the types of ads used on different tv shows. I combine these data with viewer demographic and polling data to uncover empirical findings consistent with the theory (e.g., opposing candidates target different (and more polarized) audiences with policy ads, positive valence ads are mostly targeted to a candidate’s alienated base).

My other work in Political Economy focuses on two areas. In Candidate Advertising Free Riding and Party Solutions, I exploit that media markets and station coverage cross electoral district boundaries to ask whether neighboring party candidates of the same party free ride of each others ads, and whether parties resolve such concerns. In Endogenous Order with Sequential Elections (with George Deltas), we analyze the strategic considerations stemming from the timing of primary elections, and characterize conditions such that voting order is irrelevant.

My work in Industrial Organization examines topics related to pricing, clustering and switching costs. In The Price-Matching Dilemma (with Dan Bernhardt) (International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018), we characterize when strategic considerations of stores to match prices set by rivals on branded goods devolve into a prisoner’s dilemma. In When do co-located firms selling identical products thrive? (with Dan Bernhardt and Mehdi Shadmehr) (Forthcoming at Journal of Industrial Economics), we consider a spatial economy with two co-located stores and monopolist. We characterize how the relationship between traveling costs and the share of consumers who comparison shop affects profits at the cluster. In Name-Change Fees, Scalpers, and Secondary Markets, I consider a monopolist ticket seller and identify conditions such that name-change fees --- fees that allow to transfer the ownership of tickets --- and active secondary markets are optimal. I show how this reduces demand uncertainty and alleviates price rigidity. In Airline Entry and Switching Costs (with George Deltas), we provide a measure of switching costs using airline entry into new airports via routes with airports already used by the airline. We use the relative flows based on the direction of the route to calculate our measure.

For a more detailed description, please read my research statement.