The Economic Theory workshop is a weekly seminar taking place on fridays 12-13h at the Maison des Sciences Economiques (106-110 Boulverd de l'Hopital). This seminar is a venue for theoretical work in Economics and for work drawing on quantitative methods in Economics. Defined by an approach rather than by a specific theme, the topics of the seminar can concern a variety of areas in Economics, such as (non exhaustively), micro economics, game theory, mathematical economics, decisions theory, finance or macro economics. The seminar functions as an internal workshop but also regularly greets speakers from other institutions.

If you want to be added to the seminar mailing list, or for any other query about the Economic Theory seminar, please feel free to contact Emily Tanimura (emily.tanimura@univ-paris1.fr) or Xavier Venel (xavier.venel@univ-paris1.fr).

It is supported by the Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, CNRS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

  • Friday 12 May 12:00-13:00

    Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17
    Maria Gabriella Graziano

    Title: "On the notion of stable set when preferences are other-regarding"

    Abstract. We present the notion of stable set for models of exchange economies with other-regarding preferences and address the existence problem. The importance     of this solution concept is related to the fact that the existence of core allocations for exchange economies is not assured in a framework with more than two traders.     Several results are distinguished based on two elements:
            a) the notion of dominance between two allocations;
            b) the notion of agents’ types.

  • Friday 21 April 12:00-13:00
    Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17
    René Van Den Brink (Department of Econometrics, VU University)

    Inflow Independence in Transboundary River Problems. (joint work with Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, Gerard van der Laan and Nigel Moes)

      We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river, who have quasi-linear preferences over water and money, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Given an efficient distribution of river water, where water can be sent from upstream agents to downstream agents but not the other way around, the question is what should be the monetary transfers that downstream agents have to pay to upstream agents as compensation for the upstream agents to abstain from water consumption. Under quasi-linear utility functions, an efficient water allocation and a transfer scheme determine a welfare distribution. Under more general benefit functions, van den Brink, Estevez-Fernandez, van der Laan and Moes (2014) consider independence axioms with respect to benefit functions of upstream, respectively, downstream agents. Adding each of these independence axioms to three basic axioms yields a unique welfare distribution. In this paper we investigate the impact of similar independence axioms but with respect to water inflows. Surprisingly, together with the three basic axioms, these do not characterize a welfare distribution. Independence of upstream inflows turns out to be incompatible with the three basic axioms, while independence of downstream inflows yields multiple solutions. We weaken one of the basic axioms to get compatibility with upstream independence, and then strengthen it to get uniqueness with downstream independence.

    Keywords: Water allocation, international water law, independence of inflows, incompatibility, multiplicity, uniqueness.

  • Friday 28 Avril 12:00-13:00
              Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17
              Jana Vyrastekova (Department of Economics Nijmegen University)

    Titre:  Professional norms as incentives: experiments with professionals and students (joint work with Jan-Dirk Kamman and Max Boodie)

    Abstract: Do professional norms affect behavior and even override monetary incentives? We run incentivized experiments and provide evidence that this is the case. Purchasing professionals make decisions in an incentivized economic experiment and favor the passive recipients, Internal customers, more when the decision situation is framed to appeal to the professional norm of the Purchasing professionals than when making the same decision in the absence of the framing. Professionals sacrifice more money for the passive receiver when it is described as offering higher quality for the internal customer. As a robustness check, we find that the decision of student subjects is not affected by this framing. We also find that the length of the exposure to the profession explains the impact of the framing. The novices to the profession are not affected significantly, in contrast to the professionals with longer professional life. This is consistent with internalization of professional norms to be a long-term process.

Xavier Venel,
2 janv. 2017 à 03:51