Ellen R. K. Evers
Assistant Professor Marketing
University of California, Berkeley

Haas school of Business
545 Student Services Building, 
#1900 Berkeley, CA 94720-1900 
Office F528

contact: evers[at]haas.berkeley[dot]edu


Van de Calseyde, P., Zeelenberg, M. & Evers, E. R. K. (2018, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes) 
Post-decision doubt increases regret. 

Preference reversals in willingness-to-pay and choice (In press, link is to older version on SSRN)
O'Donnell, M. & Evers, E. R. K. (2018, Journal of Consumer Research)
We document a robust and consistent difference in expressed preferences depending on whether they are expressed as choices or in willingness to pay.

Evers, E. R. K., Inbar, Y., Blanken, I., & Oosterwijk, L. D. (2017, Management Science)
Policies targeting a desirable behavior can be framed as advantaging those who act desirably, or disadvantaging those who do not. We find that people prefer policies framed as disadvantaging those who do not act desirably when targeting obligations, but prefer policies that advantage those who act desirably when targeting voluntary behavior.

Evers, E. R. K., van de Ven, N., & Weeda, D. (2015, International Journal of Internet Science)
Application of social-comparison theory in online gaming environments. Buying status-enhancing items with real money leads to a decrease in status. 

Set-Fit Effects in Choice
Ellen R. K. Evers, Yoel Inbar, & Marcel Zeelenberg (2014, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General)
The organization of a set of items causes preference-shifts

Daniel Lakens, & Ellen R. K. Evers (2014, Perspectives on Psychological Science)
Overview and how-to of new methods that can be used to interpret published studies

Ellen R. K. Evers & Daniel Lakens (2014, Frontiers in Psychology)
We repeat Tversky's (1977) studies on diagnosticity. We find similar data as Tversky, however, when we eliminate a confounding factor, we do not replicate diagnosticity effects.

Working papers

Evers, E. R. K., Inbar, Y, Loewenstein, G., & Zeelenberg, M.
We find that people prefer sets that exhibit high order. This preference leads to violations of normative choice theory.

Please email to request a copy:

Poisson Regressions: A Little Fishy
Ryan, W. H., Evers, E. R. K., & Moore, D. A.
Don't use Poisson regressions for count data, they are bad.

The Set-Completion Premium
Evers, E. R. K., Zeelenberg, M., & Inbar, Y.
When people have a large proportion of a set of items they are extra motivated to complete it.

Biased estimations of change
Evers, E. R. K., & Keren, G.
People generally underestimate large quantities more than smaller ones. As a consequence, portrayal of change in relative (i.e., %) or absolute terms leads to systematic under- or over-estimation. 

Current projects
*How consumers become collectors
* Fairness as a simple belief
*Categorization in mental accounting 
*Naturally emerging reference-points - how proportions determine the reference-points we use
*framing (dis)advantages
*Kolmogorov complexity & similarity
*Framing relative positions in assortments
*Psychological processes underlying framing effects
*Mental accounting & perceived spending constraints

Other stuff

Replication of Hoorens & Bruckmuller, 2005, study 5
Wong, P. H.

Subpages (1): spullekes