Tim Eisert

Tim Eisert

Associate Professor of Finance

Dept. of Business Economics, E2-42

Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University

Tel: (+31)0104081428

P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam (NL)

Email: eisert@ese.eur.nl

Research Interests

I am an Associate Professor of Finance at the Erasmus School of Economics (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and a Member of ERIM. My research interests include financial intermediation, monetary policy, and corporate governance. My work is both theoretical and empirical and focuses on aspects of financial interconnectedness, financial crises, monetary policy and corporate governance of financial and non-financial firms.

Research grants for the project "Whatever it takes: The Real Effects of Uncoventional Monetary Policy"

- Grant from the Banque de France Foundation

- CEPR/Assonime Programme on Restarting European Long-Term Investment Finance (RELTIF)

- Grant from Friedrich Flick Förderstiftung


The Review of Financial Studies Volume 32, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 3366–3411

(with Viral V. Acharya, Christian Eufinger, and Christian Hirsch)

Working Paper on SSRN

Covered in: New York Times, Bundesbank Speech, Bloomberg, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Money, Banking and Financial Markets, Noise from America, CBS News, Brookings

Included in Oxford University Press's Virtual Issue on Monetary Policy

Management Science, Volume 65, No 8, August 2019, Pages 3673-3693

(with Christian Eufinger)

Working Paper on SSRN

The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 8, August 2018, Pages 2855–2896 (Editor's Choice)

(with Viral V. Acharya, Christian Eufinger, and Christian Hirsch)

Covered in: VoxEU, VoxEU

Book Chapter

in "Finance and Investment: The European Case" edited by C. Mayer, S. Micossi, M. Onado, M. Pagano and A. Polo. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018

(with Viral V. Acharya, Christian Eufinger, and Christian Hirsch)

Working Papers

(with Viral V. Acharya, Katharina Bergant, Matteo Crosignani, and Fergal McCann)

We analyze the effect of regulatory limits on household leverage on residential mortgage credit, house prices, and banks' portfolio choice. Combining supervisory loan level and house price data, we examine the introduction of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits on residential mortgages in Ireland. Mortgage credit is reallocated from low- to high-income borrowers and from high- to low-house price appreciation areas, cooling down, in turn, ``hot'' housing markets. Consistent with a bank portfolio choice channel, banks more affected by the limits drive this reallocation and increase their risk-taking in their securities holdings and corporate credit, two asset classes not targeted by the policy.

(with Viral V. Acharya, Matteo Crosignani, and Christian Eufinger)

Policy speech

We show that cheap credit to impaired firms has a disinflationary effect. By helping distressed firms to stay afloat, this ``zombie credit'' creates excess production capacity that, in turn, puts downward pressure on markups and product prices. We test this mechanism exploiting granular inflation and firm-level data from eleven European countries. In the cross-section of industries and countries, we find that a rise of zombie credit is associated with a decrease in firm defaults, average firm markups and product prices, lower investment and productivity, and an increase in aggregate sales as well as material and labor cost. Our results are stronger for prices of non-tradable products, which are more affected by local credit markets, and hold at the firm level, where we document spillover effects to healthy firms in markets with high zombie credit.

  • The Manager - Shareholder Agency Conflict: Do Banks Prefer Non-Alignment?

(with Christian Hirsch)

Working Paper on SSRN

This paper studies the link between the agency costs of equity and the agency costs of debt. Using a unique sample of the ownership structure of single and dual class firms as well as hand-collected data on loan contracts, we find that the agency cost of debt – proxied by various loan contracts terms - increases in the voting power of the largest outside shareholder, our primary measure of the agency cost of equity. We provide evidence that these results are consistent with debt holders being concerned about the high risk-shifting incentives of equity holders.