Senior Lecturer, University of Technology Sydney
Ph.D. Economics, Boston University
Research interest: Microeconomic theory, game theory, Information, Communication, Language, and Bounded rationality
Contact: toru.suzuki (at) uts.edu.au
Efficiently Imprecise Contract: The Role of Conventionality
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2025)
Communication Frictions and Equilibrium Pragmatics,
International Journal of Game Theory (2025)
Endogenous Ambiguity and Rational miscommunication,
Journal of Economic Theory (2023)
Efficient Communication and Indexicality
Mathematical Social Sciences (2020)
Choice set-dependent Performance and Post-decision Dissonance
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2019)
Directives, Expressives, and Motivation
Theoretical Economics (2017)
Reminder Game: Indirectness in Persuasion,
Games and Economic Behavior (2016)
Strategic Transparency and electoral pressure
Journal of Public Economic Theory (2016) (with Laura Moretti)
Jury voting without objective probability
Social Choice and Welfare (2016) (with Kingking Li)
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize scheme
Games and Economic Behavior (2012)
Complementarity of behavioral biases
Theory and Decision (2012)
Foot-in-the-Door and Door-in-the-Face: Persuasion with Limited Memory
Unfounded Opinion's Curse (with Kingking Li)
Rational miscommunication: Miscommunication caused by the efficient use of language across imperfectly shared contexts. It doesn't occur when contexts are poorly shared, but rather when they are shared fairly well, though not perfectly. (From Endogenous Ambiguity and Rational miscommunication (2023))
Expressive directives: Instructions that implicitly convey the speaker's lack of trust in the listener's competence. Such instructions can be informationally useful but may backfire, being demoralizing. (From Directives, Expressives, and Motivation (2017))
Indexical silence: Silence that indicates the most common situation given a context. Ordinary communication utilizes indexical silence to economize communication by exploiting contextual information. (From Efficient Communication and Indexicality (2020))
Persuasive silence: Silence that is interpreted as the speaker's confidence. When silence can be persuasive, hard-sell backfires. (From Reminder Game: Indirectness in Persuasion (2016))
Choice set dependent performance: A decision-maker who exhibits cognitive dissonance puts more effort into her project if it is chosen by herself rather than assigned by others. (From Choice set-dependent Performance and Post-decision Dissonance (2019)).
Complementary of behavioral biases: Even if each bias alone can mislead a decision-maker, a combination of biases can help him make a good decision in a complex environment. (From Complementarity of behavioral biases (2012)
Efficiently Imprecise Contracts: When precise drafting is costly, contractual duties may still be imprecisely stated if market conventions support their interpretation. The level of imprecision depends more on how conventional the duty is than on how complex it is.