Published      
Jan Keil
The Trouble with Approximating Industry Concentration from Compustat [WP version]Journal of Corporate Finance2017
Jan KeilExplaining the Concentration-profitability Paradox [WP version]Review of Political Economy2017
Jan Keil Depreciated Depreciation Methods? Alternatives to Sraffa’s Take on Fixed Capital [WP version] Review of Political Economy 2016
Jan Keil &
Josef Auer

State-of-the-Art Electricity Storage Systems – Indispensable Elements of the Energy Revolution [German version]
Deutsche Bank Research2012
Revise & Resubmit   
Jan KeilIs There a Causal Effect of Concentration on Persistent Profitability Differentials?Industrial & Corporate Change2017
Under Review      
Jan Keil 
Karsten Müller
Bank Branching Deregulation and the Syndicated Loan Market   2017



Pipeline

The Effects of Lending Relationships when Creditors are in Control (Jan Keil)
The violation of a financial covenant contained in debt contracts constitutes a “technical default” that reallocates control rights to creditors. Using a regression discontinuity design that compares companies right above with those just below the threshold, I show that banking relationships play a crucial role in how severely these events affect borrowers. Investment expenditures experience a lesser reduction and a distressed exist (such as a liquidation or delisting) is less likely when relationships are present and when these relationships are more developed. I explore how exactly relationship banks behave more supportive by granting covenant waivers and providing new means of finance at better terms. Potentially endogenous lender-borrower matching is addressed with lender * borrower fixed effects and, alternatively, the instrument lender-borrower distance. Evidence suggests that relationships are beneficial to borrowers when they depend on creditors, help overcome at least some information problems and reduce social costs associated with financial distress.

Foreclosure Laws and Corporate Loans (Jan Keil & Karsten Müller)
Foreclosure laws are usually associated with residential mortgages. We establish that foreclosure laws also matter for corporate loans, using a little analyzed data set on collateral types pledged in syndicated loan contracts combined with variation in foreclosure times across U.S. states. Creditor-friendly foreclosure laws are associated with lower interest rates and longer maturities for loans secured on real estate, but also with a lower likelihood of borrowers pledging collateral in the first place. These results imply that creditor rights can simultaneously improve contract terms of secured loans but also reduce the use of collateral as contracting tool. Analyzing how lenders react to covenant violations, we are able to discriminate the first time coherently between the debtors' fear of excessive liquidation and the creditors' higher return in liquidation. 
 
Relationship Banking and Geographical Market Segmentation in Germany (Jan Keil & Karsten Müller)
Parts of the German banking industry are characterized by elements of segmentation, where relationship banks (savings and cooperative institutions) divide markets along geographical lines. We analyze the degree of this market segmentation and the causal effects on the regional real economy using an IV approach based on historical data on the local banking industries. We construct a database of bank branch presences and combine it with detailed county-level industry accounts that have not been analyzed in financial research before. Our findings suggest that relationship dependent industries benefit significantly from a stronger presence of relationship banks and that relationship banks have a decentralizing effect on the distribution of economic activity in Germany.

Does Social Proximity Foster Collusion? (Jan Keil)
Competitive intensity and the likelihood of collusion are both usually modeled in terms of industry concentration, mobility barriers, and strategic investment propensities. I analyze how familiarity, similarity, the frequency, and the ease of interaction and communication among competitors affects rates of return, stock market returns and valuations, and the likelihood of a company being convicted in an antitrust lawsuit. Using different dependent variables, I am able to discriminate between tacit and explicit collusion. For the analysis, a "social proximity" index is constructed that combines information on cross-shareholdings, managerial connections, joint ventures and association memberships of competitors. The study also relies on a second new database (constructed by the author) that combines information extracted from all market power abuse filings by U.S. antitrust authorities since 1990.