This conference has been followed by this publication:


Unconsciousness between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis

(Springer, Contributions to Phenomenology)

(link)

______


Conference:

Is there a phenomenology of unconsciousness?

February 20th and 21st, 2014


Dublin

Newman House, University College Dublin (www)

85 St Stephen’s Green

Iveagh Room


poster (pdf)


 



Organized by

Dylan Trigg (UCD, Dublin) (email)

&

Dorothée Legrand (CNRS, ENS, Husserl-Archives, Paris) (email)


Please do not hesitate to contact us for further information.

The event is open to anyone interested and is free to attend

but please do register in advance by sending us an email.



Argument

What does it mean to be oneself? When considering this issue, two approaches are unavoidable, as they both devote their investigations to the question of who one is, in one’s singularity. On the one hand, phenomenology defines the subject in terms of one’s conscious experience; on the other hand, psychoanalysis roots the subject in the unconscious. Across this rough divide, these two conceptualizations of the subject appear as irreconcilable. Nonetheless, it is precisely this irreconcilability that we aim at interrogating during this conference.

Is unconsciousness beyond phenomenal experience?

Is unconsciousness beyond phenomenological investigation?



Participants

Joseph Cohen (UCD, Dublin) (www)

Natalie Depraz (Université de Rouen, Archives Husserl, Paris) (www)

Dorothée Legrand (CNRS, ENS, Archives Husserl, Paris) (www)

Dieter Lohmar (Archives Husserl, Köln) (www)

Tim Mooney (UCD, Dublin) (www)

Dermot Moran (UCD, Dublin) (www)

Emmanuel de Saint Aubert (CNRS, ENS, Archives Husserl, Paris) (www)

Alexander Schnell (Sorbonne, Paris) (www)

Dylan Trigg (UCD, Dublin) (www)





Presentations


Natalie Depraz

The Heart Unconscious, Towards a Cardiophenomenology. The Case Study of Surprise

It is usual today to talk about a cognitive unconscious, a bodily unconscious or a psychic unconscious. These different forms of unconscious all appeal to a subpersonal level of the mind where automatic processes occur that are not accessible to my introspective lived experience, be they neural, biological or libidinal. Now, there is also a growing interest in trying to understand the dynamics of the becoming aware of such automatic events of the mind, and a growing awareness of the still abstract character of such a static dichotomy unconscious/conscious. In this talk I will suggest to make a room for the heart unconscious as a remarkable bridging thread in order to weave together the two better known threads, that is, the physical and the subjective. I will provide an experiential-experimental clue for such an epistemological contention : surprise both as physiological-cardiac startle and as inner lived perplexity, which reveals itself as a unique twofold objective-subjective occurrence






Joseph Cohen

From the Night the Event






Dorothée Legrand

The Body at the Mercy of the Unconscious

I don’t have a body, I am my body. I am not a body, I have a body. The first of these claims is defended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty whose phenomenology excels at describing preverbal(ized) states of bodily self-consciousness; the second claim is defended by Jacques Lacan whose psychoanalysis focuses on the unconscious structured like a language. Rather than being reduced in a compromising conception of bodily language, the tension between these approaches will be put to work in the aim of articulating the transformation which affects the body when it participates to the relations between speaking subjects.






Dieter Lohmar

The Unconscious from the Point of View of Non-Linguistic Thinking

One of the challenging problems with the unconscious is that it turns out to affect our consciousness and influence our behaviour. This enigma of the effectivity (Wirksamkeit) of unconscious contents asks for a theory about how we can at the same time know and not know about unconscious contents. In my opinion this enigma may be solved partly by pointing out that there is a non-language system of representation still working in our mind. I consider the difference of language and non-language systems of representation to be one of the most important steps in the continuum from conscious to unconscious thoughts. In my opinion we do not only refer to states of affairs in language modes of symbolization but also in a system of scenic phantasma accompanied by feelings. The cooperation of both systems can make us understand how to know and not-know something at the same time. 






Tim Mooney

Unconscious Perception and Projection in Phenomenology of Perception

In Merleau-Ponty’s early work he contends that there is a phenomenology of the unconscious, and it is realised though observing other human beings acting and reacting. By explicating how we appropriate our environment towards certain outcomes and respond to others, we can proceed to unearth hidden modes of operative intentionality or unconscious awareness. The primary exemplars of the awareness of environment and others are motor intentional projection and anonymous intercorporeality. These sub-reflective achievements flesh out Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the body itself is better informed about the world than we can ever be at the accessible level of act intentionality. 







Dermot Moran

Husserl’s Concept of the Human Person in Ideas II

Husserl’s Ideas II offers a complex and multi-layered account of the constitution of the human person approached from a number of different perspectives. The mature human person is on the one hand a Cartesian cogito, an “I am” whose essence lies primarily in its own self-conscious acts, position-takings and willings , and, on the other hand, a person, a socius, a member of a family, a community, in  empathic interpersonal relations with others in the context of an environment or Umwelt. But, for Husserl, the ego also is embodied and has a complex relations with its embodied states, including its sensations, affections, drives and tendencies, feelings, emotions and motor capacities. The ego has moments of wakeful alertness but can also be sunk in sleep or dreaming.  In this paper I try to chart Husserl’s conception of the person and explore some tensions in it.







Emmanuel de Saint Aubert

Merleau-Ponty's Conception of the Unconscious in the Late Manuscripts

Original and daring, the late Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the unconscious marks a culmination of his phenomenological project. Inseparable from his primacy of perception and his philosophy of the flesh – an expressive and desiring flesh – this conception evolves in a way that is at odds with psychoanalysis, while leading towards the heart of an understanding of our being-in-the-world. The collection of late unpublished manuscripts constituted by Notes on the body proves to be a major document apropos this subject.






Alexander Schnell

Different Dimensions of Phenomenological Unconsciousness

I'm interested in all kind of dimensions of pre-intentional structures "below" or "beneath" intentional consciousness (I think there are three - concerning the unconscious noematic structure, concerning the unconscious dimension of self-awareness and concerning a kind of "field-structure" of unconsciousness). I'll try to highlight in particular the "dynamic" status of phenomenological unconsciousness.






Dylan Trigg

Anxiety, Uncanny, and the Real of the Body

What is the relation between anxiety and the body? From a phenomenological perspective, anxiety is typically framed in distinction to fear in terms of lacking a discernible object. To this extent, phenomenology begins from the perspective that anxiety can be described in terms of what appears for consciousness. Applying this to the body, what we end up is an literary of symptoms that disclose the way in which a subject relates to the world. Thus, the body becomes a body to be interpreted in a worldly manner. From a psychoanalytical—especially Lacanian—perspective, this attention to the phenomenal level of bodily experience falls short of capturing the specificity of anxiety. Against phenomenology’s onus on what appears, Lacan will attempt to conceptualise anxiety in terms of contending with an object that resists the phenomenal realm altogether, and therefore marks the presence of the uncanny. In this paper, I explore to what extent Merleau-Pontean phenomenology and Lacanian psychoanalysis can merge on this uncanny anxiety, and, moreover, whether or not the figure of the uncanny can allow us to formulate the real of the body.

 


 


Program

 

20

……...

21

09:00

09:30

Dylan Trigg

Dorothée Legrand

Introduction

 

09:00

10:00

Dylan Trigg

Anxiety, Uncanny, and the Real of the Body

9:30

10:30

Dermot Moran

Husserl's Concept of the Human Person in Ideas II.

 

10:00

10:30

Pause

10:30

11:00

Pause

 

10:30

11:30

Emmanuel de Saint Aubert

Merleau-Ponty's Conception of the Unconscious in the Late Manuscripts

11:00

12:00

Alexander Schnell (read by Marta Jorba, UCD)

Different dimensions of phenomenological unconsciousness

 

11:30

12:30

Tim Mooney

Unconscious Perception and Projection in Phenomenology of Perception

12:00

13:30

Lunch

 

12:30

14:00

Lunch

13:30

14:30

Joseph Cohen

From the Night the Event

 

14:00

15:00

Dieter Lohmar

The unconscious from the point of view of non-linguistic thinking

14:30

15:30

Natalie Depraz

The Heart Unconscious, Towards a Cardiophenomenology. The Case Study of Surprise

 

15:00

15:30

Dylan Trigg

Dorothée Legrand

Conclusion

15 :30

16 :00

Pause

 


 

16:00

17:00

Dorothée Legrand

The Body at the Mercy of the Unconscious

 


19:30

Diner

 




Translation assistant
Audrey Petit




Eat and Sleep

Hotel: Staunton's on the Green


Diner on the 19th (from your pocket money please): à la Mère Zou

Diner on the 20th: Chez Max


Places for lunch (self-organized):

Ukiyo Bar (highly recommended Japanese food. Bento box for 10€)

Hatch & Son (Irish good food!?)

Dunne & Crescenzi (Italian food and italian people)

Il Primo (popular with UCD crowd)




With the financial and logistic support of

Ecole Normale Supérieure, Archives Husserl, Paris (Dominique Pradelle) (www)

French Embassy in Ireland (Hadrian Laroche) (www)

University College Dublin (Dermot Moran) (www)

UCD International Center for Newman Studies (www)