Daniel Star

Associate Professor of Philosophy
Boston University


I have wide-ranging interests, especially in ethics and epistemology. My published work to date has primarily focused on the nature of normative reasons.

My book, Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics, was recently published by Oxford University Press, and is available at Amazon [US] [UK]. 

Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics.


A CV is available here: [pdf]. A selection of papers can be accessed below.

I am the editor of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (OUP), which is the first comprehensive overview of work on reasons across ethics and epistemology, with 45 new papers on the nature of practical and theoretical reasons, and associated issues concerning normativity. 

Roger Crisp and I are editing and writing the commentary for History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary, which is forthcoming with Wiley-Blackwell.

The first review of Knowing Better was published by NDPR in January 2016 [link].

Review of John Gibbons, The Norm of Belief (OUP, 2013) []

"From Outside of Ethics" series, Ethics, Forthcoming.

Weighing Explanations

In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Oxford University Press, 232-51, with Stephen Kearns.

Weighing Reasons []

Journal of Moral Philosophy 10:1, 201370-86, with Stephen Kearns.

This is a response to two critics, John Broome and John Brunero.

Reasons, Facts-About-Evidence, and Indirect Evidence [pdf]

Analytic Philosophy 54:2, 2013, 237-43, with Stephen Kearns.

This is a response to a critic, Mark McBride.

Three Conceptions of Practical Authority [pdf]

Jurisprudence 2:1 (June), 2011, 143-60with Candice Delmas.

Two Levels of Moral Thinking []

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1, 2011, 75-96.

This paper is an early prototype of Chapter 1 of Knowing Better.

On Good Advice: A Reply to McNaughton and Rawling [pdf]

Analysis 71:3, 2011, 506-8, with Stephen Kearns.

Moral Skepticism for Foxes [pdf]

Boston University Law Review 90, 2010, 497-508.

Reasons as Evidence [pdf]

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4, 2009, 215-42, with Stephen Kearns.

Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? [

Ethics 119:1 (October), 2008, 31-56, with Stephen Kearns.

Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism [pdf]

Ratio 21:3 (September), 2008, 329-43.

Review of Allan Gibbard, Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics (OUP, 2008)


Philosophical Review 119:2, 2010, 259-63

Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism  (OUP, 2007) 


Mind 119:473, 2010, 210-15.

Review of Sean McKeever and Michael RidgePrincipled Ethics (OUP, 2006) [link]

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.

Companion Entry: Michael Smith [link]

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed. (ed. by Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis)Monash University Publishing, 2014 [2010], 519-23.

Do Confucians Really Care? [pdf

Hypatia 17:1, 2002, 77-106. 

This paper was accepted for publication before I began my graduate studies in Oxford.


During the 2015-16 academic year, I taught PH150 Introduction to Ethics (x3), as well as a graduate student seminar on normative reasons in ethics and epistemology. I am on sabbatical during the  2016-17 academic year. 

I also run the Boston University Ethics Seminar, which students are very much encouraged to attend.

Further details regarding my teaching and research can be found in my CV [pdf].