Daniel Star

Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Boston University


B.Phil. D.Phil. University of Oxford

I have wide-ranging interests, especially in ethics and epistemology. My published work to date has mostly focused on the nature of normative reasons.

My book, Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics, is in press with Oxford University Press (UK), and is due to be published in July, 2015. 


A CV is available here: [pdf]. A selection of papers can be accessed below. 

Knowing Better  presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics.
I am also editing The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (Oxford University Press), which is the first comprehensive overview of work on reasons across ethics and epistemology, with more than 40 new papers on the nature of practical and theoretical reasons, and associated issues concerning normativity.
In addition,
Roger Crisp and I are editing and writing the commentary for History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary (Wiley-Blackwell). 

Weighing Explanations []

Forthcoming in Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome, Oxford University Press, with Stephen Kearns.

Weighing Reasons []

Journal of Moral Philosophy 10:1, 201370-86, with Stephen Kearns.

This is a response to two critics, John Broome and John Brunero.

Reasons, Facts-About-Evidence, and Indirect Evidence [pdf]

Analytic Philosophy 54:2, 2013, 237-43, with Stephen Kearns.

This is a response to a critic, Mark McBride.

Three Conceptions of Practical Authority [pdf]

Jurisprudence 2:1 (June), 2011, 143-60with Candice Delmas.

Two Levels of Moral Thinking []

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1, 2011, 75-96.

This paper is an early prototype of Chapter 1 of Knowing Better.

On Good Advice: A Reply to McNaughton and Rawling [pdf]

Analysis 71:3, 2011, 506-8, with Stephen Kearns.

Moral Skepticism for Foxes [pdf]

Boston University Law Review 90, 2010, 497-508.

Reasons as Evidence [pdf]

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4, 2009, 215-42, with Stephen Kearns.

Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? [

Ethics 119:1 (October), 2008, 31-56, with Stephen Kearns.

Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism [pdf]

Ratio 21:3 (September), 2008, 329-43.

Review of Allan Gibbard, Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics(OUP, 2008)


Philosophical Review 119:2, 2010, 259-63

Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism  (OUP, 2007) 


Mind 119:473, 2010, 210-15.

Review of Sean McKeever and Michael RidgePrincipled Ethics (OUP, 2006) [link]

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.

Companion Entry: Michael Smith [pdf] [link]

A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia (ed. by Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis)Monash University Publishing, 2010, 616-21.

Do Confucians Really Care? [pdf

Hypatia 17:1, 2002, 77-106. 

This paper was accepted for publication before I began my graduate studies in Oxford.


During the 2014-15 academic year, I am teaching Introduction to Ethics in both Fall and Spring, Types of Ethical Theory in the Fall, and Contemporary Ethical Theory (theme for 2015: Love) in the Spring. I also run the Boston University Ethics Seminar, which students are very much encouraged to attend.

Further details regarding my teaching and research can be found in my CV [pdf].