I am a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs and Economics Department at Princeton University

Before my Princeton University appointment I was a PhD candidate and a Junior Researcher at CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) in Prague the Czech Republic. From Fall semester of 2015 I was a Visiting Student Research Collaborator at the Industrial Relations Section at Princeton University.

My main research interests are International Political Economy, Behavioural Economics, Education Economics, and Health Economics. I am particularly interested in the detrimental effects of wars and conflicts on a variety of outcomes: child development, human capital accumulation, health, social values and norms. My past and current research is focused on solving important policy questions in cooperation with several governmental agencies in Croatia including Ministry of Science and Education, Ministry of Veterans, Ministry of Health and Agency for Science and Higher Education. Currently I am working on two country-wide field experiment in education and health economics. 

During the past few years through an NGO in CEE region my work was focused on creation of network of scholars, promoting initiatives on right for information access in public sector and educating general public in order to help build a better functioning democracy in the CEE region. We organise yearly conferences and bring world-class economists to promote market economy in transition countries.


prof. Alexandre Mas (Princeton University, Princeton NJ)
prof. Randall K. Filer (Hunter College, CUNY, New York)
prof. Štěpán Jurajda (CERGE-EI, Prague)


"What are the Gains From a Dynamic DA Algorithm?: Evidence from a Centralised and Computerised Field Experiment?"

Current studies such as Roth (2008) and Rees-Jones (2017) show the advantages and disadvantages of a static DA algorithm used during the college admission process. There has not yet been a study which uses a dynamic version of the DA algorithm to test the efficiency of such algorithm and to test the benefits of the dynamic component of such matching. To shed more light on both, we ran a country wide RCT with information intervention on college applicants on Croatia's centralised and computerised system. This system uses a dynamic DA algorithm where matching between applicants and university programs is done on an hourly basis for a week until the system is closed. Based on hourly rankings for each program applicant update their beliefs about the probability of admission and change their preferences accordingly. Unlike settings in most countries, information about the program cutoffs and points' distribution for previous years is not a public information. Before the start of the experiment we collected baseline information about applicants preferences, priors about program cutoffs and priors about their own success on the state exams. Within the centralised admission system we designed a state of the art software and provided treatments containing program information for past years to test the welfare properties. The unique system allows us to create counterfactuals for every hourly update.

"How to Solve the Free Riding Problem in Public Goods?: Field Experiment in Blood Donations "
with Danijela Vuletic and Irena Jukic