I am Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University where I have been a member of the faculty since September 2006.
I will be a Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2013-14.
I was Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy at the Australian National University for three years from April 2007 to December 2010. My research was funded by Daniel Stoljar and Frank Jackson's ARC Project, "Conscious Experience and the Hegemony of Representation". I was also affiliated with David Chalmers' Centre for Consciousness.
I received my PhD from New York University in September 2006. My advising committee was Ned Block, Paul Boghossian (chair), Christopher Peacocke, and Crispin Wright.
I spent a year as a visiting student at the University of Warwick in 2004-5 where I was supervised by Bill Brewer and affiliated with the Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Research Centre.
I work mainly on issues at the intersection between epistemology and the philosophy of mind, including consciousness, intentionality, concepts, perception, attention, introspection, belief, justification and knowledge. I am currently writing a book on the epistemic role of consciousness.
Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, eds. C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Introspection and Consciousness, eds. D. Smithies & D. Stoljar. Oxford University Press, 2012.
"What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?" The Journal of Philosophy 108.1 (2011): 5-34.
"The Normative Role of Knowledge." Nous 46.2 (2012): 265-88. Reprinted in Epistemology, Vol.1, ed. R. Neta. Routledge, 2012.
"Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85.2 (2012): 273-300.
"The Mental Lives of Zombies." Philosophical Perspectives 26 (2012): 343-72.
"Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90.4 (2012): 723-41.
"On the Unreliability of Introspection." Philosophical Studies 165.3 (2013): 1177-86.
"Introduction." (With C. Mole and W. Wu.) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, eds. C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu. Oxford University Press, 2011: xi-xxi.
"Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness." Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, eds. C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu. Oxford University Press, 2011: 247-273.
"Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview." (With D. Stoljar.) Introspection and Consciousness, eds. D. Smithies & D. Stoljar. Oxford University Press, 2012: 3-26.
"A Simple Theory of Introspection." Introspection and Consciousness, eds. D. Smithies & D. Stoljar. Oxford University Press, 2012: 259-93.
"Why Justification Matters." Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology, eds. D. Henderson and J. Greco. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
"The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification." New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, eds. J. Kallestrup and M. Sprevak. Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming.
"Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?" Current Controversies in Epistemology, ed. R Neta. Routledge, forthcoming.
"The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology." Philosophy Compass 8.8 (2013): 744-54.
"The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology." Philosophy Compass 8.8 (2013): 731-43.
"Teaching and Learning Guide for: Cognitive Phenomenology." Philosophy Compass 8.10 (2013): 999-1002.
"Knowledge by Acquaintance." The Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. H. Pashler. Sage Publications, 2013: 452-3.
"Introspection (Philosophical Psychology)." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, ed. B. Kaldis. Sage Publications, 2013: 502-5.
"Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2013.
"Reasons and Perception." The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. D. Star. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
"The Role of Experience in A Priori Justification." Synthese, forthcoming.
"Affective Phenomenology and Reasons for Action." (With Jeremy Weiss.)
"Belief and Moore's Paradox."
"Access Internalism and the Extended Mind."
Rationality and the Subject's Point of View. New York University, 2006.