Carnap and the Limits of Metaphysics

Papers

When Should Philosophers Omit Details? (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences provide better explanations than lower level sciences because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. 

Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories (forthcoming) Philosophical Studies

Carnap's Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics (forthcoming) Synthese 

I argue that Carnap's criticism of metaphysics is not based on verificationism, but on the absence of any evidence that could confirm metaphysical theories.

Deutsch on Confirmation in Everettian Quantum Theory (2017) Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57: 111-114 (2017)

I discuss David Deutsch's (2016) attempt to develop a confirmation theory for branching worlds.

A Priori Causal Laws (2017) Inquiry 60 (4): 358-370

Works in progress

Explanatory Details and Logical Strength

Pragmatics and Priors

From Semantic to Epistemological Arguments Against Metaphysics

Conferences

Conference on Metaphysical Deflationism

Conference on Theoretical Virtues in Science and Philosophy

Conference on the Metaphysics of Jonathan Schaffer

Videos

In progress with http://www.wi-phi.com/