Papers
When Should Philosophers Omit Details? (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences provide better explanations than lower level sciences because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs.
Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories (forthcoming) Philosophical Studies
Carnap's Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics (forthcoming) Synthese
I argue that Carnap's criticism of metaphysics is not based on verificationism, but on the absence of any evidence that could confirm metaphysical theories.
Deutsch on Confirmation in Everettian Quantum Theory (2017) Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57: 111-114 (2017)
I discuss David Deutsch's (2016) attempt to develop a confirmation theory for branching worlds.
A Priori Causal Laws (2017) Inquiry 60 (4): 358-370
Works in progress
Explanatory Details and Logical Strength
Pragmatics and Priors
From Semantic to Epistemological Arguments Against Metaphysics
Conferences
Conference on Metaphysical Deflationism
Conference on Theoretical Virtues in Science and Philosophy
Conference on the Metaphysics of Jonathan Schaffer
Videos
In progress with http://www.wi-phi.com/