Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles
Tarabar, Danko. "Does National Culture Change as Countries Develop? Evidence from Generational Cleavages." Accepted in Journal of Institutional Economics .
Tarabar, Danko. 2018. "Regional Integration and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from European Union." Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy 7 (2): 117-134 .
Tarabar, Danko. 2017. "Culture, Democracy, and Market Reforms: Evidence from Transition Countries." Journal of Comparative Economics 45 (3): 456-480.
Tarabar, Danko, and Andrew T. Young. 2017. "Liberalizing Reforms and the European Union: Accession, Membership, and Convergence." Southern Economic Journal 83 (4): 932-951.
Tarabar, Danko, and Joshua C. Hall. 2016. "Explaining the Worldwide Decline in the Length of Mandatory Military Service, 1970-2010." Public Choice 168 (1): 55-74.
Tarabar, Danko, and Joshua C. Hall. 2015. "The Seventeenth Amendment, Senate Ideology and the Growth of Government." Applied Economics Letters 22 (8): 637-640.
Articles in Collected Volumes
Hall, Joshua C., Dean Stansel, and Danko Tarabar. 2015. "Economic Freedom Studies: A Survey." In Economic Freedom, Economic Behavior, and Entrepreneurship, by Richard Cebula, Joshua Hall, Franklin Mixon, and James Payne (eds.). Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing: 38-50.
Tarabar, Danko, and Andrew T. Young. 2014. "Does the European Union Promote Convergence in Economic Freedoms?" In The European Union – Catalyst for Economic Freedom?, by Julie Cantalou and Caroline Margaux Haury (eds.). Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom: 25-34.
Work in Progress
Tarabar, Danko, and Javier Portillo. "Culture, Voting Behavior, and Institutional Reform: Evidence from Transition Countries."
Why do some societies fail to adopt good institutions? Recent literature points to the crucial role of complementarity between prevailing social norms and institutional change. To shed light on one potential mechanism, we track parliamentary election performance of chief executive parties to test whether civic cultural attitudes influenced voters’ response to institutional reform. To this end, we study a sample of up to 17 democracies transitioning from planned to market economy between 1991 and 2015. We present empirical evidence that in more individualistic cultures, greater market reform efforts during incumbent’s tenure is robustly associated with a greater electoral reward in the next election. The implication is that voters choose the ruling elites whose behavior is in line with the prevailing culture. Our finding are consistent with the growing literature that finds a robust effect of individualism economics and institutional development.
Tarabar, Danko. "Culture, Democracy, and Institutional Reform: A Cross-Country Analysis."
Past empirical investigations into the impact of democracy on long-run institutional reform/convergence have largely ignored the potential role of culture. In this paper I argue that different cultural values, proxied by Hofstede (1980) dimensions, may have significantly moderated the effectiveness of democratization depending on the cultural environment in which it proceeded. Using a sample of up to 74 countries in an unbalanced panel observed at five year intervals between 1970 and 2010, I find that a sense of individualism, low tolerance for rigid social hierarchies, and to a limited extent intolerance of uncertainty enhance the positive impact of democracy over institutional improvements in the realm of economic freedom, rule of law, absence of corruption, and quality of bureaucracy.