PUBLICATIONS

Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies (with Manuel Foerster). Journal of Public Economics, 2025. Vol. 245, 105354. Pre-print.

Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence. RAND Journal of Economics, accepted.

WORKING PAPERS

Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations (with Nicolás Riquelme). Submitted.

Abstract: A manager chooses whether to acquire information to guide project selection, whereas a worker determines implementation effort. We model diversity as heterogeneous prior beliefs and empowerment as the weight of worker perspectives in project selection. Incentives for information and effort can be strategic complements when the worker reacts to new information. In such cases, greater diversity enhances the manager's incentives if her information is sufficiently precise, with potential indirect benefits on worker effort. For low-quality information, increasing diversity leads to projects 'too far' from the manager's ideal and discourages her from motivating effort. When the worker is not reactive, greater diversity always improves information incentives, but the (direct) effect on effort remains negative. The benefits from diversity are fragile, depending critically on organisational transparency and trust. Under covert information acquisition, benefits disappear because the manager cannot signal commitment to reducing disagreement. Under strategic communication, heterogeneous priors create credibility problems that weaken information incentives, though higher information quality can mitigate these issues.

Authority, Communication, and Internal Markets (with Manuel Foerster). Submitted.

Abstract: We revisit the trade-off between keeping authority and granting decision-making rights to an informed agent. We introduce transfers, allowing the agent to charge a fee for her services, but she may also offer the principal a side payment. The principal's equilibrium contracting decision maximizes the aggregate payoff. In particular, introducing transfers changes the contracting decision from centralization to delegation and improves efficiency if delegation maximizes the aggregate payoff but requires a side payment. We then introduce general delegation mechanisms. We first show that the agent, behaving ex ante like a social planner would do, restricts the discretion of her interim self in equilibrium. We then derive the optimal delegation set and show that delegation is more prevalent but less intense in equilibrium. Our results contribute to the debate over subsidiary governance in multinational corporations, showing how financial intermediation by headquarters can induce the parties to act in the organization's interest.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Incentives to Innovate and Multinational Competition (with Sébastien Mitraille)

Cheap Talk with Moral Hazard (with Nicolás Riquelme)

A Theory of Policy Influence (with Manuel Foerster)

Information Aggregation in Multidimensional Cheap Talk