PUBLICATIONS

Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies (with Manuel Foerster). Journal of Public Economics, 2025. Vol. 245, 105354. Pre-print.

Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence. RAND Journal of Economics, accepted.

WORKING PAPERS

Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations (with Nicolás Riquelme). Submitted.

Abstract: We study how diversity and participatory decision-making affect organizational performance. Our model features a manager who can acquire costly information to guide project selection and a worker responsible for implementation. We model diversity as heterogeneous priors and participatory decision-making as the extent to which the worker’s perspective influences project choice--capturing notions of empowerment and inclusion. We find that higher diversity improves decision-making and implementation when the manager has access to high-quality information and the worker is sufficiently empowered. Indeed, more inclusive organizations have higher chances of experiencing such performance enhancement. We extend the model in two directions. First, when the manager’s acquisition decision is unobservable, diversity no longer improves outcomes, as she cannot signal her commitment to reducing disagreement. Second, we examine strategic communication and characterize the conflict of interest at the messaging stage. While credibility loss weakens the manager’s gains from information, higher informational quality improves communication incentives. Our findings highlight that the “business case for diversity” must involve complementary organizational processes promoting inclusion, transparency, and trust.

Authority, Communication, and Internal Markets (with Manuel Foerster). Submitted.

Abstract: We revisit the trade-off between keeping authority and granting decision-making rights to an informed agent. We introduce transfers, allowing the agent to charge a fee for her services, but she may also offer the principal a side payment. The principal's equilibrium contracting decision maximizes the aggregate payoff. In particular, introducing transfers changes the contracting decision from centralization to delegation and improves efficiency if delegation maximizes the aggregate payoff but requires a side payment. We then introduce general delegation mechanisms. We first show that the agent, behaving ex ante like a social planner would do, restricts the discretion of her interim self in equilibrium. We then derive the optimal delegation set and show that delegation is more prevalent but less intense in equilibrium. Our results contribute to the debate over subsidiary governance in multinational corporations, showing how financial intermediation by headquarters can induce the parties to act in the organization's interest.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Incentives to Innovate and Multinational Competition (with Sébastien Mitraille)

Cheap Talk with Moral Hazard (with Nicolás Riquelme)

A Theory of Policy Influence (with Manuel Foerster)

Information Aggregation in Multidimensional Cheap Talk