The primary aim of my research is to articulate a philosophical account of scientific explanation in cognitive science. A characteristic feature of my work is that it closely analyzes current empirical and modeling work in several cognitive science research areas. Previously, I focused mostly on the areas of embodied and situated cognition, as well as dynamical systems approaches in cognitive science. These days, I am particularly interested in network neuroscience, Bayesian statistical modeling, and cognitive modeling in general.
Although these areas are methodologically diverse and the range of cognitive phenomena being investigated is vast, I believe that they are unified in their attempt to discover and describe mechanisms. This is somewhat controversial, because it is eschews notions of multiple realizability and functional explanation traditionally associated with cognitive science, and instead embraces the reductive tendencies more commonly linked to neuroscience. That said, sciences are messy, and don't usually let themselves be shoe-horned into philosophical frameworks...especially if these frameworks themselves require elaboration.
Therefore, my work attempts to provide a better understanding of scientific explanation in cognitive science, but to also develop a clearer conception of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. What I find particularly intriguing is the role of mathematical analysis in all of this.