Cyril Monnet

Professor of Economics                                                                                                                

University of Bern                                                              Phone:  +41 31 631 4747 
Schanzenheckstr 1                                                              Fax:      +41 31 631 3783
3001 Bern                                                                          cyril.monnet (at) 
Postfach 21, 3115 Gerzensee

  • Rational Opacity (with Erwan Quintin) Review of Financial Studies (forthcoming)
    • We study why some corporations are more opaque than they could be.
  • Limited disclosure and hidden orders in asset markets (with Erwan Quintin) Journal of Financial Economics, 2017
    • The optimal organization of asset markets is characterized by hidden orders of expert investors and limited disclosure from the originators of assets to induce participation of non-experts. 
  • Monetary Emissions Trading Mechanisms (with Ted Temzelides) International Journal of Game Theory, 2016
    • We use insights from dynamic mechanism design in monetary economics to derive properties of 

      optimal dynamic emissions trading mechanisms. 
    • Efficient Contract Enforcement (with Thor Koeppl and Erwan QuintinEconomic Theory, 2014
      • When the choice of institutions is endogenous what is the impact of inequality on the quality of institutions and ultimately on growth. 
    • Endogenous Credit Cycles (with Chao Gu, Fabrizio Mattesini and Randy Wright) Journal of Political Economy, 2013
      • How endogenous credit limit can create exotic and interesting dynamics. 
    • Banking: A new monetarist approach (with Chao Gu, Fabrizio Mattesini and Randy Wright) Review of Economic Studies, 2013
      • A mechanism approach to banking that emphasizes limited commitment.
    • Money Talks (with Marie Hoerova and Ted Temzelides) Economic Letters, 2012
      • We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus, lending credibility. 

    Unpublished papers
    • A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-Use and Repo Intermediation (with Piero Gottardi and Vincent Maurin)
        • We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a “collateral multiplier” effect. Intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders. 

  • Endogenous adverse selection, market discipline, and central bank lending (with Marie Hoerova)
  • What is the role of a central bank when market discipline is effective?
  • Teaching