WBS Workshop on Contract Theory and Organizational Economics (a.k.a. CTWE)

Basic Information

  • This workshop is a part of the research project (EN / JP) of the Institute for Business and Finance (EN / JP), Waseda Business School, organized by Hideshi Itoh. It intends to be informal and accessible to anyone who is interested in the topics irrespective of his/her affiliation. Please send me (my first name dot my last name at alumni d0t stanford dot edu) an e-mail if you are interested in contributing to the workshop by presenting your (however incomplete) work or participating actively in discussion. Presentation may be in English contingent on the audience.
  • When: Usually Fridays.
  • Where: Waseda campus.

2019 Workshop Schedule

  • January 25 (joint with Friday Seminar) :
    • Location: TBD
    • Time: 16:30-18:00

2018 Workshop Schedule

  • December 21 (joint with Friday Seminar):
    • Location: TBD
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
  • December 28: Annual Communication Theory Workshop

2017 Workshop Schedule

  • December 22: Annual Communication Theory Workshop, joint with Waseda Seminar on Game Theory and Experimental Economics (JP)
    • Location: Waseda campus, Bldg 3, 10F, Conference Room 1 (3号館10階第一会議室). See the map (pdf)
    • 15:50-16:50
      • Speaker: Shintaro Miura (Kanagawa U)
      • Title: Value of Mass Media
      • Abstract: Are biased media outlets always harmful to voters? To answer this question, we discuss the value of biased media outlets. The distortion aused by biased outlets is modeled by the manipulated news model, where voters do not directly observe policies chosen by candidates, and then they rely on the news from media outlets. We then compare it with the following two counterfactual models in which voters commit not to observe the news from the outlets, but there are alternative sources providing election-relevant information. The first one is the word-of-mouth model, in which voters obtain “rumors” about the proposed policies from the other voters. The second one is the social media model, in which candidates can send direct but imperfect messages to voters. Our conclusion is that the answer depends on whether the alternative sources can send credible information.
    • 17:00-18:00
      • Speaker: Kohei Kawamura (Waseda U)
      • Title: A Simple Theory of Media Reports (with Mark Le Quement)
      • Abstract: We study a model of endogenously repeated cheap talk in a Markovian environment. In each period, the uninformed party (the receiver, i.e. the public/readers) can consult the informed party (the sender, i.e. the media) at a cost. The sender, who is driven by profits, has an incentive to generate uncertainty in order to encourage future consultation. We find that the accuracy of the sender's reports may decline as the cost of consultation becomes lower. Both the sender and receiver can benefit from a higher cost of consultation, which dampens the sender's responsiveness to uncertainty and allows him to commit to similar likelihood of (re)consultation conditional on different messages, thereby reducing the sender's incentive to misreport.
    • Register by December 13 if you want to join the dinner.

Past Workshop

2012-2017 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2001-2005 (Japanese)