Peirce's Terms

A little addendum to the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms .
Entelechy Two definitions: one from 1889, and one from 1886.

1. From the Century Dictionary (1889):

entelechy (en-tel´e-ki), n. [ L. entelechia, Gr. ’εντελέχεια, actuality, ’εν τέλει ’έχειν, be complete (cf. ’εντελής, complete, full): ’εν, in; dat. of τέλος, end, completion; ’έχειν have, hold, intr. be.] Realization: opposed to power or potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The only difference is that entelechy implies a more perfect realization. The idea of entelechy is connected with that of form, the idea of power with that of matter. Thus, iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made iron must be worked; when this is done, the iron exists in entelechy. The development from being in posse or in germ to entelechy takes place, according to Aristotle, by means of a change, the imperfect action or energy, of which the perfected result is the entelechy. Entelechy is, however, either first or second. First entelechy is being in working order; second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be the first entelechy of the body, which seems to imply that it grows out of the body as its germ; but the idea more insisted upon is that man without the soul would be but a body, while the soul, once developed, is not lost when the man sleeps. Cudworth terms his plastic nature (which see, under nature) a first entelechy, and Leibnitz calls a monad an entelechy.

To express this aspect of the mental functions, Aristotle makes use of the word entelechy. The word is one which explains itself. Frequently, it is true, Aristotle fails to draw any strict line of demarcation between entelechy and energy; but in theory, at least, the two are definitely separated from each other, and enérgeia represents merely a stage on the path toward entelécheia. Entelechy in short is the realization which contains the end of a process: the complete expression of some function—the perfection of some phenomenon, the last stage in that process from potentiality to reality which we have already noticed. Soul then is not only the realization of the body; it is its perfect realization or full development. E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology, p. xlii.
2. From 1886, in Writings 5:404:

ENTELECHY (Gr. entelecheia, word invented by Aristotle, from en telei echon, having attained the end.)

Literally, attainment, realization; opposed to power, potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The idea of entelechy is connected with that of form, the idea of power with that of matter. Iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made iron must be worked. When this is done, the iron exists in entelechy. The passage from power to entelechy takes place by means of change (kinesis). This is the imperfect energy, the perfected energy is the entelechy. First entelechy is being in working order, second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be a first entelechy, that is, a thing precisely like a man in every respect, except that it would not feel, would be a body without a soul; but a soul once infused is not lost whenever the man is asleep. This is the Aristotelian sense, but Cudworth and others have used entelechy and first entelechy somewhat differently. Cudworth calls his plastic nature or vital principle the first entelechy, and Leibniz terms a monad an entelechy.

Fact CP 6.67 (1898): Mill seems to have thoughtlessly or nominalistically assumed that a fact is the very objective history of the universe for a short time, in its objective state of existence in itself. But that is not what a fact is. A fact is an abstracted element of that. A fact is so much of the reality as is represented in a single proposition. If a proposition is true, that which it represents is a fact.
Normal CP 6.327 (c.1909): But, in fact, the ‘normal’ is not the average (or any other kind of mean) of what actually occurs, but of what would, in the long run, occur under certain circumstances. Now what would be, can, it is true, only be learned through observation of what happens to be; but nevertheless no collection of happenings can constitute one trillionth of one per cent of what might be, and would be under supposable conditions; and therefore, though it might conceivably prevent many generations from rightly determining what is normal, it could not affect the true – and ultimately ascertainable (provided there were anybody to ascertain it) – mean and normal; and thus, the result is that no such accident could affect the normal or the true color.
Simple From "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," 1908.

Modern science has been builded after the model of Galileo, who founded it on il lume naturale. That truly inspired prophet had said that, of two hypotheses, the simpler is to be preferred; but I was formerly one of those who, in our dull self-conceit fancying ourselves more sly than he, twisted the maxim to mean the logically simpler, the one that adds the least to what has been observed, in spite of three obvious objections: first, that so there was no support for any hypothesis; secondly, that by the same token we ought to content ourselves with simply formulating the special observations actually made; and thirdly, that every advance of science that further opens the truth to our view discloses a world of unexpected complications. It was not until long experience forced me to realise that subsequent discoveries were every time showing I had been wrong, while those who understood the maxim as Galileo had done, early unlocked the secret, that the scales fell from my eyes and my mind awoke to the broad and flaming daylight that it is the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the reason that unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature's, he has no chance of understanding nature at all. Many tests of this principal and positive fact, relating as well to my own studies as to the researches of others, have confirmed me in this opinion; and when I shall come to set them forth in a book, their array will convince everybody. Oh no! I am forgetting that armour, impenetrable by accurate thought, in which the rank and file of minds are clad! They may, for example, get the notion that my proposition involves a denial of the rigidity of the laws of association: it would be quite on a par with much that is current. I do not mean that logical simplicity is a consideration of no value at all, but only that its value is badly secondary to that of simplicity in the other sense.

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