Central role of uncertainty handling skills
As the world fully enters the information age, it has become clear that the numeracy skills of the last age are not sufficient to meet the needs of individual citizens or of society as a whole because they lack a calculus for reckoning uncertainty. Uncertainty arises because all data about the real world are incomplete and imprecise, and our knowledge of how the world works is imperfect at best. While people are aware of this, few methods for drawing conclusions or making calculations that respect the inherent coarseness of our information are used in practice. Instead, calculations are generally made and decisions taken under tacit assumptions that every detail is known with certainty. Missing and censored data, error, natural variability, and sheer ignorance, so pervasive in real world observations, are routinely replaced in calculations with deterministic point estimates, falsely certain information, and the central tendencies of data distributions. Calculations and decisions made in this way may often be good enough for some purpose, but they can sometimes simply be wrong. Decision makers, from top policy officials to private citizens in their daily lives, are overly credulous, and they make statements with little or no expression or even recognition of doubt, regardless of the actual quality of evidence or reliability of inferences. At the same time, people sometimes exhibit an insensitivity to objectively strong evidence, often predicated by the false notion that all facts are negotiable.
This poorly calibrated skepticism is indubiety, which is the combination of credulousness and insensitivity to evidence, exhibited by professionals and the general public alike, is a direct result of having no ready means for accounting for the actual state of ignorance. It has grown into a serious problem in the information age which is characterized by an unprecedented dependence on the analysis and understanding of complex data at all levels of society. Such data are uncertain to some degree and all purportedly precise estimates are in fact subject to imprecision, error, and a host of other sources of incertitude and variability. Indubiety is a fundamental contributor to imprudent, inefficient, contentious, or counterfactual decisions in virtually all domains of public and private life in the information age. Thus, just as the industrial age required widespread literacy and post-industrial society required widespread numeracy, so competitive and truly democratic societies in the information age will require dubiety.
Uncertainty can be categorized into two primary types: variability and incertitude. Variability (also called randomness, aleatory uncertainty, objective uncertainty, or irreducible uncertainty) arises from natural stochasticity, environmental variation across space or through time, genetic heterogeneity among individuals, and other sources. Incertitude (also called epistemic uncertainty, or subjective uncertainty) arises from incomplete knowledge about the world. Sources of incertitude include measurement uncertainty, small sample sizes, detection limits and data censoring, ignorance about the details of the mechanisms and processes involved, and other imperfections in scientific understanding. Although the terminology and mathematical underpinnings are common to both phenomena, variability and uncertainty are fundamentally different. Incertitude can in principle be reduced by focused empirical effort. Variability can often be better characterized by further specific study, but it is not generally reducible. Incertitude and variability also have profoundly different implications for policy, with the former forcing analysts and decision-makers to confront whether and to what extent we should be “better safe than sorry,” and the latter forcing them to confront whether and to what extent “some will be safe while others will be sorry” (Finkel, 2002).
We need to be able to discern when uncertainty can overwhelm us and drain a conclusion of its justification—and just as importantly—when a conclusion is evident despite uncertainty. Professionals but also citizens generally need to be able to make calculations with imprecise quantities. We must also be able to mix together in calculations quantities with very different precisions, some well characterized and some about which we have very little knowledge. We need ways to track the provenance of information, and to infer how reliable conclusions will be that are based on details with different origins or from different sources. Finally, we also need tools that can check the integrity of those calculations so that we can be confident that their results are sensible. This should include straightforward but often neglected checks such as confirming that the calculations even make sense dimensionally and that the units of numbers conform so that we are not trying to add meters and seconds, or raise a number to the "2 inch" power. It is also important to review dangerously overused assumptions about linearity, independence, stationarity, unbiasedness, equiprobability, and uniformity.
One fundamental need is a bridge between interval analysis and traditional statistics. It is not unfair to say that the last hundred years of statistics has focused almost exclusively on accounting for the implications of small sample sizes. With the advent over the last few decades of remote sensing technologies, robotic and microscale laboratory work, and network-distributed observation collection, the limitations of sample size per se have become less and less important. In many situations, “big data” are now being collected. Sample size is no longer the constraint. But having big data does not mean the uncertainty disappears. Other forms of uncertainty such as mensurational imprecision (i.e., the plus-or-minus part of measurements), data censoring, demographic stochasticity, can sometimes be very important, yet they have not received nearly as much attention in statistics. Likewise, distributions, even though they may be based on very large data sets may still not be normal, or independent of other variables. A bridge between these two disciplines would represent a novel and satisfying approach to calculation with the sort of uncertain numbers that are ubiquitous in real world applications. Until the widespread availability of inexpensive personal digital computers that marked the advent of the information age, calculations of this sort simply could not be conveniently made. Techniques dependent on simplifying assumptions required that important uncertainty be ignored, treated qualitatively, or misspecified. However the time is now right to begin calculating with actual instead of ideal quantities, giving full consideration to the uncertain nature of much of what is known.
In the past, most calculations have been performed by hand and were thus limited to closed form solutions or tractable algorithms. To simply achieve any result at all, researchers were forced to make strong simplifying assumptions. For instance, real world measurements might appear to be distributed similarly to a named probability distribution, for instance Gaussian, therefore calculations are made using the closed form solution for that distribution parameterized by the data. Yet “distributed similarly to” and “distributed precisely as” are very different statements of knowledge. In risk analysis in general, probabilities are the answers, and they....
Indubiety may be fed by culturally induced or socially structured ignorance or doubt created by biased focus, historical revisionism, information suppression or strategic delay, misleading advertising, propaganda, distraction or disinformation campaigns or other unknowledge (Schick) or agnotological (sensu Proctor) mechanisms. Other reasons for indubiety include cognitive inertia, and mechanisms to mitigate cognitive dissonance, learned self-defeating behaviours (what Wells colourfully calls ‘stupidity’), and more general agnoiological (Ferrier) causes unrelated to any mischief making or defect owing to fundamental limits on what can be known. Indubiety seems to also be related to what Asimov calls a ‘cult of ignorance’ born from willful anti-science bias or anti-intellectualism more broadly. It is probably not related to the interesting but esoteric phenomena of dilation (Seidenfeld) or negative information (Horodecki et al.) in which gaining some information can actually reduce one’s aggregate knowledge. Examples of such effects are all technical but can be likened to the situation when hiring employees based on resumes and interviews yields worse decisions than hiring based on resumes alone. ...
Additional topics for discussion
Biological purpose of communication
All writing is fiction or advertising
Hoaxes and scams are nothing new
Cottingley Fairies and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
Yet truth really can be stranger than fiction
Pareidolia
Wishful thinking
Recognizing fakery
Warrants: evidence versus trust and tribe
Exegesis for tracking motives
False flags
Savvy farmers and tinfoil-hat city dwellers
Beautiful websites are considered more trustworthy, especially by the young
Ferson's Quiet Doubt
Europeans ban fake news: Germany has an anti-fake news law, the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) which requires internet platforms with over 2 million users to report and scrub fake news, hate speech and other illicit content. French president Macron will seek legislation to allow the media watchdog agency CSA to combat misinformation on social media sites during elections as a threat to democracy.
Disneyland actors must make up a reality: According to former employees, actors at Disneyland are not allowed to answer a guest's question with "I don't know", which the theme park thinks would spoil the magic. They must make up answers even if they are silly for the sake of the illusion.
Assessing the successes and failures of the UK government response to covid:
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/assessing-englands-response-covid-19-framework
https://www.bmj.com/company/newsroom/uks-response-to-covid-19-too-little-too-late-too-flawed/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7577497/