Topics in Game Theory (FGT 15) - Finnish Doctoral Program in Economics, Spring 2015
Course Syllabus
Lecture Note: Part I, Part II (written by Juuso Välimäki)
Lecture Slides Part I, Part II
Part I: Mechanism Design in a Static Environment
- L1: Course Overview and Baseline Model
- L2: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
- L3: Payoff Equivalence Theorem and Optimal Auction Design
- L4: Correlated Types
- L5: Interdependent Values: Generalized VCG Mechanisms
- L6: Comparison of Mechanisms
- L7: Common Values and Information Aggregation
- L8: Two-Sided Incomplete Information and Double Auctions
- L9: Information Acquisition and Mechanism Design, Competing Mechanisms
- L10: Partially Verifiable Information, Limited Commitments
Part II: Mechanism Design in a Dynamic Environment
- L11: Stochastic Types
- L12: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency
- L13: Sequential Screening
- L14: Arrival of New Information
- L15: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization